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"'The Jewel in British Rail's Crown'. An account of the Closure at 
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By John Sansick. 
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Dept of Sociology, 
University of Durham. 
ABSTRACT OF THESIS. 
In April 1982 British Rail Engineering Limited announced they were closing 
their Wagon Works in Shildon, County Durham. Prior to the closure 
Shildon was very much a single occupational community. The purpose of 
this study is to evaluate the effects of that closure, both as part of a 
specific instance, and as part of the general decline of primary industries 
in the north east of England. 
The main body of the study examines the immediate consequences of the 
closure and how it affected those responsible for administering the 
community of Shildon. This was largely achieved through extensive 
interviewing of the people charged with that responsibility both in Shildon 
and in the surrounding Sedgefield District Council area. 
Subsequent to the closure Shildon Town Council, in conjunction with 
Sedgefield District Council, set up a Development Agency <SASDA- Sedgefield 
and Shildon Development Agency> to try and attract employment to the area. 
An account of the political processes thus involved is the central point of 
the study. In examining how day-to-day events affected policy, both at 
local and national level, an attempt is made to compare the public rhetoric 
of apparent firm resolve with the more private sense of confusion felt by 
all concerned. As the pressure to accept British Rail's compensatory 
package grew so those faced with the responsibility of trying to alleviate 
the consequences of the closure found themselves unwilling partners in an 
elaborate game of bluff and counter-bluff. How this happened, and the 
subsequent developments, are examined in detail. 
British Rail's decision to.close the Works at Shildon was inevitably linked 
to wider issues: how British Rail operates is, for instance, largely 
dependent on the transport policy of successive governments; when a 
closure is announced the trade unions affected have to organise, often at 
short notice, an adequate response; and, finally, when a workforce is made 
redundant what can be done to retrain it for other work? It seemed 
appropriate therefore also to briefly assess. how these considerations 
affected Shildon. 
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PREFACE: "Y'know, I often wonder what it was really all about?" 
This chance comment in a Shildon pub, is, in a very real sense, why I wrote 
this study. It happened during a drink with a Shildon town councillor 
who worked in the town's British Rail Wagon Works- he had worked there 
since 1945, had been a foreman welder, a shop steward, and was then 
inspector of welding. On the 23rd of April 1982 it had been announced 
that the Works were scheduled for closure and we were discussing how the 
town was reacting to the news. The Consett steel works had recently 
been shut down and a similar fate was promised for a number of other 
industries in the north east. Our conversation turned on what this meant 
to the people who had lived and worked in these industries. Two years 
later, December 1985, I remembered this conversation and decided to try and 
discover a little of what it was "really all about." 
I wanted to examine, in as much detail as possible, the events that led up 
to the closure at Shildon. No one can ever know what anything is "really 
all about" because no one has that kind of ability. Sociologists and 
historians interpret evidence by placing discovered facts into some kind of 
structure, but the interpretation always depends on just that-
interpretation. Letting the "facts speak for themselves" doesn't help 
because someone somewhere will no doubt have selected which facts will act 
as spokesman. Such arguments can of course, lead, into a kind of 
cultural cul de sac. If, in the end, nothing can be known what is the 
point of asking questions etc? But there is a point. If we only begin 
to understand a part of how something like a closure happens it will, 
perhaps, help us understand what to do when the next one comes along. If 
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we listen carefully to the people suffering unemployment are we not then 
better equipped to help them? Before we can extrapolate a theoretical 
response from any circumstance we must first make sure we know as much as 
we can about that circumstance. 
constructed my study. 
This was the base point around which I 
Wherever possible I have directly referred to primary sources. I have 
interviewed most of the people who were at the centre of the events 
described. Where I was unable to interview I have stated that my 
observations could not be confirmed. An example of this is in the 
reported conversations of Hector Macmillan- a crucial figure in the 
creation of the Sedgefield and Shildon Development Agency <SASDA). I refer 
not only to his letters, but to transcripts of telephone conversations, 
comments he made at meetings, etc, but the latter could only be confirmed 
by others, not BY HIM, for the simple reason that the unfortunate man died 
in 1985. In some cases I have interviewed individuals over a three year 
period to guage any changes in their attitude. 
In almost every case my interviews were tape-recorded. Some were 
transcribed, but occasionally I worked direct from the tape. I recorded 
the interviews for two reasons; one, to ensure I had a continuous record 
which could be either up-dated or referred to in subsequent interviews, 
and; two, to create a body of evidence that could, if necessary, be used to 
confirm the statements of those interviewed. As some of the comments 
could be regarded as being rather controversial I felt it was wise to have 
a record of what people had actually said. It is interesting to note 
that, given what sometimes emerged in these interviews, in almost every 
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instance the person interviewed agreed to being recorded. 
It was obviously important that the "establishment" figures of the town 
were interviewed- Town Clerk, councillors, vicars, CAB advisors, Works 
management, District Council officers, etc.- and through them I was able to 
develop a workable network of contacts. In addition to these I 
interviewed many people who were unconnected with any established authority 
or held any kind of "position." 
Interviewing people is not always the best way of discovering what they 
think. Many will tell the interviewer what they think the latter wants to 
hear. Some will even set out to distort their response in order to 
register a kind of protest. Most communities seem almost to treasure a 
suspicion of strangers and Shildon was no exception to this- in many ways 
the town seems to be the very personification of this attitude. I was 
quite definitely a stranger- I did not live in the town and had only lived 
in the north east for twenty four years and so was often regarded with some 
caution. At the same time I found many who were eager to "put their 
case" about the closure and all the events that surrounded it. Above all, 
considering that my questions could often seem impertinent, I was always 
met with great kindness and an understanding sympathy of what I was trying 
to do. The study could not have happened without that co-operation. 
A further source, and, in many ways, perhaps the most crucial for the 
sections dealing with the post closure period, was my unlimited access to 
the archives of Shildon Town Council. This included access not only to 
minutes of meetings, but to the more personal correspondence between all 
concerned with the Council's response to the closure. 
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In addition I had 
access to the minutes of Sedegfield District Council meetings. I was 
never refused any request for access to documents. This co-operation from 
Tom Toward <Town Clerk to the Shildon Town Council) and Alan Roberts <Chief 
Executive of Sedgefield District Council) was unstinting and complete and, 
in many ways, reflected their joint concern that the study be as true a 
record as is possible. Their preparedness to allow such access was a 
refreshing recognition, by them, of the need for an open debate on all the 
issues raised. This kind of co-operation can, to the more cynical 
amongst us, indicate an indifference to what might be said, but considering 
what was under scrutiny I cannot believe those responsible were indifferent 
and, therefore, can only thank them for their frankness. 
I was also given access to the more personal records of people living in 
the town. This occasionally enabled me to place the "personal" against 
the "official" version of events. I would, in particular, like to record 
my gratitude to Councillor Walter Nunn, a former inspector of welding in 
the Works, for the opportunity to use his very extensive files- especially 
for the details leading up to the closure. By juxtaposing this material 
alongside the reporting in the local and national newspapers I was able not 
only to describe the circumstances that surrounded events, but also to 
suggest that the "evidence" about those events was often open to many 
interpretations. 
The main body of study is almost solely descriptive. It is designed that 
way because I wanted to explore the daily experiences of people having to 
endure the process we have come to call deindustrialisation. It seemed 
appropriate, therefore, to begin with a few brief observations on what 
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might be meant by that term. Similarly I felt that it was also 
appropriate to end with some comments on:- the role of trade unions in the 
changing industrial pattern; the way successive governments have tried to 
conduct an overall "transport policy"- perhaps NOT conducted one would be 
more accurate; and, finally, some examination of whether training, as 
present offered, will be of much use to the unemployed. 
Others have described the same kinds of situations, but I would contend 
that there will always be a need for such descriptive work. If we are to 
construct any kind of useful theoretical addition to the unemployment 
debate we must constantly take account of the actual experiences of those 
suffering that unemployment. 
I left school in 1949 and for the first fifteen years worked in 
circumstances very similar to those of the people I interviewed. I have 
been a trade unionist for over forty years. During my time as a fireman 
in the London Fire Brigade I helped organise two strikes- not an easy 
exercise given the job- and, as "trainee" shop steward in Surrey Commercial 
Docks, had been involved in a number of industrial disputes. It is 
impossible to say whether this trade union background helped me understand 
the events at Shildon more clearly. I do, however, feel that it did help 
me gain some insight into the personal problems that underlie so many 
industrial disputes. I.strongly believe these private circumstances 
usually determine most of what we do despite our more public behaviour-
that beneath it all we are as Checkov describes - "Going through life in a 
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permanent state of confusion." One translation of Checkov has it as 
"despair", but I think most people in Shildon would be quite happy to 
settle for "confusion." 
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INTRODUCTION: "You know what deindustrialisation means? It means that 
places like Spennymoor get called 'Enterprise City.' Nothing changes, 
except the name. " 
Factory closures often follow, or are part of, a process generally known as 
"deindustrialisation." But what does "deindustrialization" mean? It 
might be useful to first try to briefly define "industry." In recent 
times the word has become almost fashionable; film and television producers 
talk of "The Industry", fashion designers of "Our Industry"; even more 
curiously there is the notion of an "industry of care" as expressed by 
those who attempt to define medicine in market terms. Most, if not all, 
of these recent converts to working in an "industry" would, no doubt, run a 
mile if confronted by one of Blake's satanic mills, so what has changed? 
Has the word become so generalised as to rid it of any specific meaning, or 
is it simply part of the accompanying jargon of "market forces"? 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "industry" in, as always, a number of 
different ways- "systematic work or labour: habitual employment in some 
specific work," etc. Perhaps the Dictionary's definition of 
"industrialism" is more useful- "a system of things arising from or 
involving the rise of great industries; the organisation of industrial 
occupations." 
In the past "great industries" meant something that happened in a factory. 
It was an activity that involved dirt, noise, not a little danger, and 
usually took place in the north. People talked of the "industrial 
north", or "industrial towns" and everyone knew, or thought they did, what 
this meant: Lowryesque figures scuttling back and forth between smoking 
chimneys and streets of small back-to-back houses. 
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It is this type of industry that is generally reckoned to be suffering most 
from "deindustrialisation." It is difficult to determine when the term 
first came into common use. It is fairly certain that when Denis Healey 
<budget speech, April 1975)- said "we must reverse the process of 
deindustrialisation." the term had, by then, become familiar. In 1979 a 
Fabian Research document studied some of the economic circumstances that 
could be associated with deindustrialisation. 
"One of the main reasons (for deindustrialisation) is that growth of 
output per head in manufacturing is higher than in most services, so 
that, over time, as economies grow, even if people demand industry's 
products and services in the same proportions, fewer people will be 
required to produce the industry's products compared with services. 
Therefore a pattern of demand which did not favour services will 
nevertheless lead over time to a services biased employment pattern." 
"A Deindustrialised Britain?" pp 1. Tom Sheriff. 
Sheriff also goes on to mention the tendency for "rich" countries to 
increasingly spend more on services "(education, travel, health, banking, 
etc)" and argues that "a move towards a 'service economy' is somehow 
inevitable in advanced countries". He then connects Britain's particular 
problems of deindustrialisation to a "general economic malaise of the 
British economy". 
The Fabian document offers other definitions and in particular that made by 
the Cambridge school of economics. It quotes an article by Ajit Singh 
<"UK Industry and the World Economy: A case of deindustrialisation?") which 
appeared in the Cambridge Journal of Economics June, 1977. Singh is 
described as arguing that deindustrialisation refers to the: 
"· .. absence of a manufacturing sector which 'currently as well as 
potentially, not only satisfied the demands of consumers at home, but 
is also able to sell enough of its products abroad to pay for the 
nation's import requirements.' He adds that these objectives need 
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to be achieved at 'socially acceptable levels of output, employment 
and exchange rate'." 
Ibid. pp 3-4 
It is generally accepted that a decline in manufacturing began to occur 
shortly after, if not before, the Second World War. To try and 
understand why this happened is not easy. Sheriff argues that the 
constant balance of payments crises of the 1950' and 1960's created the 
circumstances for the decline: 
"The main source of this balance of payments problem is the 
uncompetitive nature of the manufacturing sector, particularly in 
the non price factors, poor design, poor quality, and bad delivery 
of shoddy goods,etc. This meant that neither foreigners nor UK 
residents have wanted British goods <even when they have wanted UK 
goods, supply has not always been forthcoming. ) ... A manufacturing 
sector once inefficient has no chance to recover without a respite 
from continued competition from abroad Other countries have 
increased their competitivness relative to that of the UK as they . 
have expanded faster, have been able to invest in research and 
innovation, attract top personnel and invest in the most up-to-date 
equipment simply because they were confident of an expanding market 
in the future." 
Ibid pp 11-12 
It is perhaps worth remembering here that this Fabian pamphlet was written 
before MarRaret Thatcher became Prime Minster which cannot help but bring 
to mind Al Jolson's comment in the "Jazz Singer"- "You ain't seen nothing 
yet". 
The Fabian piece concludes with a further reference to the Cambridge 
Economic Policy Group's "Economic Policy Review". The Group suggests 
that in the coming decade <1980's) unemployment will approach "the 5 
million mark" <pp 16-1 '1). Sheriff felt this was too pessimistic, but 
unfortunately it was only too accurate. The final recommendations of the 
Fabian document seem now, knowing how the in-coming Government would view 
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its role in industrial change, almost quaint. 
"Services cannot supplant manfacturing as our main exporter ... Policy 
should be guided towards strengthening the manufacturing base in such 
a way that when the North Sea oil is gone, we are not faced with a 
massive balance of payments deficit and an un-competitive exporting 
sector ... Devaluation or import controls are necessary to provide the 
impetus of faster growth to stimulate the investment ... " 
Ibid pp 22 
The Conservative Government took office in the summer of 1979 and soon made 
clear how it intended to remedy Britain's "industrial malaise". It not 
only argued that it was wrong to help industry survive competition, but 
went further and suggested that such help did positive harm. Industry 
must be left to manage alone and without government interference. Only 
then would it become efficient and therefore successful. 
Its economic strategy was based upon the economic theories of the New Right 
economists, the most distinguished of whom was F.A.Hayek. Hayek's 
arguments were that once "governments became involved, economic outcomes 
cease to reflect impersonal market forces and become politicized". 
<"Capitalism Since World War Two" Armstrong, Glyn, and Harrison. pp 403-
404). This economic approach suggested government's only function was to 
preserve law and order and ensure the country was defended, but few 
elective governments would be prepared to go that far. 
The new Government saw inflation as the real enemy of economic stability 
and decided to control this two ways. One was MONETARISM; the control of 
money supply and credit through reducing government deficits, and the other 
SUPPLY SIDE economics; the drastic reducing of taxes which, it was hoped, 
would lead to greater work incentives and the growing investment of the 
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freed income <Armstrong et.al. pp 405). The only problem was how to deal 
with the people who would have to suffer the consequences of such a 
strategy. 
"<The) theories systematically avoid any mention of classes. Thus 
the central fear of the New Right is not the politicisation of the 
decision-making itself, but politicized decisions in which the working 
class has a big say. The worry was not coalitions of any old 
interest groups, but the political power of the labour movement." 
"Capitalism Since World War Two" pp 495 Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison. 1984 
It soon became Government policy to introduce legislation that would 
restrict the power of the unions. At first sight this could have 
appeared electorally risky, but union practice had, in many ways, become 
discredited, not only for the general public, but amongst its members. 
That the Government was reasonably successful in diffusing union power is 
not in question, that it was able to do it so easily is, however, a much 
more important problem, but more of that later. 
As the policies of the Government took hold so unemployment increased. 
"Annual average unemployment rates 1971-1983 
19.71 1974 1977 1980 1983 
3.00 2.52 5.70 7.40 13.10 
OECD, Economic Outlooks <OECD standardised unemployment rates)" 
Increases of this nature can often create dangerous pyschological pressure 
on those most vulnerable to such changes- the people likely to be sacked. 
Trade unions depend, ultimately, on the solidarity of their members and if 
they are weakened by fear for their jobs then getting them to take action 
in defense of those jobs becomes difficult. This nervousness is perhaps 
one explanation of why so many often appear almost acquiescent when faced 
with a threat of a plant closure? People can become all too easily 
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accustomed to the notion that they are victims of a system which is 
unalterable, even unchallengable. It seems fair to say that most of us 
simply want a quiet life- taking industrial action always requires courage. 
Whatever the causes for this rise in unemployment- and there is still no 
absolute consensus as to why world economies suffered so drastic a decline 
in 1970's, apart from blaming the oil crisis<es>- the net result for many 
people was that they saw their job, often of a lifetime, become threatened 
and then vanish. Any examination of the figures for regional unemployment 
makes clear that most of those job losses occured in the north. 
"Regional unemployment levels, 1983 Rates of unemployment % 
South East England (including Greater London> 
East Anglia 
South West England 
West Midlands 
East Midlands 
Yorkshire and Humberside 
North West England 
North England 
Wales 
Scotland 
Northern Ireland 
9.5 
10.6 
11.3 
15.7 
11.7 
14.1 
15.7 
17.3 
16. 1 
15.0 
21.0 
Source: Department of Employment Gazette, April 1984: S26-S29" 
"Unemployment in the UK" pp 28 Jeremy Moon and J.J.Richardson. 1985 
Statistics and descriptions abound as to which jobs were lost, where they 
were lost, and perhaps why. Massey and Meegan <"The Anatomy of Job Loss" 
1982) describe the way changes in job practices and geographical 
redeployment of plant helped increase unemployment in the period. Moon 
and Richardson outline how successive government policies have tried to 
deal with the increasing numbers of workless. Sinfield and Shawler <"The 
Workless State" 1981) attack the notion of the workshy- the idea that the 
unemployed are somehow partially responsible for their condition and argue 
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that lack of investment, not a departure from Keynesian principles, are the 
root cause of much unemployment. Sinfield in another book <"What 
Unemployment Means" 1981) examines the notion that high levels of 
unemployment will, perhaps, always be with us and discusses the 
implications of this and how public attitudes towards the jobless might 
have to change. Dennis Marsden <"Workleso" revised edition 1982) 
describes, thn1Ugh the direct experiences of the unemployed themselves, 
what it means to be without work and goes on to ask for a "social contract" 
to assist greater worker involvement in the decisions affecting their work. 
Giles Merritt <"World out of Work") looks at the global implications of 
high unemployment and how this, in particular, affects the young. All 
these, and many more, recognise that for whatever causes high rates of 
unemployment are likely to remain with us well into the foreseeable future. 
Since these were written the collapse of totalitarian regimes in Eastern 
Europe has created yet another problem. Government policy in these 
economies had often been used to heavily subsidize jobs. This was done 
partly because having people out of work appeared to contradict the 
underlying ideology, but also because, in a sense, having a regular job was 
one of the few perks available in an otherwise fairly deprived society. 
It seems certain that such policies will now become too expensive and the 
practice will end. 
The notion that the right to a job is just that, a right, looks like 
disappearing from most economic strategies. Whether this is a good or bad 
thing is too large an issue to discuss here, but that it will very likely 
happen appears not in doubt. As more and more people everywhere become 
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either permanently unemployed, or subject to long periods of unemployment, 
so the problems of what to do with these people will become more and more 
pressing. 
What should governments do to try and alter this seemingly intractable 
problem? In the past no elective government could ignore high 
unemployment levels for long, but has this changed? Perhaps unemployment 
has become so commonplace it has become just another part of an apparently 
unchanging fact of life? It is a fact, for instance, that the 
Conservative Government has survived the last two elections with high 
levels of unemployment- 1979: unemployment at 5.6% <first elected), and 
rising to 1983: at 12.9%, 1987: at 11.4%. Are we to assume from this 
that a significant number of people have become somehow unconcerned about 
unemployment, or at least unconcerned about someone else's unemployment? 
Even taking into account the recent constituency boundary changes, with its 
consequent bias in favour of the Conservatives, there were still enough 
people throughout the country who voted for an administration that appeared 
indifferent to the unemployment caused by its policies. 
Can a government, any government, in the end do much to prevent job losses? 
Should it try? Two contrasting studies of deindustrialisation in America 
give some indication of the difficulties governments face when dealing 
with any kind of industrial decline. In "Plant Closings: Public or 
Private Choices?" <edited by Richard B.McKenzie) there is a fairly 
straightforward argument that any government interference in the "natural" 
process of industrial investment <and mobUity> would simply lead to high 
levels of subsidy and eventual economic stagnation. 
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"Business mobility- the mirror image of the free play of economic 
forces- is a normal, indeed inevitable, feature of any dynamic and 
growing economy. Nonetheless, particular moves <plant closings, 
relocations, and the like) can and do evoke protests by the 
communities and the workers left behind. These people see themselves 
as somehow wronged, and among the pol i ti_cal remedies they seek are 
restraints by government fiat on business mobility ... In recent years 
Bills that would seriously restrict business mobjity have been 
introduced in the US Congress ... If such measure<s> become federal law 
<they) would substantially increase government intervention in 
business decision making, alter our national economic system in 
fundamental ways, and be, on balance, detrimental to the regional 
and local economies of the country in the bargain " 
"Plant Closures: Public or Private Choices." pp 11-12 
Richard .B.McKenzie 1984 
edited by 
McKenzie argues that freedom of movement is as much in the interest of the 
workers as it is the employers- "the case AGAINST plant-closing 
restrictions is a case FOR workers and FOR the economic revitalisation of 
this country." <pp.309). He is particularly concerned about the way 
legislation might limit a company's financial freedom. 
"Backers of the new restrictive legislation fervently contend that 
firms have a social responsiblity to their workers and to the 
communities in which they exist, a responsibility that extends beyond 
the labor contract and the shutting of the plant's doors. They point 
to the social disruption caused by the plants closing <and ignore the 
good it has done>: the loss of tax base, idle workers and plants, 
impairment of community services because of lower tax revenues, and 
higher taxes imposed on others, because of higher unemployment and 
social welfare expenditures ... Admittedly,plant closings create 
hardships for some people. The important question to ask, however, 
is whether the remedy ... is more damaging to the social and economic 
progress than the disease?" 
Ibid. pp 207-208 
His answer to that question is, somewhat predictably, that it is. He 
suggests that such legislation could, in fact, lead to lower wages through 
being "priced" out of the market. 
"To operate in a financially sound manner under such a law over the 
long run, a company must prepare for the eventual expenditure 
associated with closing: It can establish its own contingency fund 
... the cost will be recovered from wages that would otherwise be 
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paid ... What advocates of restrictions seem to want is protection 
from competition and from the threat of pricing themselves out of the 
market. Consumers and taxpayers should be gravely concerned about 
plant-closing restrictions. As the bill is now written, it hands 
over to the unions the power to price labor out of the market- to turn 
a profitable concern into a losing propositon- and then gives them 
access to the coffers of the federal government for a 'bailout' or 
'buyout'" 
Ibid pp 210-15 
Another contributor to the book <"Reindustrialization Policy: Atari 
Mercantilism?" James C. Miller 111> discuss government intervention in a 
more general way. 
"Any discussion of industrial policy should begin with a recognition 
that we already have one. The issue is what type? For example, 
should the government be more or less involved? Should it be a 
'planner' or a 'catalyst' for market forces? For reasons that will 
soon become clear I am skeptical about government programs to achieve 
industrial growth through special subsidies, protective regulations, 
and grants of monopoly privilege." 
Ibid. pp 222 
Considering the threat to American commercial interests posed by Japan- a 
country apparently determined to do all the things Miller abhors- it is not 
suprising that he finds it necessary to discuss this apparent 
contradiction. 
"According to Brookings Senior Fellow Phillip Trezise, the Japanese 
are spending an 'almost trivial' amount of public funds on special 
subsidies for prospective high-growth industries ... The idea that the 
leadership of US firms is about to be surpassed en masse by Japan is 
dubious at best." 
Ibid. pp 226 
~e are not told what Miller, or his source, Phillip Trezise, regard as a 
"'trivial' amoun~" so therefore cannot judge whether their arguments are 
just, but to suggest that Japan is now not a major competitive threat to 
the US economy seems to be little more than wishful thinking. 
In summary McKenzie <et al) argue that a prosperous economy depends on the 
-20-
free movement of capital and that any restrictions on that movement will 
inevitably lead to an economic decline- "the proposed legislation <on 
severance pay, etc) imposes a disguised 'tax' on US firms ... restrictions on 
plant closings, such as those in the proposed law, ultimately become 
restrictions on plant openings ... plant closing laws will tend to have the 
unexpected consequence of closing some plants that could have remained 
open ... "<pp 311-312) 
He concludes: 
"In summary, the imposition of plant-closing restrictions is an 
economic mistake that a country in the midst of economic distress 
can ill afford to make." 
Ibid. pp 313. 
NcKenzie and his other contributors echo the "market forces" arguments of 
the British Government throughout the 1980's. As will be seen, these 
kinds of arguments were used to justify the closure at Shildon, were used 
to close Consett, to end shipbuilding on the Wear and Tyne (and elsewhere>. 
They were used to decimate the mining industry, the docks of Liverpool and 
London, and to support the idea that industry can only survive if it is 
able to sell its services or goods and that if cannot do this it should go. 
In many ways NcKenzie's book <1984) seems to have been a counterblast to an 
earlier book on closures <"The Deindustrializtion of America: Plant 
Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry." 
Barry Bluestone and Bennet Harrison. 1982). McKenzie often refers 
critically to the Bluestone and Harrison's idea that the economics of 
industry should somehow be made more responsible for what they do. 
The opening chapter of Bluestone and Harrison's book <"Capital 
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vs.Community.") does, in many, ways state the inherent problems implicit in 
applying economic laws to social acts- "At the root of all is the 
fundamental struggle between capital and the community." <pp 19) They 
quote at length from an essay written by John Friedman <"Life Space and 
Economic Space" UCLA, Los Angeles 1981.) What Friedman wrote is, in many 
ways, central to much that was at stake in Shildon and is therefore worth 
quoting in detail. 
•Two geographies together constitute a 'unity of opposites.' I shall 
shall call them LIFE SPACE and ECONOMIC SPACE. Although both are 
necessary for sustenance of modern societies they are inherently in 
conflict with each other. Life space is at once the theatre of life, 
understood in a convivial life, and an expression of it ... Life spaces 
exist at different scales <and) are typically bounded, territorial 
spaces ... Places have names. They constitute political communities. 
In contrast, economic space is abstract and discontinuous, consisting 
primarily of locations, <nodes) and linkages <flows of commodities, 
capital, labor, and information). As an abstract space, it undergoes 
continous change and transformation. Economic space is open and 
unlimited ... indeed its continuous expansion is vital to the 
reproduction of capitalist relations as a whole. Expansion occurs 
ruthlessly ... A capitalist city has no reverence for life. It 
bulldozes over neighbourhoods to make way for business. It abandons 
entire regions because profits are greater somewhere else. Deprived 
of their life spaces, people's lives are reduced to a purely economic 
dimension as workers and consumers- so long, at least, as there is 
work." 
"The Deindustrialization of America." pp 20. Bluestone and Harrison. 
Even allowing for the perhaps slightly romantic tone much that Friedman 
says is directly relevant to any discussion of the social effects on 
communities suffering large scale economic upheaval. It provides an 
interesting contrast to the slightly colder economic arguments of McKenzie 
<et al). 
Bluestone and Harrison write at some length about the impact of closures on 
workers <Chapter Four- pp 49-81>, and much that they describe is familiar 
to the events in Shildon. They also mention how closures can bring a 
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"strange si 1 ver 1 i ni ng ... management" . 
"The swelling ranks of the unemployed creates a reserve of malleable 
workers and even potential strikebreakers. The memory of such drastic 
dislocation can have what labor relations experts call a 'chilling' 
effect on future labor-management negotiations. Surviving firms in 
an area gain the advantage of being able to hire the most highly 
skilled of the dischargees without having to bid them away from former 
jobs." 
Ibid pp 79 
They argue that the "chilling effect" is also often accompaniQd by a 
feeling in the community that the workforce had "brought the problem on 
themselves". 
"researchers <investigating closures in New York state) reported that 
they repeatedly encountered an 'anti-union animus' related to a 
widespread belief in the community that it was 'the local union's 
exorbitant demands' and 'intransigent' position in negotiations 
before the shutdown that caused the closing ... that 'the militant 
stance and strike by the union had caused the closing. In short 
they had got what they deserved.'" 
Ibid pp 80 
It would be difficult to describe the unions at Shildon as militant. If 
anything they were perhaps too accommodating and consequently vulnerable to 
a management desperately seeking ways to cut costs, but some, when seeking 
an explanation for the closure, did try to blame the unions involved. It 
~ 
was"if they needed to simplify the issues around a scapegoat in order to 
understand what had happened. 
Bluestone and Harrison note that any "social contract", however vaguely 
framed, only seems to work during periods of economic growth. That once 
things start to go wrong the "contract" quickly collapses. 
"It is crucial to recognize that whatever the interpretation, both 
the new social contract with organized labor in particular and the 
extension of the social wage in general were predicated on more or 
less continuous growth that in turn depend on the Pax Americana 
in global affairs. As the conditions underlying that growth fell 
apart in the late 1960's and early 1970's, it was inevitable that 
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both the willingness of capital to honor the social contract and the 
ability of the US economy to afford a large and growing social safety 
net would come to an end. And that,of course, is exactly what is 
occurring now." 
Ibid pp 139 
The notion that mobility brings growth <McKenzie, et al> is examined in 
their chapter on "Managerial Capitalism and Economic Crisis." <pp 140-193> 
Here they describe how capital operates when planning a move to another 
location. How it "bribes" the new community. 
•The shifting of capital from inner cities to the suburbs <after 
World War Two) has been accompanied by often surprisingly up-front 
demands by corporate managers ... Elected state and local government 
officials have at best felt helpless before these demands." 
Ibid pp 182-185 
The promising of new business "carrots" to beleaguered authorities in the 
UK is now a familiar pattern, but the author's description of the process 
in the USA is indeed "chilling". 
"The relocation <1979) of the $180m Goodyear plant from Ohio 
to Oklahoma provides a clear illustration of the power an enormous 
corporation can hold over a small town ... At one point the management 
placed ads in newspapers in different communities to 'feel out' the 
availablity of labor although there were no jobs being offered. 
Finally Goodyear solicited bids from six jurisdictions. The 'winner' 
made amazing concessions ... the interstate highway was moved, access 
roads built, a schools jurisdiction annexed so that children of 
Goodyear managers could attend a school run by <their) local 
authority ... " 
Ibid pp 185 
In Detroit General Motors wanted to move its plant into the centre of the 
city. The treasury of Detroit was nearly bankrupt and knew that if it 
disagreed the company would move elsewhere. 
"In this highly uneven poker game the city had the poor hand ... 
therefore the city met the demands of the company almost totally. 
Over four hundred acres were cleared, 3,200 people were forced from 
their homes in what had been one of Detroit's most integrated 
communities, churches were torn down, and 160 community business 
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closed. The city used its power to clear out families and small-
time entrepreneurs and to give a twelve year tax abatement that may 
cost the city as much as $240m in foregone revenues." 
Ibid. 186-187 
Could it happen here? Any study of the "deindustrialisation" in the 
north east will show that it can, and does. Given a different industrial 
history such practices are undertaken with perhaps more subtlety here, but 
the principle remains the same. As will be seen, the bargaining between 
Sedgefield District Council and British Rail Engineering Limited soon came 
to resemble a kind of extended "poker game". 
One result of that "poker game" was the creation of the Sedgefield and 
Shildon Development Agency, <SASDA>. Bluestone and Harrison, often using 
UK examples, examine the notion of such agencies and in particular their 
place in "enterprise zones". They do not seem much impressed with what 
they saw. 
"The other 'quick-fix' policy now being trumpeted by conservatives 
<with suprising support from some liberal politicians) is the 
designation of urban 'enterprise zones': selected areas in which 
business would be encouraged to invest, under conditions of reduced 
incomes and property.taxes." 
Ibid. 225 
They go on to outline how this practice has been "recently imported" into 
the USA. Their main criticism of these zones is that they appear to 
depend on a sort of suspension of disbelief as to the true intentions of 
business practice. 
"The ... proposals are extraordinarily naive about the relationship 
between the management of technological change in the capitalist firm, 
on the one hand, and hiring and plant location policies, on the other 
hand ... As managers introduce new machinery they tend to alter work 
rules about who to hire to perform these jobs ... Indeed there is good 
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ev 
reason to expect that the zones could become havens for a ~ival of 
old-fashioned sweatshops." 
Ibid 228 
Quoting labour costs in similar types of workplaces in the Third World, 
they argue that it will be impossible for the new enterprise zones to 
compete because much that they make can be manufactured more cheaply 
elsewhere. They believe that however much we subsidise wage levels in 
the USA, or UK, we cannot hope to match the wages in places like "Thailand, 
Mauritius, Phillippines, and Haiti". 
This is, of course, true, but it does presuppose that we simply continue to 
manufacture the same types of goods. Bluestone and Harrison seem to be 
arguing that the only real solution is for government to exercise more 
control over large scale industrialisation. That it should regulate 
against the effects of closure rather than try and replace the industry 
altogether. There is much sense in this argument, but the balance between 
that regulation and having a proper understanding of whether what is being 
manufactured is still needed is a slightly more tricky one to achieve. 
Communities must be protected against the often quite arbitrary dictates of 
profit, but if that protection involves keeping a plant operating at an 
increasing loss then everyone, in the end, must suffer. If anyone doubts 
this they need only look to Eastern Europe to see what can happen if that 
balance goes wrong. 
Whether we use the term "deindustrialisation" to explain closure(s) or not 
is unimportant, but that massive change in employment has occu~d is not 
in doubt. What to do about them is less clear. The dilemma of what to 
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do with the communities suffering these changes seems, at times, almost 
intractable. If, in order to protect such communities, we simply 
subsidise uncompetitive industries who will pay for the subsidies? 
Presumably some of the cost could be off-set against the social cost of 
allowing closures, but only some- where does the rest come from? If one 
part of the economy, the "efficient" part, is to be used to underpin those 
parts efficiency cannot reach could not the burden on the former simply 
curb its efficiency to the point where it joins the latter? 
Eastern Europe has given us some idea of what happens when you have a 
totally planned economy. The reunification of Germany, in many ways, 
perfectly illustrates the problems faced throughout the developed world. 
In the FDR we appear to have an economy at its most successful, in the GDR 
an economy which, like its currency, was/is/ in a mess. The solution 
for those in the GDR seemed simple- join the FDR. But was this the 
intention of those.in the GDR who first agitated for reform? Was 
everything in the GDR bad and everything in the FDR good? Maybe a BMW is 
more classy than a Trabant, but in the end they are both only cars and one 
costs a great deal more than the other. Is it possible that in the rush 
to join the FDR much that was good in the GDR could be lost? 
"The GDR was an attempt to create an efficient welfare state which 
flawed itself by its political ineptitude and authoritarianism. On 
the pavement outside the old SED Central Committee building someone 
with gallows sense of humour has written in white paint ... 'The Reds 
are guilty. That's now the fashion. What nonsense. I die laughing' 
The joker is right. The Reds were guilty, but they built something 
which partly worked. Now it is being swallowed up. Goodbye GDR." 
Jonathan Steele "The end of a flawed dream". Weekly Guardian. 
7th Ocotober, 1990. 
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Those from the old GDR now have access to the goodies of a flourishing 
capitalist society, but will they be able to afford them? What will 
happen to the "inefficient" industries in the east? How will the 
communities that worked in those industries feel when, in the name of 
efficiency, they are closed? In a couple of years these people will have 
the unique experience of seeing the two extreme ends of the argument about 
how to run an economy. What is fairly certain is that many in the old 
GDR are now going to become sadly familiar with the less attractive aspects 
of the "market economy"- things like deindustrialisation. 
How this process will end is, to a large extent, unknown. It is 
possible that we are witnessing changes which will eventually totally 
transform our ideas of work? The early days of industrial revolution 
started quietly enough, but once underway it soon grew strong enough to 
utterly change our lives, our landscape, and alter forever our 
understanding of how society would continue. Maybe we are at the 
beginning of a similar period? In the meantime we can only try and 
understand what is directly before us and so perhaps gain some insights of 
how we might prepare for this worrying future. We can learn a little of 
what it is like for those suffering such changes- those, for instance, who 
were living in Shildon when British Rail closed the Wagon Works. 
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CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND. 
"Should your home need toning down rather than living up, you might 
consider buying the very downbeat item which has just won a Johnson 
Wax award for furniture design. It is a low table with a laminate 
finish based on the colours and textures found in decaying industrial 
areas" 
"The Times Diary" 3. 1. 84 
The purpose of this study is to examine the social and economic effects of 
the closure of an industry which is part of a single occupational 
community. 
The community is the town of Shildon. On the 23rd of April 1982 British 
Rail Engineering Limited <BREL) announced that as part of a reorganisation 
procedure they would be closing the Shildon Wagon Works in County Durham. 
Shildon was already recognised by the County Council and District Councils 
as an area with serious long-term problems of economic and social decline 
and had been allocated special County financial incentives to try and 
attract new jobs. 
When the closure was announced:-
-2,600 people were employed in the Works, accounting for over half 
the Town's workforce and 86% of male manufacturing jobs. 
- unemployment in the Bishop Auckland and Shildon area was 19.5% 
<January 1983), and with the closure male unemployment within Shildon would 
rise to 44%. 
-the closure would affect local suppliers and service industries 
with a consequent loss of a further 450 jobs. 
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-the costs of the closure to BREL and local government would be 
approximately £27.1m in the first year. The costs of the second and 
subsequent years would be around £10m if there was no recovery package. 
Cost of the recovery package was estimated at £21.5m. 
The works closed on the 30th June 1984. 
Many communities, towns, cities, and regions have experienced the rapid 
change brought about by the loss of a large industrial base. Steel, 
mining, docks, shipbuilding, all have suffered drastic, if not total, 
decline. Shildon's problems are a smaller version of that pattern and 
the direct experiences of the people there will form the main part of this 
study. They will directly describe what happened to them and so help to 
give expression to a process which has now come to involve millions- how to 
recover from the post-closure shock of losing secure employment. 
Shildon, with a population of around 12,000, is not large. Situated in 
the south west corner of County Durham it sits between the larger towns of 
Bishop Auckland and Darlington, with the new town of Newton Aycliffe close 
by. 
In many ways it is not typical of "decaying industrial areas" in that it 
has retained an appearance of normality. Like many Durham pit villages 
that have seen their mines close, the loss of Shildon's main employer has 
not much changed the look of the place. 
Many towns and villages in the area have quickly reverted to an almost 
rural feel. Their "industry" was never large and often underground or 
tucked in a corner of the town. The sense of the countryside pervades an< 
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it would be difficult to compare these people with what is usually 
understood as a highly industrialised workforce. There is more "peasant" 
here than "proletariat". It is this almost disguised quality of 
deprivation that can easily give a false impression of security. 
Shildon grew alongside the development of the railway. It was almost 
inevitable that any man born there would work in the Wagon Works There 
were pits, four at one time, but they came and went whilst the Wagon Works 
remained. Getting a job usually depended on a father to son relationship 
much as work in the docks, and market porters in London's East End 
operated. It was a kind of unofficial "closed shop" which naturally bred 
resentment amongst those not chosen. But for those successful in joining 
the "Works" once in "you were set, your problem's over". 
This relatively secure pattern brought with it a degree of complacency. A 
kind of patronage developed as the unions involved determined who would, 
or, more importantly, who would not be employed. Sacking was rare and 
"slackers" were usually carried by their fellow workers; it would be 
resented, but was easier and avoided fuss. 
Nearly all of the workforce lived locally and tended to use the "Works" as 
much as a social point of contact as place of work. Everyone knew each 
other, where they lived, who they had married and why. This is not 
unusual and a similar pattern can be seen in mill towns, pit villages, etc, 
but the peculiar nature of Shildon was that it was a railway town in an 
area that was predominately mining. The workforce did not share an 
occupation with the surrounding area and consequently became, in how it 
defined its working practices, somewhat separate from that area. 
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There 
was little shared experience with the working people of neighbouring towns. 
Darlington, some ten miles distant, had a railway workshop complex, but for 
the building of locomotives not wagons. 
"It were always an inward looking town. Kept itself to itself 
like. You could walk to work in the morning and see everyone you 
knew, wave at them across the road. You knew all about each 
other. That were a good thing like, but it could be bad as 
well. Looking back you felt you knew where you were. Or 
thought you did." 
Retired foreman in the Works 
This suspicion of outsiders meant that innovation, if not generated 
internally, was resisted. When, in the 1970's, BREL laid off men from its 
Darlington works and they came to Shildon they were regarded as 
"interlopers, not good workers, pushy". This sense of separateness, 
almost small town self-satisfaction, was to create considerable problems 
when closure of the works became likely. 
Insularity is not the peculiar reserve of Shildon. Most districts have 
their patterns, their commonly accepted "characters", participants in the 
routine of the place, but what makes Shildon so especially interesting is 
the almost perverse pride in being insular. 
"People rarely leave, and if they do, they come back. I have 
baptism requests for children, or grandchildren who live in,say 
Doncaster <some townspeople went to the BREL works in Doncaster 
after the closure) and they'll say 'We're coming back to live 
in Shildon you see, in about eighteen months.' They have work 
there, but are PLANNING <my emphasis) to come back because they 
are unhappy being away from the town ... This sense of community 
is, of course, a strength, but I feel here, in this town the 
degree of fear, or resentment of the outside is something that is 
a 1i ttle worrying." 
Vicar in Shildon 
This distrust of anything outside the community has many causes. One is 
the dependency by the community on one employer. The collapse of the 
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inland mining industry in County Durham meant that the people affected were 
nearly all victims of many lifetimes of dependency an one employer. They 
had grumbled and protested against their working conditions, but they 
almost always remained. They rarely left the area they were barn in and 
sa had became trapped in an atmosphere of insularity. In many ways the 
miner was nat dissimilar from the farmwarker in that he was nat only tied 
to his work by who awned his home, but also by a tradition of immobility. 
What is true of the minewarker is even mare true far the workforce in 
Shildan. At least with mine work there was a degree of travel from pit to 
pit during slack periods, in Shildan this was nat necessary. 
The large urban working papulation has a style of its awn. It "survives" 
because it is surrounded by change, it has grown through change. This is 
nat to say that the closure of say, the steel works in Sheffield, or the 
collapse of the Part of Landon did nat bring great hardship. But the 
capacity to "came back" in those communities is likely to be greater than 
would be found in the mare rural areas of unemployment. The sheer scope 
far different employment in large cities means that people living there 
will usually adapt to changed circumstances faster. They may have to 
submit to many forms of exploitation- lower pay, worse working conditions, 
etc, but they will begin that process of adaption which is essential for 
their future. Far communities like Shildon, this ability to manouevre, to 
read the bad signs and make plans, was- and for some in the town still is-
lacking. 
I've got lads on training schemes who have never been out of 
Shildan. In their twenties. They don't know how to use a 
telephone and these are men! Never been on a train. 
Xanager of a Training Agency in Shildon. 
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Whether Shildon was picked off by British Rail as an easy target for cost 
cutting is not sure. There seemed little commercial sense for its closure 
and it was one of the few BREL works making a profit. It had plenty of 
orders on i t· 1S books and a skilled workforce to fulfill those orders. 
Perhaps its was selected for closure BECAUSE of its vulnerability? It 
could be trimmed more easily in a climate of cost saving exercises 
irrespective of whether that decision made economic sense or not. 
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TOWN. A disproportionate number of people 
interviewed for this study expressed an opinion that the people of Shildon 
seemed curiously "different" from other people in the area. This puzzling 
quality of "separateness" was referred to time and time again by those 
professionals whose job it is to advise, counsel, and administer the town 
and surrounding area. Whether these observations were fair or not is 
almost impossible to decide, but in trying to account for them it might be 
useful here to briefly outline how Shildon developed. <For much of the 
local detail that follows I am grateful to the various publications of the 
Shildon Local History group and to "Timothy Hackworth and the locomotive" 
by Robert Young 
The town forms part of the valley of the river Wear. The river runs south 
west from Durham City until it reaches Bishop Auckland and then turns west. 
Shildon, two miles south of Bishop Auckland, is thus at the beginning of 
Weardale. 
It is shielded from the valley to the west by a low ridge of hills, later 
known as the Brusselton/Etherley incline. These hills protected the town 
and probably gave it its first name- the Anglo Saxon combination 
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of'sceld' <or 'scyld') and 'dun'; the former meaning shield, refuge, or 
protective place and the latter denoting a hill. There are various 
references to the town; 1214 "Sciluedon", 1291 Schilvedon", 1363 "Shylden" 
and allowing the vagaries of medieval spelling it seems fairly certain tha1 
Shildon was always known as such. 
Bishop Auckland is the official residence of the Bishops of Durham and it 
is not therefore suprising to find that Shildon formed part of church land. 
During the Anglo-Saxon period Danish raiding parties occasionally used 
Shackleton Hill, just above the Town, as a base camp. The Bishops 
requested protection from these raiders from the Earls of Northumberland, 
but their lordships simply took the land themselves. It was returned to 
the Church by King Canute and remained its property until the Dissolution. 
Farming and later coal mining formed the main economic base for the Town 
and area. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Town 
changed little and still only had a population of 101 in 1800. Some 
weaving of tammies, linen and cotton, was developed by women and children 
and sold in Darlington market. 
The growth of industry in the mid eighteenth century put increasing 
pressure on the road system and schemes were suggested to make roads pay. 
One solution was road tolls and the avoidance of these became an art. 
Shildon formed part of one such diversion with mule trains carrying coal 
from the West Auckland coalfield using the Town to avoid Turnpike road. 
In the 18th century transport costs meant that coal was expensive and ways 
were constantly sought to make the use of coal more economic. The 
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nationwide canal mania was one response and a number of projected canals in 
the north east were to include the Town. But despite numerous surveys, 
public subscriptions, and schemes the use of canals did not appeal. This 
was mainly because the hilly nature of the ground meant that the cost of a 
canal would be prohibitive. Yet there still remained the problem of how 
to efficiently transport coal from the west Durham Coalfields to the north 
east coast and thence to the industrial and commercial centres? 
On the 18th of September 1810 a celebratory dinner was held in the Stockton 
Town Hlill to mark the completion of a "cut" to reduce the distance of 
navigation on the Tees by two and half miles. The dinner developed into a 
public meeting and a committee was formed to study the practicability of 
building a canal, or railway, from Stockton, through Darlington to 
Winston. Yet another survey was done and to everyone's shock the cost 
was estimated at over £200,000. The idea was abandoned, but from it grew 
the idea of COMBINING a railway with a canal. 
It was argued that the cost of constructing a railway would be a third 
that of a canal. Maintenance for a railway would cost less and 
consequently profits would be greater. A railway could also be built much 
more quickly than a canal. As the idea of a mixed system grew so 
subscriptions began to increase. On April 5th 1819, a Railway Bill was 
passed and the project moved closer to becoming a fact. After various set-
backs and alterations, however, the idea of a combined canal/railway was 
dropped in favour of just a railway. On May 12th 1821 the Stockton and 
Darlington Railway Company was formed. The Company acquired two rooms at 
number 9 High Row in Darlington and planned their railway. 
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Railway systems at this time were horsedrawn and the idea of using a 
locomotive for power was not considered. This, however, was to change 
when the Stockton and Darlington Railway Company approached George 
Stephenson for advice. Stephenson had established a reputation of being 
an able surveyor and had constructed a number of stationary engines for 
Tyneside collieries. 
In September 1821 Stephenson, assisted by John Dixon, was commissioned to 
survey the line. On January 18th 1822 he reported that the route was 
feasible and was appointed Engineer of the line at a fixed salary of £660. 
Stephenson now needed to convince the directors of the Company that 
traction by lomocotion was better than horse. After initial misgivings 
amongst the Board he finally persuaded them that the idea was at least 
worth expoloring and they agreed to try his locomotive "Locomotion" in 
trials on the line. 
After many set-backs and modifications the line was completed. The hill 
between Shildon and ~est Auckland, <the Brusselton /Etherley incline), was 
overcome by the installation of two stationary engines for hauling the 
wagons over the incline. "Locomotion" arrived from Stephenson's Newcastle 
works and all was ready for the opening celebrations. So it was that on 
27th September the first locomotive drawn train left Shildon for Darlington 
and Stockton. 
This first day was not without problems. The haulage up Brusselton was 
delayed when the rope kept snapping. The whole wagon train, preceded by a 
horseman, came to continual halts as various mechanical difficulties made 
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further progress dangerous- at one point the wagon carrying the surveyors 
and engineers developed axle trouble, left the rails and had to be 
uncoupled and left behind. But by the afternoon, speeding at times at 
fifteen miles per hour, the train had made its first journey. 
Stephenson had proved his ideas, up to a point. His "Locomotion" had 
completed the journey, but only just. As the months went by more and 
more difficulties made the further use of locomotive power seem doubtful. 
One engine, nicknamed "The Maniac", was so unreliable that it would often 
start of its own accord and run amok- eventually it was thought to be too 
dangerous and was destroyed. Constant breakdowns began to eat into the 
profits of the Company and it began to seriously consider returning to 
horse drawn wagons. This it would undoubtedly have done, but for one man-
Timothy Hackworth. 
In many ways Timothy Hackworth can be seen as the founder of present day 
Shildon. He was a well-known Tyneside engineer and inventor when 
Stephenson persuaded him to come to Shildon and become Resident Engineer to 
the Company. He had been Guard on that first run of the railway and had 
gone on to complete most of the innovations and adaptions that kept the 
railway running. During this time he had, in his spare time, developed 
his own locomotive, "The George". This was an improvement of Stephenson's 
design having six wheels, better boiler system, and all-around greater 
reliability. Hackworth came to the beleagured Stephenson and offered to 
use his "George" on the line. The offer was accepted and "The George" 
rapidly proved to the Company the viability of locomotive traction. 
Hackworth's invention had saved the project from failure and had thus 
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helped start what was rapidly to become the main transport of the 
nineteenth century- the locomotive. 
The success of this initial project meant that the growth of similar 
systems would be rapid. The next big project was for a railway between 
Manchester and Liverpool and a trial was held to select the most suitable 
locomotive. These Rainhill Trials excited people's imagination and the 
competing engineers knew much depended on success before this national 
audience. Stephenson's "Rocket" won the trials, but Hackworth's "Sans 
Pareil" had been thought by many to be the better locomotive. During the 
Trials Hackworth's locomotive suffered a crucial boiler failure- a boiler 
made at Stephenson's works and cause for much speculation and rumour- and 
this meant that Hackworth had to drop out of the Trials. Stephenson's 
fame was assured and Hackworth left behind. 
Hackworth returned to Shildon and remained an employee of the Stockton and 
Darlington railway whilst also developing and selling his own locomotives. 
Shortly after his return from Rainhill he received an order for a locmotive 
from the Russian Tzar. 
get his machine there? 
The order was straighforward enough, but how to 
Eventually he placed his sixteen year old son, 
John Wesley Hackworth, in charge and drivers and mechanics set out by ship, 
wagon, and sledge to make the journey. The Tzar had ordered a short 
railway line to be built which would connect one palace to its neighbour. 
On arrival the young Hackworth remembered watching as Orthodox priests 
"clinging periously to the engine blessed the whole enterprise as it 
trundled through the snow''. 
In 1835 Hackworth resigned from the Stockton and Darlington Company and 
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was soon exporting his own locomotives around the world. He had not 
achieved the fame of Stephenson, but his reputation for sound engineerinR 
enabled him to profit from much that followed as rail transport rapidly 
grew. His engineering skills, however, were not matched by a business 
sense and after his death in 1850 his company suffered a serious decline 
only to recover when it passed into other hands. 
By 1845 a kind of railway "mania" had developed and railways were soon 
running through almost every small town in the country. As the railways 
grew so did Shildon. The "Works" BECAME the Town and much followed from 
that tight interdependency. 
One important influence on the town's development arose from the fact that 
Hackworth's reputation as a Methodist lay-preacher was almost equal to his 
reputation as an engineer. He founded a number of chapels and made sure 
his workforce attended. Thus the chapel and the works became part of the 
twin controlling elements of Shildon. People came to identify work and 
community as something synonymous. They were, as it were, trapped, 
albeit in perhaps a relatively safe trap, but trapped nonetheless in a 
pattern of dependency quite different from those living elsewhere in the 
north east. This identification of town WITH work would literally create 
in them a belief that their town would be the determinant of everything 
they would know. 
This particular form of religious based paternalism was not, of course, 
uncommon in 19th century Britain, but the dependency it engendered varied 
depending on the industry, the location, and how important each was in 
determining people's appreciation of their lives. A large industrial city 
-40-
might have a more radical workforce, but this might not perhaps be because 
they are, in some way, more prone to question, but simply because their 
very numbers gave them some security. Similarily if many people share 
the experience of an industry, but are spread across the countryside 
<e.g.mining), this does not mean they will not be aware of some self-
identification with the interests or problems of people not their 
neighbours- they have a common cause in the experiences of their work. 
For the people of Shildon much of this does not apply. They developed in 
a corner of County Durham in a manner that was, in many ways, quite removed 
from what was happenning elsewhere in the County. 
It is perhaps ironic that the very industry that was to "liberate" many 
working people should be Shildon's trap. 
"Of the working men, at least in the more advanced countries of Europe, 
it may be pronounced certain, that the patriarchal or paternal system 
of government is one to which they will not be again subject ... when 
railways enabled working men to shift from place to place and 
change their patrons and employers as easily as their coats; when 
they were encouraged to seek a share in the government by means of the 
electoral franchise. The working classes have taken their interests 
into their own hands, and are perpetually showing that they think the 
interests of their employers not identical with their own, but opposite 
to them." 
~The Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes" from "The Principles of 
Political Economy" 1852 John Stuart :Mill 
There is much of what Mill says that is still to happen, but it does seem 
reasonable to suggest that some of what he prophesied came true. The 
changes wrought by greater industrialisation did mean that working people 
could begin to take their "interests into their own hands"- certainly, at 
least, there was some improvement on what had gone before. Yet as a 
gradual awareness of that potential strength coalesced around trade · 
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unionism, the pursuit of direct political power, etc,.so the working people 
of Shildon, it seems, took the interests of their EMPLOYER as the 
determinant of how they should live their lives. The paternalism that 
lay at the heart of Hackworth's works had, it appears, perhaps laid the 
seeds of the town's acquiescent nature- they identified their interests and 
those of their employers as being the same. 
The growth of railways allowed an expansion of commerce on a scale never 
before experienced. 
Cannot it be said that there is a limit, a ceiling which restricts 
all human life, containing it with a frontier of varying outline, 
one which is hard to reach and even harder to cross. This border, 
which in every age, even our own, separates the possible from the 
impossible, what can be done with little effort from what cannot 
be done at all. In the past the borderline was imposed by 
inadequate food supplies, a population that was too big or too small 
for its resources, low productivity of labour, and the as yet slow 
progress in controlling nature. Between the fifteenth and the 
eighteenth centuries, these constraints hardly changed at all. 
It is worth insisting on this slow progress, this inertia. 
"The Structures of Everyday Life." pp 27 Fernand Braudel 
Braudel goes on to suggest that these pre-industrial limitations only end 
"about 1830" with the development of improved roads and railways. He 
argues that it is "only when overland transport became commonplace ... that 
the limits of the possible were actually achieved". 
"And this is not the only area in which backwardness persisted. 
In the end, the only real change, innovation and revolution along 
the borderline between possible and the impossible came with the 
nineteenth century and the changed face of the world" 
Ibid pp 27 
The events that surrounded the opening of the Stockton and Darlington 
railway were part of that change and Shildon a point of contact between 
what had been "impossible" and had now been made "possible". 
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In the years that followed these momentous changes there were to be many 
Shildons as there were to be many Hackworths, but it was a fact that 
invention had been a reason for the town. Its growth would go side by 
side with extraordinary events. 
It has been necessary to stress Shildon's industrial origins in order to 
try and establish an understanding of how the town sees its own history, 
its own development. There is always great debate as to which moment, 
which invention, which insight, will alter our lives. Towns and cities 
across the world spend much effort and money laying claim to various 
moments when they were special- when they mattered. It is part of human 
nature to desire prominence, to be in some way special, and this is never 
e. 
more noticable than when the claimant(s) feels vunerable- perhaps in some 
)\ 
way inferior. 
Whether a community can experience a kind of collective inferiority complex 
is unsure, but it does seem possible for a community to have a collective 
sense of its identity- why else fear outsiders if not because they are new 
to that identity? 
This "collective identity" will often depend upon a number of myths and 
misunderstandings about its past. The past is constantly being subjected 
to the prejudiced interpretation of the present, but this does not 
necessarily invalidate the conclusions made. We all believe many kinds 
of things for all manner of reasons. So what may sustain a community 
might be its idea that it is "special"; whether it is or not is, to a large 
extent, irrelevant. 
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"Sociologically, then, a generation is that span of time within which 
identity is assembled on the basis of an unchanged system of meanings 
and possibilities. A sociological generation can thus encompass 
many biological generations. We are told there were fourteen 
generations from the time of King David to the Babylonian Captivity, 
but there was only a single sociological generation. The example is 
apt because it brings out the importance of great historical events 
and experiences in the making of sociological generations." 
"Historical Sociology" pp 256 Philip Abrams 
Shildon has experienced many generations since Hackworth built his 
workshops, but the sociological generation might be seen to extend from 
Hackworth to the post-war <1945), perhaps even to the time of the closure 
of the Works? Much changed in that one hundred and sixty years, but how 
much that change altered people's understanding of what Shildon was for is 
less sure. Many interviewed for this study.felt the change to be almost 
minimal and that is why the closure proved so traumatic for all involved. 
What is being claimed is that Shildon is "different" from communities it 
might otherwise resemble. Trying to account for that difference is one 
of the purposes of this study. In so doing caution will have to be 
exercised because what is being attempted is the placing of an historical 
framework against present day behaviour. The collective consciousness 
that might affect behaviour has to start somewhere and where better than in 
trying to understand <or forget) the past. 
It is certainly desirable that we have a greater-
... understanding <of) historical change as a process embedded in the 
coming together of personal and social time, and conversely of 
understanding the typical identities of social generations as 
historical creations. 
Of course, to get this far is only a beginning. All sorts of problems 
remain. For example, the translation of historical experience into 
new meanings and new patterns of identity does nat have to be a 
dramatic response to single, momentous events. It can also be achieved 
gradually by way of a slaw accretion of quite mundane experiences. In 
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such circumstances the cut-off points between generations tend to 
remain obscure; one can see that given time a new identity type has 
established, but cannot fix the point at which its establishment began" 
Ibid pp 259-260. 
There are many in Shildon who know nothing of its past. People often 
remain in the present because that is all they have time for; they are too 
busy with now to wonder, for long, about causes. They accept the present 
because it seems to make a kind of sense and to conceptualise "the past" is 
not interesting to them. It is possible, however, that they will place 
the restraints on their community within an historical context because, for 
them perhaps, that is where the "them" who alter and control their lives 
began and continue. They are aware that what happened in the past 
matters, but do not believe it important TO THEM to necessarily understand 
it. Whether this is a wise attitude or not is not the concern of this 
study, but it will argue that much of what happens in Shildon is rooted 
firmly in its past and that the understanding of why that is so might 
perhaps help understand its future. 
-45-
CHAPTER TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BREL WORKS 1825-1984 
"When they ripped up the railway lines to the Works 
it must have been a trauma for the Town. It was the 
cutting of their umbilical cord with the rest of the 
world." 
Tom Toward, Shildon Town Clerk. 
The BREL Shildon Wagon Works started with a small workforce. 
"Only about 50 persons <were) employed in the works, and few of them 
skilled, with no tools except hand lathes .. ,no means of raising 
heavy parts, but the screwjack of old fashioned make. Boiler and 
cylinder, mine old friends tell me, were got from Newcastle" 
Bishop Auckland Herald 3.9.1863 
And the conditions hard. 
"Many a night I was told Mr Hackworth was at work on an engine 
by the flickering light of a candle, in weather frosty enough 
to freeze the tallow as it began to run down the candle sides. 
So work was done in those days and its lasting character is no mean 
tribute to those who persevered in it with so few appliances and 
under so many discouragements." 
In the same article John Dixon, the Company's engineer was reported 
describing what he remembered of the Work's beginnings. 
"I have known Shildon for fifty years when there was not a house 
of any sort at New Shildon, much less a Mechanics Institute <the 
article was a report of a speech given at this Institute to 
celebrate the opening of the S & D railway>. When I surveyed 
the lines of the projected railway in 1821, the site of this New 
Shildon Works was a wet, swampy field- a likely place to find a 
snipe, or a flock of peewits. Dan Adamson's was the nearest house. 
A part of Old Shildon existed, but 'Chapel Row', a row of miner's 
houses, was unbuilt or unthought of." 
The Works were built simultaneously with the opening of the railway. 
The buildings, described by a contemporary as "like narrow barns" were 
begun in the autumn of 1825. They comprised of a blacksmiths shop, a 
joiners shop, and an engine shed- the latter large enough to hold two small 
engines. The Committee, reluctant to risk capital, left the engine shed, 
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for its first few months at least, without a roof. Timothy Hackworth took 
possession of these somewhat primitive surroundings in the June of 1825. 
His salary was fixed at £550 per annum. 
The eventual success of the railway line meant an inevitable expansion of 
the Works. The S & D rail line was doubled (1831) and in the following 
year extensive new building for the Works completed. In the same year 
twelve new engines were added to the rolling stock, all built at Shildon. 
By 1833 Hackworth had virtually become manager of the Works and it seems 
probable that it was his very success that now prompted him to reassess his 
conditions of employment. He felt the need to expand even further and 
have the capacity to manufacture stock for other companies as well as the 
S & D. The Company agreed and following an evaluation of the Works 
Hackworth took over all responsibity for the plant and site with the 
Company retaining a 5% annual interest. 
Hackworth was to provide and maintain in good condition all the necessary 
"locomotive power, to find all workmen and material, including fuel and 
lubrication for rolling stock, "while the Company undertook to take back 
all stock on conclusion of the contract following a second valuation. It 
was, in effect, a management "buyout" of a going concern. This new 
arrangement came into force towards the end of 1833 and gave Hackworth 
complete independence with regards his business. 
By 1840 the old buildings, unsuitable for further use were abandoned and a 
new Works constructed nearby. In 1840 Hackworth resigned from the S & D 
Company and formed his own company- The Shildon Works Company. In 1848 
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a new running shed was proposed "for 6 to 8 engines, with proper coke 
depots, furnace and sand drying place, with water laid on" and a plan of 
the works <1849) shows these developments in place. 
As the Works developed so houses were built for the workmen, the resulting 
township being known as New Shildon. The steady growth of the Town was 
to continue, like most other towns in the north, alongside the development 
of the industry that had given it its original purpose. 
Hackworth died in 1850 and control of the Works passed to a Board of 
Management of the S & D. In 1857 the directors, feeling that Shildon was 
no longer convenient to the main rail network, decided to move their 
contract for locomotives to a new site in Darlington. From this time on 
the Shildon Works was to be responsible for the building of wagons; its 
days as a manufacturer of locomotives were over. 
THE NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY. 
In 1863 the S & D Company amalgamated with the North Eastern Railway 
Company. This effectively meant that the Shildon Works would have, if 
not a new employer at least a new contractor so powerful as to make any 
decision by the Company binding on its subsidiaries. 
Whether this larger employer meant any deterioration of relationship 
between employer and employee is not sure, but it is a fact that the first 
dispute at the Works took place within two years of the amalagmation. On 
the 8th of June 1865 a petition for a 2s increase in waRes was delivered to 
Mr Dixon, the works manager. If the Company failed to aRree work would 
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cease on the 1st July. Although a rise was eventually agreed the 
conditions in the Works remained harsh. 
Some felt that once locomotive building was moved to Darlington the Shildon 
Works would decline and probably eventually vanish, but work continued and 
by the 1880's as many as 700 men were repairing wagons on an average weekly 
wage of £1.6s.2 3/4p. 
A description of the Works at this time appeared in the Bishop Auckland 
Herald <Mr John Dixon describing his early days at Works-3rd October 1863) 
"There are traces of engines in the air, traces as distinct on the 
walls as the handwriting of old; traces in the smell of oil and 
grease, traces in the enginey-looking men of greasy jackets, with 
waste-bulged pockets. For Shildon is girt about with a gridiron 
of lines and the route to the works, stations and streets is by way 
around and over rails. Go into which street you will, all seem to 
converge to the line. The male adults seem all either enginemen, 
"works" men, or colliers. The engine penetrates everywhere. 
Pictures of its improvers are on the walls of the public buildings 
pictures of novel engines are the ornaments on office walls, and I 
doubt not that "Puffing Billy's" photograph hangs on the walls of 
many a cottage!" 
... Many have grown old and grey in the service of the S & D which 
is to them the be-all and end-all of railways, and the directors 
and engineering officials of which have in Shildon the PATRIARCHIAL 
AUTHORITY OF FEUDAL CHIEFTAINS. <My emphasis) ... In the course of 
service so long they became, as it were, part of the system -and a 
parcel of "the section". 
By the turn of the century Shildon works was flourishing and in 1897 the 
NER extended the Works site to incorporate a forge, sawmillls, a new paint 
shop and larger offices for the staff. The site now employed over 500 
men. 
In 1923 a grouping of railway companies occurred and control of the NER 
went to the London and North Eastern Railway Company <LNER). The LNER 
remained in control of Shildon until nationalisation on the 1st January 
1948. 
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In 1963 the British Railway Workshops Division was formed, with 
headquarters in Derby. During this re-organisation a certain degree of 
"rationalisation" took place, but Shildon escaped closure and was instead 
modernised at a cost of £800,000. This investment continued in 1965 when 
new machinery and plant were installed. 
"The million pound reorganisation plans for the BREL workshops at 
Shildon, the largest employer in the area, are making excellent 
progress and many proposed innovations are now operating ... 
Coinciding with this development, but not necessitating it, is 
the building of the a brand new 32-ton galvanised body full automatic 
coal wagon at the works. " 
The Northern Despatch 19.11.65 
It seems to be a curious fact of life that whenever large scale 
modernisation takes place somewhere it is often shortly followed by threats 
of closure. So common is this practice that some people become quite 
fearful when they learn that their workplace is "to be improved". Shildon 
did not escape from this odd practice. 
"200 RAILWAYMEN TO LOSE THEIR JOBS. 
More than 200 railway workers in the the Darlington, Shildon and 
Northallerton area will lose their jobs if BR's plan to streamline 
its freight service goes through ... 
The possible cuts were this afternoon described as a 'slashing blow' 
by Mr Webster, secretary of the Bishop Auckland branch of the NUR ... 
A BR spokesman at Newcastle said today that the scheme would close 
the marshalling yards and the footplatemen' s depot at Shildon." 
The Northern Despatch 20.6.1968 
On the 1st of January 1970 British Rail Engineering Limited <BREL) was 
formed and Shildon Works, along with thirteen other works, became 
controlled by a subsidiary board of directors with its own managing 
director. New managements, like "improvements", can also bring their own 
peculiar anxieties and by 1972 Shildon's future was again being threatened. 
"Shildon Wagon Works will not be closing- at least in the 'FORSEEABLE 
FUTURE' <my emphasis). This assurance was given to the Great 
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Aycliffe parish council last night by the Dept of Environment. The 
Council had heard of the possibility of a shutdown. While discussing 
a rail halt for Newton Aycliffe councillors said they wanted to make 
sure the Works would not be closing as most of the passengers using 
any halt would be travelling to the Shildon Works. The DOE said 
in reply that the two major works in the country were Ashford and 
Shildon. If either had to be closed, it would be the Ashford Works 
and Shildon kept going. Mr Richard Marsh <Chairman of BR> , who was 
also asked about the future of Shildon Works, agreed that BR had no 
plans in moving out of Shildon." 
Northern Echo 24.2.72 
In 1973 another modernisation and rationalisation took place when the Drop 
Forging facilities were improved at a cost of t280,00~. Shildon was now 
the largest wagon works in BREL with extensive contracts from both home and 
abroad. 
The above has briefly outlined the progress of the Works up to the period 
immediately before closure. Throughout that time, especially during the 
1980's, there had been a decline, in real terms of subsidy for the 
railways and a large scale reduction of the work force and selling of rail 
assets. One prime target for cuts had been the closure of British 
Rail Engineering Limited's <BREL) various wagon works. Although Shildon 
was "the premier wagon works in Europe and the jewel in the crown of BREL" 
<Ian Gardiner- then Managing Director BREL> it seemed very probably that it 
too would eventually come under threat of closure. 
-51-
CHAPTER THREE: THE CLOSURE. 
uif it had been just a matter of inefficiency we would 
never have closed." 
Charge hand in wagon repair shop 
On the 22nd April 1982 the six o'clock news bulletin announced that Shildon 
BREL works was to close. 
Rumours that the Works were to close had been circulating for some time. 
People in Durham had become almost acclimatised to talk of closures. 
During the early 1980's there had been many in the region- Consett steel 
works, shipbuilding on the Wear and Tyne, Teesside steel works, and a 
number of pits. It was natural then to be anxious about who was to be 
next? This anxiety had been a natural breeding ground for rumour. 
•Two years or more I kept getting, from outside, sometimes with no 
indication of who was phoning me, calls 'what are you doing about 
Shildon works?' I said what's wrong like? 'Well you ought to be 
getting something done before it's too late you know'. It was 
worrying and obviously somewhere along the line they knew and this 
was beginning to come out. Maybe two or three calls and 
towards the last month or two I was getting them more frequently. 
I noticed there's not been any five year contracts been given out, 
you know, then all of sudden, bump, it came down on 22nd April 
1982." 
Town and County Councillor employed in Works. 
On the 23rd April the Town Clerk of Shildon <Tom Toward) wrote to the town 
councillors. 
"I hereby summon you to attend a SPECIAL MEETING of the Council to be 
held in the COUNCIL CHAMBER, BURKE STREET, SHILDON, on WEDNESDAY 28TH 
APRIL 1982 at 6.30pm. 
AGENDA 
1. THREATENED CLOSURE OF SHILDON BR ENGINEERING WORKS: 
To authorise the Chairman of the Town Council to call a public 
meeting." 
In the House of Commons on the 26th April Derek Foster, MP for Bishop 
Auckland and Opposition Chief Whip, "moved for Adjournment of the House 
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under Standing order No 9" far the purpose of discussing a specific and 
important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely, 
"The announced closure of the British Rail engineering works at 
Shildan Ca. Durham, throwing 2,500 mostly skilled workers on to the 
dale in a town of only 14,000 in which the unemployment rate is 
already above the national average." 
Forty six MP'S signed the motion. The Speaker replied 
"On this occasion I must tell the House that I was in the locality 
of the Works at the weekend. Therefore it is all the more difficult 
for me to explain that· it is not in my power to decide whether this 
matter is to be debated. I merely have the right to decide whether 
we must change our business tonight or tomorrow night for an 
emergency debate on the proposed action. 
I hope the the han. Gentleman will appreciate that I listened to him 
with sympathetic concern. However I have to rule that his 
submission does not fall within the provisions of the Standing Order 
and, therefore, I cannot submit his application to the House." 
On the same day the shop stewards at the Works decided to hold a raffle 
draw to raise funds for their "determined effort to keep alive the Works". 
"Help in any way will be greatly appreciated, i.e. prizes for the 
draw or donations to the Fund. If you are interested in helping our 
fight we can possibly organise a voucher system for prizes." 
Leaflet to workforce 
Hardly a call to man the barricades, but a start. People were "invited" 
to take part in an organised march on the 29th April. 
On the 27th April the Chief Executive of Sedgefield District Council <Alan 
Roberts> issued a confidential memo outlining his immediate strategy on 
the "Proposed Closure of the Shildon 'Shops'". His plan was to alert all 
those likely to be affected with "telex/telegram messages to be sent to 
notables". A meeting of "leading members" <of the Council> had met on 
Saturday 24th to discuss a possible campaign to oppose closure. He 
concluded that the District and County Council Planning Departments are co-
operating in preparing a detailed report on the proposed closure which 
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should be available by Friday 7th May. 
There were some who wondered whether all this activity was simply too 
little too late. Hindsight is an unfair way of judging people caught in 
circumstances not within their control. We can all see ways out of a fix 
afterwards, but at the time it is not so easy. However it does seem 
curious that more had not been done before. There appeared to have been 
no contingency plans despite the unsteady nature of employment in the 
County. It is as if each addition to the closure list came, somehow, as a 
suprise to those suffering it. 
"I had this leaflet urging everybody, everybody, to stand and organise 
and help Consett. It said 'your turn could be next'. It had a list 
of those places that could be next and it included Shildon Works. 
I put one up on the welders screen. The union officials took it to 
the management. The manager went mad. But the union officials, NOT 
manager complained about it being brought into the the Works. The 
AEU convenor told the manager who'd put it up. The manager had me 
down and was threatening to sack me for subversive activity and the 
convenor said to my face ' If I had my way I'd sack you on the spot. 
I'll tell you what I'm going to do with them <leaflets) I'm lighting 
the fire with them'. That's absolutely true. The Works Manager 
didn't know what the hell to do when he got me. They thought it was 
some little mug who'd be easily frightened. They didn't know it was 
me. He didn't know what to do. I said you're not telling people 
in this Works what to read or not read. I had six and half years in 
bloody khaki helping fight a bugger that burned books and that. 
After he got over the shock of that- and this'll tell you about the 
attitude in the Works- he said 'what am I going to do then? I've 
promised the 'Big Six' <2 Boilermakers, 2 NUR, 2 AEU- Works convenors) 
that I'd sack the man who brought that in'. I said 'That's your fault 
isn't it'. He said 'But I promised.' Management! Eh?'" 
Foreman welder with 39 years service in the Works. 
This reaction, and similar stories confirm that this was not uncommon, 
seems odd. That union officials should fear any unsettling of the smooth 
routine of the day almost suggests a kind of guilt. 
"I don't think they were stupid. It was more that they were carrying 
on, I use the expression, playing along with management, in a way like 
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'We're all one big happy family and we'll keep the Works, newt's going 
on, nobody's coming in, we're not going out, we're alright here.' 
That was the attitude." 
Ibid. 
Once the threat of closure became official scenes like that described above 
became less frequent. Management and shop floor workforce began to 
combine to save their jobs. Whether an earlier, and a perhaps more 
vigorous campaign, would have been more effective is, of course, unknown, 
but it is certainly true that some in the Works did feel let down by their 
union<s). 
A Working Party of the Shildon "Shops" was formed and a meeting held on the 
28th April in the Council Chamber of Sedgefield District Council, Green 
Lane~., Spennymoor. The Chairman of the Council was appointed Chairman of 
the Working Party. It was arranged that a joint meeting of 
representatives of Durham County Council and Darlington, Sedgefield and 
Wear Valley District Councils be arranged to discuss the closure. A 
suggestion that Shildon Town Council be allowed to attend was rejected. 
Bureaucratic procedure- or political convenience?- thus ensured that those 
most affected were to be informed of what was being planned after it had 
been agreed. Whilst it is true that some Shildon Town Councillors were 
also District Councillors it still seems a curious decision to exclude 
those on the Town council with direct working experience in the Works. 
A Trade Union march was arranged for the next day, 29th April. It was 
resolved that Sedgefield District Council be represented on the March by 
the Working Party and that "members' attendance at the march be classed as 
an approved duty". Council staff were also allowed time off with pay to 
participate. It would seem then that, for some, protest marches could 
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pay, but for the majority to have attended at all would be their only 
reward. 
At seven o'clock on the evening of 28th the Shildon Town Council met to 
plan their strategy. Another "working party" was formed and the protest 
march was to assemble at 10.00 am the next day by the recreation ground 
near Sun~ __ ;dale School. Later the same evening the Works NUR met to 
establish a "fighting fund" and was told that the AUEW was organising a 
draw with prizes from local traders. They also discussed what to do with 
those "who won't fight?" This early recognition that some would not 
fight was an indication of problems to come. It seemed that, as an 
immediate response to the news of closure, not much was going to be done 
beyond having a march and holding raffles. 
Perhaps a more active response would have set a different mood for the 
coming months? Around that time French steel workers in Longwy heard 
their works were to close and they instantly blocked the main road into the 
town and effectively brought the area to a halt. The government, to avoid 
further disturbances, responded with large aid packages. If the French 
workers had merely raffled a few prizes it seems quite possible that they 
too would have been ignored. 
It is not as if the announcment of closure had not been trailed in the days 
and even weeks before. On Wednesday the 14th April, eight days before the 
official notification, the local Evening despatch had carried an article 
about a possible closure. 
"Shildon rail workers joined a national fight with BR today over the 
expected shutdown of vital rail works ... This could mean the complete 
shutdown of one or more railway engineering plants ... Worried union 
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leaders from Shildon and York joined a demonstration outside BR's 
London HQ" 
People, at this stage; were openly discussing the possibility, "It'll be a 
serious blow to the community" <Vilf Edwards, Town councillor and clerk in 
the Works>, "There have been rumours about the plant and jobs, especially 
over the last few weeks. If it comes to the crunch obviously we have to 
fight it because it would be devastating for the town" <Gary Norman, 
Transport and Salaried Staff Association representative>, but by the 16th 
the Evening Despatch reporter, Jim Gilchrist, reported that when he 
attempted to contact NUR officials at the Works the "phone was slammed 
down." On the same day the "Northern Echo" reporter, Doug Meek, also 
reported that "union officials at Shildon refused to speak about their 
future 11 • Why this sudden silence? 
Obviously negotiations were at a crucial stage, but surely it would have 
been in the union's interest to keep some public pressure on management? 
They needed all the help they could get, given the determination of BR for 
cuts, and publicity about the possible effects of a closure would surely 
have been a useful component in presenting their case for a reprieve? 
The press is often a dubious ally in such circumstance- its habit of 
simplifying issues can often create problems for negotiators in a dispute-
but to exclude it completely at this stage seemed strange. Once BR made 
public its intention to close the Works then reversing that decision would 
be very difficult, but if a change could be obtained before it would have 
been easier for BR to avoid an apparent volte face. 
All industrial negotiations, like negotiations anywhere, depend on a 
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solution where both sides can avoid a "loss of face." Once a situation 
develops beyond that point then intransigence soon becomes stalemate. It 
seems crucial that once closure at Shildon had been suggested everything 
possible should have been done to prevent that suggestion becoming fact. 
There is always the danger that too much pressure can itself create 
intransigence, but it seems fairly certain that BR had come to a decision 
and action was needed immediately if that decision was to be modified, even 
changed. 
On the 17th Roy Jones, chairman of the NUR at the Works, collapsed on his 
way to work and was taken to hospital suffering from a stroke. He had 
been in London on the 13th, and 14th for talks about the closure. Many 
felt that the pressure of negotiation had caused the attack. "He would 
have taken all this very badly, and fought to·do his utmost for the Town. 
I saw him a couple of day ago and I did not think he was looking well. 
I told him to start taking things easy". <Walter Nunn, NUR Staff 
Association at the Works.) 
Roy Jones's NUR colleague in the Works, Phil Wigley, branch secretary, 
"refused to comment". The loss, even·if temporary, of a crucial 
negotiator could not have eased matters, but it might have been sensible to 
have given the press more details, if only to show how distressed people at 
the Works were becoming. 
Union officials, especially under pressure, often become nervous when 
dealing with the media. This is an important fault because if the 
officials of a union are unprepared- and being unable to present a quick 
lucid account of ANY union activity is being unprepared, then much is lost. 
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When Roy Jones became ill someone should have been ready to not only take 
his place, but comment on both his role and the anxiety his sudden illness 
had caused. Failure to do this seems to have been a mistake. 
On Thursday 29th the march took place. Led by union officials, town and 
county councillors, Derek Foster MP, and Roland Boyes, MEP, it proceeded 
through the town to the football pitch. 
"More than 5000 people poured through the doomed railway town yesterday 
in the biggest show of strength in its history. The protest line was 
a mile long ... Shildon came to a sudden standstill as 2,500 wagon 
workers marched to save their jobs joined by women, children, and 
pensioners." 
"Northern Echo" 30th. March, 1982 
There were widespread pledges of support and speeches about determination 
not to give in. "A feeling of solidarity was in the air" and a sense that 
perhaps there was cause for optimism. 
"This must be one of the most moving days in my, and your lifetime. 
Today walking through the streets seeing the looks on the people's 
faces reminded me of Consett .... The highlight of the march was when we 
walked past the school and heard the children calling out- it brought 
tears to my eyes and I'm sure it did to you too." <Alex McFadden North 
Eastern NUR leader) 
Ibid 
Such days can be heady affairs, but they can also be deceptive. The 
physical sense of purpose in such a gathering can easily raise false 
expectations. At one with everyone around it is easy to believe all is 
possible. In the middle of a fight it is always necessary to have a boost 
to the morale providing everyone is realistic about what is happening. 
The community who marched that day must have felt their case was proved, 
but unfortunately to those outside the day passed like any other. As an 
expression of outrage it had been needed, but whether it affected decisions 
about the closure is more in doubt. 
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Within days of the announced closure BREL presented its case for the need 
for cuts in a "Railtalk Special". 
Shildon was to go, with further cuts at Horwich, Swindon, and the Derby 
locomotive works. No alternative proposals that "would retain the works 
and improve the company's financial position and safeguard remaining jobs, 
have yet been put forward." 
"BREL believes the closure proposals are the best business solution 
to the problem." 
Using a question and answer format- a kind of Platonic commentary of our 
times- BREL took the readers through its argument. 
"1. Q. What is our problem? 
A. BREL no long has sufficient new construction maintenance and 
repair work to justify the retention of 12 main works ... 
2. Q How has this reduction in workload come about? 
A. The continuing drive by BR for more competitive performance 
rests heavily on better utilisation of all aasets ... The 
introduction of high speed trains and the more intensive use of 
other locomotives multiple units and carriages has resulted in a 
significant reduction in fleet sizes ... 
This continues with a resume of wagon, locomotive, and carriage statistics. 
Then sets about discussing where the cuts are to fall:-
'"7 Q. BREL has 12 main works. Why must the axe fall so heavily on 
Shildon, Horwich and Swindon? 
A. In times of reducing workload, there are certain operating 
expenses at each Works which cannot be reduced to compensate 
for the lower level of sales. Unless the proposed action to 
close Shildon and to reduce staff elsewhere is taken, these 
so called 'Fixed Costs' will have the effect of increasing 
our product prices. These price increases, in the case of 
Rail business, have to be met by increased passenger and 
freight revenue. They also make BREL less competitive in 
export sales. The only way to reduce these costs is by 
disposing of the underutilised surplus workshop capacity. 
The measures now proposed will save an estimated £50m 
between 1983 and 1986 and £18m per annum thereafter. 
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"Why Shildon? 
Shildon is BREL principal wagon-building works and has a 
capacity to build some 1,200-1,500 wagons per year, and to 
repair in excess of 20,000 wagons per year. There are no 
new build orders in for 1983 and prospects for 1984 and 1985 
indicate that future needs are insignificant in relation to the 
capacity available. Operating Shildon on the substantially 
reduced repairs workload only would not be viable and would 
lead to substantial losses in 1983, with no prospect of a return 
to profit in the future. 
The reduced requirement for BR's wagon repairs is clearly 
illustrated in the following tables:-
Year 
1976 
1981 
1982 
1986 
Repairs 
45,000 
19,000 
12,000 
8/9,000 
In addition to Shildon, BR has capacity for wagon repairs 
at Temple Mills <in East London> and Doncaster. Although, in 
internal accountancy terms, Shildon made a net profit of about 
£730,000 in 1981, there will be a loss in 1982, and in 1983 a 
loss of 2.2m with no prospect of recovery." 
That, in summary, was BR's case for closing Shildon. The "Jewel in BR's 
Crown", despite being profitable, had, it seemed suddenly turned into a 
worthless trinket. The document went on to ask itself about the "serious 
consequences for the communities concerned" and was there "no alternative? 
"A. As a responsible employer we are deeply aware and concerned 
about the effect the proposals will have on the areas in 
question. Certainly, other options were considered, but none 
would have tackled the overriding business problems of 
substantially reducing overheads and matching capacity to the 
much lower workload" 
A rather long way around saying business interests must always come before 
workforce and community. BR's case, as set out in "Railtalk Special", is 
an almost triumphal paean to "market forces". It is obviously sensible to 
run any business in a way that makes economic sense, but when that business 
employs a very large proportion of a community's workforce considerations 
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other than the simply economic should be, if not paramount, at least 
acknowledged. To employ people for, in many cases, a total working life, 
and then discard them because of "overriding business problems" is using 
market forces as a weapon rather than as an economic justification. 
British Rail identified a problem and sought the "best business solution" 
by sacking large numbers of its workforce. If its figures for decline 
in wagon demand were accurate, and this claim will be examined in more 
detail later, then some scaled withdrawal with "natural wastage" of labour 
could surely have been considered? 
On the 4th of May a meeting of the "joint committe fighting fund" agreed 
that a raffle draw be held on 29th May with 10,000 tickets at lOp each. 
British Rail had obviously picked their target with care. 
In the evening of the 6th of May Derek Foster MP rose to address an 
adjournment debate in the House of Commons; he spoke about the Yorks 
closure. 
" ... Not more than 14 months ago it <the Works) was described as the 
most efficient wagon works in the whole of Europe- not by me, not 
by the workers at the plant, but by the managing director of 
BREL ... Now British Rail is saying that it is obsolete. Yhat has 
happened in the meantime to make BREL describe this works- which 
was so efficient, so profitable, so valuable to it- as obsolete? 
... Why has BR decided to buy no wagons in 1983? Is it commercially 
prudent? Even though its fleet has diminished and will continue to 
diminish, surely BR will need to purchase wagons soon. It cannot 
go year after year without replenishing stock. 
By quoting BR's figures for a more efficient use of a reduced wagon force 
he asked whether:-
"that means that each wagon must bear four times as much wear and 
tear. Indeed wear and tear will be greater because of the higher 
speeds and greater braking and the consequent load transference. 
If the wagons have been designed with greater intensity of use in 
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mind, it has been a secret to us. If that is the case, how long ago 
were those developments foreseen and why were they not planned? Why 
was it possible for the deputy chairman of the board and managing 
director of BREL in their headquarters in Euston to tell me not 
14 months ago that no conceivable restructuring of BREL could 
possibly undermine the long-term future of Shildon? 
May I press the Minister on the important trend of BR advising its 
clients to purchase their own trucks or to lease them? We suspect 
that most of those privately purchased or leased trucks are being 
bought from the private sector, not BREL. I have a paper from 
Mr Sanderson, the director of freight, who tells me that there are 
16,000 such wagons. How many of them have been bought from private 
manufacturers? Those 16,000 wagons represent 16 years work for the 
people of Shildon. How many have been bought from the private 
sector? Does the fleet of 34,000 <BR's figures) in 1986 include 
those 16,000? If not, will the 16,000 also be severely slimmed 
down by greater efficiency?" 
The question of what part "private sector" considerations played in BR's 
decision to close is a difficult one to unravel. It must be remembered 
that throughout the period of the closure the government was vigorously 
pursuing a privatisation policy. It was planned that British Rail would 
be eventually taken out of the public sector and it was, consequently, 
essential that it be made to appear "financially attractive" to investors. 
This would mean making the industry appear profitable. No rai 1 system, 
certainly in Europe, nor even in the USA, was expected to be profitable. 
All attracted subsidies because the governments concerned wished to develop 
their rail systems as an integral part of an overall transport policy. As 
the rest of Europe continued to invest in their railways so the UK 
government seemed content to trim its system down to a size that was 
"marketable". 
"As the Minister knows, less freight is carried in the United 
Kingdom than in any other European country, for the simple reason 
that we subsidise our railways much less than any other European 
country, despite the strong environmental arguments for carrying 
more freight by rail. There is less damage to roads and buildings, 
less pollution, noise and fumes. It is far safer than road carriage 
from the point of view of accidents- and the cost of accidents must 
also be borne in mind. There is also the fuel economy argument. 
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"It would be far cheaper to carry freight by rail, especially if the 
electrification work were allowed to go ahead. 
There is tremendous need for investment in rail. In summary of 
accounts, Sir Peter Parker <Chairman of BR> said that t500 million 
per year was needed to take care of essential renewals, which 
includes wagon renewals, but only t308 million was spent last year-
far less than was needed." 
The Under Secretary for Transport <Mr Reginald Eyre> replied on behalf of 
the government. He expressed the usual anxieties about Shildon's 
workforce and "fully understood" their cause for concern. He then 
explained that, as oulined in the BR "Railtalk Special", BR's demand for 
wagons had drastically declined, but he failed to address why. If 
government policy was to reduce, in real terms, railway subsidy then it was 
hardly surprising that BR would not be able to invest in rolling stock. 
"For several years the BR Board has been pursuing a strategy intended 
to bring the freight business up to date." 
A government announcement of a "strategy" for "bringing something up to 
date" usually means cuts. It seems reasonable to suggest that 
"modernisations", "improvements", or "renovations" are often signs that 
someone somewhere has either made a mistake and needs to cover it up, or 
wants to "prove" something, usually a combination of both. 
The Undersecretary then went on to place the decision within the context of 
his government's industrial policy since coming to office in 1979. 
"Following a reappraisal of freight business plans, the board <BR> 
has necessarily revised downwards its future requirements as 
e 
orginally fo~seen. Indeed, I have to emphasise that because 
of the continuous pace of technical change the board's latest 
forecast is that its total fleet requirements will, by 1986, 
be only 34,000 wagons while still carrying the same or even higher 
levels of traffic as today. 
There are three main reasons for this ... modern wagons have been 
developed in such a way as to have greater carrying capacity and 
higher operating speeds than their predecessors ... Secondly 
the development of Total Operations Processing system means that it 
is now possible for BR to increase the utilisation of individual 
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"wagons much more efficiently ... The third reason relates to forecast 
carryings. These forecasts have unfortunately had to be revised, 
downwards in recent time. 
In 1979 the board carried 169 million tonnes of freight. In 1980, 
carryings were down by 10% to 153 million tonnes as a result of the 
steel strike. Despite some improvements in particular areas, 
including steel, carrying in 1981 stayed about the same at 154 
million tonnes. 
The amount of freight carried is inevitably affected by changes 
in the industrial structure generally in a world trade recession- I 
emphasise a world recession- and also by technical changes in 
industries that are predominately movers of bulk traffic. Present 
forecasts by BR now suggest that it will take until the end of the 
decade before rail freight can return to the position that it was in 
1979" 
The Undersecretary's emphasising of "world trade recession" is interesting. 
On coming to office his government presided over the biggest decline in 
primary industries this century. Naturally this was accompanied by high 
unemployment. Small wonder that BR's freight trade had declined, 
government policy had ensured that within a year of taking office almost 
everything had declined. The "TECHNICAL CHANGES <my emphasis) in 
industries that are predominately movers of bulk traffic" presu:mably meant 
"removal of". 
The government argument that the closures were necessary centred around the 
idea that demand for their products had diminshed. It seems clear that 
government policy had largely contributed to that reduction in demand and 
therefore was directly responsible for its consequences. To argue that 
the decision to close was largely BR's is to cloud the direct relationship 
between government policy and the running of state industries. It must 
have been government policy to "run down" rail freight traffic. 
Railways, being heavily unionised, can always pose an economic threat to a 
government. History has shown that rail strikes, if in combination with 
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other industrial action, can even threaten the very existence of a 
government. In the summer of 1911 armed troops, cavalry, and even 
artillery were placed around railway stations when a national strike 
threatened. One way to meet such a threat would be to move as much 
freight as possible onto the roads. Road transport is not heavily 
unionised, and is mostly operated through small, sometimes owner driver, 
companies. Bringing such an industry out on strike is very difficult. 
Whether such considerations were part of government thinking on the 
closures is very difficult to prove, but it is interesting to note that one 
of the reasons given for the defeat of the miner's strke of 1984/85 was the 
preparedness of enough road transporters to cross picket lines- the rail 
workers had declared support for the coal strike. 
On the 5th of May Alan Roberts, Chief Executive of Sedgefield District 
Council, issued a joint report on the closure by the planning departments 
of Durham and Sedgefield Councils. They recommended that it be sent to 
the "Government, BRand other interested parties". 
It noted that closure would mean the loss of 2,180 jobs, that one in four 
of the "insured population in the Bishop Auckland Employment Exchange area" 
would be unemployed. Male unemployment would therefore rise to over 30% 
and within the Shildon ward it could rise to 50%. A further 450 jobs 
would be lost by local suppliers to the Works. It estimated that 
"when direct and indirect effects are considered with the likely growth 
in the labour force and temporary employment schemes there is need to 
create 6,500 jobs in the South West Durham travel to work area by 
1986. The majority, 5,000, will be needed in the Bishop Auckland and 
Shildon and Aycliffe EEA. 
The short term costs of closure to BR, Central and local government 
are approximately £10m in the first year. The costs in the second 
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"and subsequent years will be around £6m if there is no recovery 
package. The costs of a recovery package could be as much as £90m." 
It argued that BR had three alternatives to closure; a) transfer all "new 
and expected construction work" to the Works, b) increase investment in 
rolling stock- including east coast electrification, and c> transfer work 
to Shildon from areas where unemployment is lower. 
Whether these alternatives were realistic depended not only on BR, but also 
on central government. David Howell, Minister for Transport, had earlier 
that month made a cut of £15m <in real terms> from next year's BR external 
financing limit. BR had wanted £885 million, but had to settle for £804m. 
Robert Taylor, writing in the Observer <Business Section> on 25th April, 
outlined the sorts of problems facing BRat this time .. BR had overshot 
its 1981182 budget of "£920m by £39m". There had been an ASLEF 
<Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen> strike during the 
winter which "had cost, BR claimed, £60m from lost passengers, £20m lost 
freight, and £12m from parcels, with a further £3m from freightliners. It 
also estimated that further losses could be between £32m and £78m." 
Taylor went on to report that a considerable part of these losses, and 
certainly their continuance, was due to customers moving from rail to road. 
There had been a "15% drop in Red Star parcel traffic" and, during the 
strike, "the Central Electricity Generating Board had moved 200,000 tons of 
coal by road". 
A further problem for BR was what Lord McCarthy's tribunal inquiry into 
flexible rostering for drivers was still to report. This potentially 
explosive issue was helping to delay any Government decisions on the future 
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of BR. BR hoped to be able to phase in flexible rostering during 1982, 
but knew that this would not be an easy industrial exercise. If 
McCarthy's report ended by favouring the driver's case against flexible 
rostering then the Board would have to either impose the change or resign. 
This uncertainty made it easier for the Government to delay any discussion 
of long term plans for the railways. 
A year previously Sir Peter Parker, Chairman of BR, had issued a Red Book 
on the future of railways in the 1980's. It was, in effect, a blueprint 
for a revival. A massive electrification of the system was proposedi a 
widespread expansion in rolling stock and track; a Channel tunnel link; a 
cross London link; and the development of an Advanced Passenger Train. 
The total package would, by 1990, cost an estimated tlbn. 
After a four year campaign Sir Peter Parker had at last received approval 
from the Ministry of Transport for his electrification proposals. He had 
achieved this by creating an alliance of support stretching from the TUG, 
Confederation of British Industries, to both sides of the House of Commons. 
It was at this point that Professor Alan Walters, the Prime Minister's 
chief economic advisor, queried whether the expansion was commercially 
sound? This objection effectively delayed any decision and it was finally 
decided that each electrification project would be judged on strictly 
commercial terms. 
It was during these considerations that the Centre for Policy Studies, an 
influential "think tank" for the Prime Minister, published a pamphlet 
advocating the conversion of railways into roads thus saving the taxpayer 
tlbn a year. Small wonder that the Treasury was delaying approval for the 
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various electification projects submitted by BR <London to Leeds and 
Newcastle, Bedford to Nottingham). 
Seen against this background the Sedgefield and Durham "Case Against 
Closure" arguments seemed certain to fall on very stony ground. 
It outlined its "Future Employment Prospects" 
"Jab lasses have far outweighed jab gains in recent years, most notably 
in the Bishop Auckland/Shildan area. This, together with the expected 
loss of Newton Aycliffe's New Town status in 1985 <which had been 
responsible far its relatively good performance in attracting new jabs) 
bones ill far the future of the area's economy- even without the 
closure of the Wagon Works ... 
taking all factors into account, 6,500 new jobs will be needed in the 
South West Durham area if the Wagon Works closed. 
New Jab Opportunities required by 1986 in S.W.Durham Area 
Wagon Works jab lass <numbers seeking work) 
Indirect jab lasses 
Net decline in other existing industries 
Labour farce increases 
Replacement jabs far those an MSC schemes 
TOTAL 
1,700 
450 
1,200 
1,750 
1,400 
6,500 
It is estimated that the vast majority <5,000) of these jobs will be 
needed in the Bishop Auckland and Shildan and Aycliffe EEA" 
These figures detail the actual numbers of people likely to be without a 
jab, but the underlying casts are, in "market" terms, perhaps more 
important. 
"Costs of Closure. 
Four main casts will arise as a result of the closure of the Works. 
Firstly the casts to BR in redundancy payments and the written off 
value of plant, buildings and machinery. Secondly, the costs to 
central Government in the farm of reduced revenue and increased 
payments to the unemployed. Thirdly, there will be the costs to 
Local Government, mainly in the farm of reduced rate income. Finally, 
there will be the cast of providing new jabs to replace those lost in 
order to bring unemployment back to a reasonable level. 
Short term casts. 
The casts presented below are estimated for the first twelve months 
only, following the complete closure of the Works. In the absence 
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"of detailed knowledge of each individual's circumstances, a number of 
realistic and conservative estimates have been made. 
"a) Casts to British Rail 
i) 
ii) 
Cost of redundancy payments 
Write off building,plant and 
machinery 
TOTAL 
b) Casts to Central Government 
i) Unemployment benefit 
•<assuming all workers receive 
single person's benefit) 
ii) Loss of National Insurance Contributions 
a) Employer's Contribution 
b) Employee's Contribution 
iii) Loss of Income Tax 
••<assuming all workforce receive 
married man's allowance) 
iv) Rent and Rate Rebate 
V) 
•••<assuming 80% of workforce qualify 
and based on current average levels 
in Shildon) 
Redundancy Payments 
<estimated total cost of t2.5m 
Redundancy Fund contribution is 41% 
actual payments subject to negotiation) 
Total cast far Central Government 
t 
1,500,000 
? 
1,500.000 
2,542,410 
1,260,318 
546,050 
1,858,202 
447,151 
1,000,000 
7,654,131 
• This is the minimum amount payable. The majority of the workforce 
are married and hence entitled to higher benefits. 
** Realistic income tax revenue lasses are impossible to calculate 
without detailed knowledge of individuals' circumstances. In 
practice, tax lasses for single persons will be higher and for 
persons with mortgages, lower. 
c) Costs to Local Government 
i) Rent and Rate rebates <Local Government 
Contribution) 
ii) Loss of contribution in lieu of Rates 
<no allowance made for loss) 
Total 
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49,000 
700,000 
749,000 
"Long term Costs 
"Total direct costs of closure in 
first twelve months 9,903,814+ 
Estimates of the long-term costs arising from closure are extremely 
difficult to calculate .... they will be affected by the ability of 
employees to find new employment. It is likely that the numbers 
receiving unemployment benefit would reduce over time, but this 
will be more than compensated by an increase in the number of people 
receiving social security payments. The following costs are 
expected to continue after the first 12 monthsi unemployment 
benefit, loss of national insurance contributions, loss of income 
tax, rent and rate rebates and loss of contribution in lieu of 
rates. The costs in second and subsequent years could be around 
£6m if there is no recovery package. 
Costs of a 'Recovery Package' 
Experience from other areas where there have been major plant 
closures indicates that the costs of funding recovery action are 
extremely high. In Consett, which is a roughly parallel situation 
and only 15 miles from Shildon, the initial estimate of such costs 
was in the order of £90m, in order to provide for a similar number 
of new jobs. 
To date the following major items of expenditure have been agreed 
in relation to the Consett recovery strategy:-
EIEC factory building and estate development 
Reclamation of steelworks site 
Compensation for loss of rate income 
Major new highway construction 
Bus subsidies 
Local authority factory building and estate 
development 
Retraining 
Total 
tm 
12.5 
10.0 
'4, 0 
19.8 
0.3 
2.3 
n.a. 
48.9 
Despite this considerable level of investment the unemployment rate 
in Derwentside, which includes Consett, is still the highest in the 
country at 24.61." 
Following the closure of Consett's steelworks much was made of how 
recovery plans would prevent high levels of longterm unemployment. If, 
however, after having spent nearly £50m one in four Consett people were 
still unemployed how much would be needed to help Shildon? Where, for 
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instance, would the "market forces" come from who could provide these sorts 
of sums if not from central government? And yet if central government 
was following a proper policy of "market forces" then it would obviously 
eschew interfering in the natural development of that market. This was, 
presumably, the pivot upon which their policy operated and any deviation 
from this would make nonsense of their economic strategy. If "market 
forces" are to be the guiding force it would be absurd then to start 
tinkering with SELECTED bits because the whole basis of such an economic 
policy is to allow matters total freedom so that they can thus find their 
own level of efficiency. 
The Sedgefield and Durham report goes on to discuss the "Social Costs" of 
the closure. It describes a familiar pattern; young people would move 
away from the area leaving the least able to help themselves in a majority; 
the environment, through lack of finance, would deteriorate; low levels of 
support would mean a penurious population and some would inevitably 
supplement their income from crime; the educational performance of 
schoolchildren would suffer from the consequent feeling of helplessness. 
In a sense, the list is endless. To throw most people in town out of 
work and then expect them to carry on as before would be ridiculous. 
The report concludes with a detailed examination of BR's case for closure. 
It challenged BR's prediction of a decline in demand for wagons arguing 
that as this was mainly due to a lack of government investment it could 
change. It also criticised the predictions of a similar decline in export 
orders arguing that the export market was extremely volatile and therefore 
UNpredictable. It went on to point out that considerable recent 
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investment in Shildon had meant that it had equipment not found elsewhere 
in the UK which, together with a skilled workforce, meant it could do work 
more easily and more efficiently than elsewhere in BREL. 
"The decision to transfer the Shildon works repair and maintenance 
workload to other centres appears to be even more arbitrary. It is 
claimed total closure will reduce the overheads which would arise 
from partial closure, but no figures are given at all to substantiate 
this. No attempt seems to have been made to see whether these 
overheads could be reduced by retaining some new production capacity 
for the purposes set out in paragraph 5.6 <the electrification of the 
railway system> ... 
In effect, no case at all is made for taking the grave step of 
transferring work from an area of very high unemployment within 
an organisation with branches in parts of the country where 
unemployment is much lower. This is particularily important 
when considered within the context of the currently high unemployment 
rates which prevail not just in Sbildon and the surrounding area, but 
in the Northern Region as a whole." 
To support this argument a list of relative unemployment rates affecting 
the areas where BREL operates is presented. 
"BREL Workshops Region Regional unemployment 
Rate (March 1982) 
Derby Litchurcb Lane East Midlands 10.9% 
Derby Locomotive Works -"- 10.9% 
Crewe North West 15.0% 
Horwich 
-··-
15.0% 
Glasgow Scotland 14.9% 
East leigh South East 9.22% 
Temple Mills -"- 9.22% 
Wolverton _ .. _ 9.22% 
Swindon South West 11.0% 
Worcester West JUdlands 15.1% 
Doncaster Yorkshire and 
Humberside 13.2% 
York _ .. _ 13.2% 
SHILDON North 16.0% 
The Report's recommendations were predictably that BR reconsider and that 
should re-evaluation mean SOME job losses in Shildon then consultants would 
be appointed by the joint local authorities to see bow this could be 
-72-
effected with the minimum of distress. It also recommended that the 
recent downgrading of the Bishop Auckland and Shildon and Newton Aycliffe 
EEA's to Intermediate Area Status should be "immediately rescinded and the 
areas upgraded as a Special Development Area, so long as there is any 
prospect of job losses from the Works". 
BR's "Railtalk", together with the Sedgefield District and Durham County 
Report, effectively summarised the two sides' main arguments and the coming 
campaign would come to revolve around the various points raised. 
During the few days following the 7th May a series of meetings were held in 
County Durham to plan a common strategy against closure. 
At 7.30 on the evening of the 7th a meeting was held in the staff canteen 
of the Works to enable the unions and staff to report on "progress so far". 
It was agreed that "if we didn't nip the closure in the bud there'd be no 
workshop left". The mood centred around the idea that it was time "the 
unions got together". The meeting was opened for discussion and it was 
reported that there was "some apathy" amongst the workforce. There had 
been talk of a strike by NUR, but "Derby were lukewarm, but Glasgow 
suggested an immediate strike because of fears that there would be a 
dwindling of workshops". A one day march to London was suggested as 
being "better than a one day strike". "Price for a charter train from 
Bishop Auckland to London was £6 90 for a 660 seater and £560 for a 350 
seater." It was agreed that each supporter would "pay £5 a head and the 
rest from the fund". 
The next day the Durham City Labour Party met and Item 5 discussed the 
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closure. A number of speakers commented on the failure of the Consett 
campaign and urged that the protest not "just go through the motions". It 
was agreed that a proper policy towards the ideas of profitablity and 
public ownership be developed because it was felt that this was where most 
of the coming conflicts with government would occur. Not suprisingly 
the meeting felt that the campaign against closure should be a "political" 
one and that the social effects of the closure be stressed. 
On the lOth a Shildon Works meeting was held in the City Hall. The City 
Planning Officer presented the Report "Case Against Closure" and the 
Reports's recommendations were discussed. Various speakers commented on 
the problems of combatting the government's stated intent of 
denationalisation. If an industry "was transferred from public to 
0 private ownership then a manop} y was inevitable" <from the notes of a 
member of the Shildon Town Council Working Party>. It was also argued 
that it was "imprudent to propose alternatives" to BR., "We should fight to 
win!" There seemed a general feeling that the decision to close was part 
of a policy of "divide and rule" in that BR was "picking off" one workshop 
at a time and that other closures would follow. That by "deliberately 
cutting investment in the public sector the Government was being very 
crafty. By privatising the profitable bits and then letting the rest go." 
"The TUG should not trade jobs." The meeting ended with a request for a 
second report which would place greater stress on retaining Shildon Works 
as a complete entity and not as part of a "trade off" of some jobs in order 
to keep the Works. 
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On the same day <10th> the Shildon Town Clerk, Tom Toward, wrote to The 
Convenor, Works Shop Supervisory LDC, Shildon Works outlining the proposals 
for a 
"Public Meeting to be held on Saturday the 29th May in the Hackworth 
Park, Shildon." Invitations had been extended to, Albert Booth, 
Shadow Minister of Transport, Sid Weighall, General Secretary of the 
National Union of Railwaymen, Derek Foster, MP and Roland Boyes, MEP 
as principal speakers." 
On the 13th May the Bishop Auckland Labour Party met and passed an 
emergency motion calling on the North Region Labour Party to "give its full 
and active support to those union and Labour Party members who are 
presently engaged in the campaign to prevent the proposed closure of 
Shildon Wagon Works". 
At a meeting of the Joint Committee Fighting Fund, also on the 13th, an 
income of £2,603,04p was recorded with expenditure to date of t182.65p. 
It was also agreed that "each trade unionist contribute 50p per week 
starting on the 21st May and each week after until necessary funds had 
achieved our aims". The details of various raffles were also discussed. 
With a workforce of 2600 the weekly levy of 50p per person would raise, in 
one month, approximately t5,000. It might also perhaps create a greater 
sense of individual involvement. Even allowing for the non-payment of 
some these funds would be more than adequate for the immediate needs of the 
campaign. 
A new "Case Against Closure" Report was drafted and presented to the Joint 
Committee on the 14th May. This version did not offer BR "alternatives", 
but simply insisted the Works be kept open. There was also a change in 
emphasis on what action would be taken if closure went ahead; a certain 
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toning down with the deleting of phrases like <that the closure would be 
opposed) "by every means possible". BR was urged to immediately increase 
its investment in new plant <electrification> and to have this plant built 
at Shildon. 
The meeting accepted the draft and then went on to discuss matters arising. 
Questions were asked on; "what BR would be doing about transferring work to 
other workshops'?"; "What was BR intentions about the site 'after a 
closure'?''' A report from Derek Foster on privatisation of rolling stock 
<or leasing) showed 12,370 owned and 4,473 leased- "was this subsidised by 
a Section grant'?". Foster also reported that an "Early Bird Motion" <an 
emergency debate) was being sought in the House of Commons. It had got 
"over 120 names, one SDP and no Tories." Michael Foot was pressing the 
Government for time and if this was opposed then he would use a Supply Day. 
The Northern Group of Labour MP's had been given "full powers to conduct 
the campaign". 25th May was being lobbied as the date for the debate and 
it was suggested that the three workshops involved should lobby Parliament 
on that day. 
The meeting then re-convened to include the Works BREL management. BREL 
management had requested that the meeting with the Council be through a 
small delegation and consequently the members of the Working Party who were 
not part of the Council's delegation had to be excluded, but they were to 
be given the opportunity of an informal meeting with BREL later. 
It was pointed out that BREL had a need for a "more productive system" and 
that this "hit wagon building the hardest". It was explained that greater 
productivity and more efficient use of existing wagons had meant over 
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capacity. The "business solution was to tackle where the problem arises. 
Better than sharing the agony." It was pointed out that the BREL "had not 
given up trying to get more business in exports- Korea, Japan, and 
S.America can build for less than our material costs which obviously 
creates difficulties." "We are engaging a job creation consultant <P.A. 
Creating Employment Consultants) over the next two months and will be 
talking with them soon about best ways of financing investment." 
The meeting then discussed the points raised. The management were asked 
about "short term problem but where does long term lead7" Discussion 
followed on the relationship between the privately and BREL built wagons-
"Where would private wagons be built?" 
"The private fleet of wagons currently totalled 17,000 and it was 
estimated that by 1986, the size of that fleet would rise to 25,000. 
In the main, those wagons were manufactured by Procol of Wakefield 
and Standard Wagon of Stockport who each employed at most 200 
employees. By 1986, British Rail's wagon fleet would reduce to 
36,000 and, taking into account the private fleet of 25,000, a total 
of 61,000 wagons would be operating at that time. BREL was tendering 
for private fleet work but only expected to get a small proportion 
of that work because the smaller companies manufacturing private wagons 
sold their own design of wagons for specific puposes and BREL could 
not tool up to repair those wagons and at the same expect to compete 
with the private manufacturers because of the specialised design of 
those wagons. " 
Minutes from Sedgefield District Council report of Meeting 
hCMI-
It was then asked if "work"been deliberately taken from Shildon?" This 
query was answered by a "chorus of 'No's!', but then they were asked 'well 
why Shildon7'" (from written notes taken by member of Shildon Working 
Party> A direct request was made by the Working Party "Could we get some 
info7" The management's answer was short and to the point "If we can 
answer, Yes!" Management was then asked when the final decision 
concerning the Works was to be made7 
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"In reply to a question of the prefered timetable for closure, BREL's 
representatives indicated that this was complicated by the Trade Unions' 
present stance. However, the Company would prefer cessation of all new 
building by 31st December 1982 <necessitating 1,000 redundancies> with 
balance being made redundant by the end of March 1983. There was 
negligible scope for redeployment within BREL of staff from Shildon 
although staff could apply for vacancies in other parts of British 
Rail. It was considered unlikely that any more than 150 persons would 
take advantage of redeployment." 
Minutes from SDC report of meeting 
The 'Working Party then made the point that "On that timetable the next two 
months were critical because July 1st is the date for six months redundancy 
notice." The management made no comment nor answered a query concerning 
the transfer of equipment. 
The meeting ended with both sides realising that in the coming months both 
would face some long and difficult further meetings. The 'Works management 
were obviously acting on instructions from above. In theory they had some 
degree of local autonomy, but in reality were simply the front line troops 
of a dispute planned elsewhere. 
Ater this initial flurry of activity, even excitement, a more realistic 
mood began to colour the campaign. The march in Shildon had undoubtedly 
been a moving experience , but it was very much Shildon telling ITSELF it 
had problems- throughout these early days the Falklands 'War occupied most 
newspaper headlines. Now after the "dust had settled" a slow erosion of 
support started to develop. 
In a meeting of the 'Working Party <20th May> it was noted that "'We could be 
held back by other authorities, Darlington is substantially interested." 
It was also acknowledged that "support in the trade union movement may not 
be as strong as it had first seemed. There could be a lot of words and 
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and a lot of deals being done which could do a lot of harm. " In answer 
to the question "'Where from here?' there was much shaking of heads and 
shrugging of shoulders." It was recognised that there was "difficulty in 
orchestrating" trade union support. <from written notes by member of 
Working Party> 
It was agreed that "Communications!" were crucial, but how to use them? 
"Should we let the press in? BBC TV?" No one seemed able to respond to 
these fairly fundamental questions. 
Perhaps an indication of how low morale had got could be seen in the 
discussion of whether the campaign should be fought as a "Joint" one with 
other trade unions or as a "Separate" , but "Joint" if needed. This 
confusion of aims, although understandable, was potentially very damaging 
because the longer the campaign remained stalled by indecision the stronger 
the management became. 
Everyone agreed that something should be done to keep the momentum going, 
but beyond saying the same things over no one seemed sure what it was that 
should be done? Horwich, the other threatened workshop, seemed to have 
"given up" and it was recognised that this could lead to difficulties of 
"who talks to who from now on?" There had always been the problems of 
setting workshop against workshop and that this would be used by management 
to weaken a campaign. 
"There's one thing that has always stuck in my mind. A big ponced up 
convenor from Derby with a purple suede, not suede, more like velvet, 
coat and a brocade waistcoat. We were battling for our jobs and he 
said, 'Well we're not so much concerned at Derby. I'm just down here 
holding a watching brief. If there's any rundown on the workshops 
we just walk across the road into Royces' <Rolls Royce), But you see 
Royces closed down! I thought of that many a time. I hope that 
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"buggers signing on. I'll never forget that. He weren't concerned 
because the Midlands had plenty of work. Did anyhow, till now." 
NUR Shop Steward at Works talking of an earlier campaign against 
closures. 
Unless a joint action could be agreed, and acted on, everyone knew the 
campaign would slowly come to accept the closure and that the fight would 
then become no more than a damage limitation exercise. In most campaigns 
early support is forthcoming because of the excitement engendered from 
seeing that very support develop. There is a kind of self-fulfilling 
quality that coalesces around an emotional response to someone else's 
problems, but this emotional commitment often fades unless something occurs 
to regenerate interest. Involvement takes time and energy and most 
people are too busy earning their living to take time out on behalf of 
others. The Shildon working party knew that unless they could mobilize 
outside support the closure would go ahead. They also knew that no 
matter what happened they would not be able to openly acknowledge the 
likelihood of defeat until it had become fact- this exercise in self-
deception would probably be the most difficult part of the campaign. 
1982 was proving to be a difficult year for the NUR, the largest union at 
the Works. There were many in the Union, from branch to head office 
level, who were convinced the Government would use the ASLEF strike <over 
flexible rostering) as an excuse to cut back investment and this would 
inevitably mean job losses. When negotiating with management any union as 
large as the NUR must think, quite naturally, of ALL of its members and the 
Shildon closure would have to be examined in relation to other threats to 
the railway workforce. Added to this was the rivalry between the railway 
unions. 
-80-
"Bitter rivalry between rail unions ASLEF and NUR almost ended in a 
punch up at an explosive TUC meeting. ASLEF president, Derek 
Fullick threatened to 'put one on' NUR leader Sid Weighall. TUC 
General Secretary Len Murray called for order and Mr Fullick told 
him 'I'll pick you up by the braces and drop you down the lift 
shaft.' ... Details of the clashes emerged last night ... The unions 
<rail) are likely to fight together against a three per cent pay 
offer ... " 
"Daily Mirror" 14th May 1982 
How a union negotiates is always difficult to uncover because if the 
dispute is large enough other elements enter the considerations. 
Politicians will claim that management in a nationalised industry is 
autonomous, but everyone knows this to be more often fiction than fact. 
No government would allow an appointed management to play with the affairs 
of the state without regard to national policy; if the railways strike the 
country comes to a halt, if power works strike we cease to produce 
anything, if the water industry were to strike some of us could die. 
It would seem likely then that negotiations in such industries often 
involves much "behind the scenes" trading. It is easier to make this 
assumption than to prove it. 
A number of those at the Works began to have a suspicion that "something 
was going on at head office <NUR)." 
"The support from the railway unions was absolutely lacking. Other 
trade unions and the town's people rallied round, but from the 
railways it was absolutely shocking. It was a period when they were 
trying to get rid of Sid Weighall <General Secretary, NUR) and I 
think Sid was pledged to help us, but the present Secretary (Jimmy 
Knapp- this interview recorded in Janu ary 1986) was dragging his feet 
a bit. There were lots of stories going around that Glasgow was more 
likely for a closure, but that for political reasons, Scotland 
and all that, they daren't touch it. There was conniving between 
management and unions, no doubt about it There was some at the 
NUR headquarters in London who I knew. I'd be in London for 
conference or something and I'd call in the NUR and have a bit crack 
to some of the people I knew. I spent a whole evening with a 
national ~xecutive member and he said 'Well you know, there's always 
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•something funny in Shildon. It's one of the biggest centres and 
we have less communication there than from any other branch secretary. 
You got the feeling they felt they could resolve everything with 
management themselves.' There was trading with jobs in the Works 
and the AEU had taken over a lot of the semi-skilled jobs from NUR and 
the NUR absolutely resented that. I think that's why NUR didn't put 
their backs into it the way they might have done. Other centres 
didn't help much either, they didn't rally round with that unity you'd 
expect. They thought, 'Well Shildon can go, we're alright.'" 
"Shop steward at Works" 
Once the fear of possible closure is upon a workforce it is inevitable that 
any sense of grievance will develop into a jealousy towards another 
workforce who is not threatened. Similarly the latter will often want to 
distance itself from the problems of the former in the hope that this will 
perhaps help keep their jobs; a collective notion that if you keep "your 
head down" it might go away- if the ostrich had really reacted this way it 
would, by now, have surely become extinct. 
"People don't think. Take Doncaster. There was a lot of chortling 
here <Shildon> about the thought of Doncaster closing (an earlier 
closure> because they thought 'Bugger them we'll get the work.' 
They were overjoyed at the thought of Doncaster going. It were 
greed. People had brought it on themselves. Greed and fear. A lot 
of them had no thought of redundancy, couldn't imagine it, or 
wouldn't and they had mortgages now, and second mortgages, cars, 
foreign holidays, you name it they owned it. Like I say it were a 
mixture of fear and greed that did for them in the end." 
Ibid. 
In the afternoon of the 24th May a meeting took place in the Repair Shop of 
the Works. A "Mass Rally" was planned for Saturday 29th with "10,000 
expected". "Widespread support" for the campaign was reported with a 
number of northern MP's, TUG, offering help. It was further reported that 
there were now "thirty prizes for the next raffle but that there had been 
objections to the 50p levy for campaign funds 0 • 
The next day a large "Works deputation" left for London. At 7.15 am six 
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hundred men, women, and children joined the eleven railway coaches at 
Darlington. They arrived at King Cross at 11.00 am. They marched to 
the British Rail headquarters in Euston Road where they delivered a bundle 
of 630 letters to Sir Peter Parker, Chairman of BR, and then went on to 
the House of Commons to lobby members of Parliament. Assuming a generous 
five hundred of the marchers to be employed at the Works there is no record 
of what the other 1900 did on the day; presumably they stayed to work their 
shifts? They left London at six o'clock to be back in Darlington 22.20. 
The day before the mass rally a joint shop steward meeting was held in the 
morning to plan the day. Bob Howard of the regional TUG attended the 
meeting to make clear the TUG's attitude to the campaign. He re-affirmed 
the TUG'S support, but strongly urged that a clear strategy be developed. 
"TUG will only help a genuine and unified campaign." He warned against 
"personality clashes and inter-union rivalry". "A crisis can regenerate 
a community so essential the community support the campaign." Howard 
went on to suggest that the Consett closure had not been very well handled 
because there had been a reluctance to involve the "whole community in the 
democracy- persuasion is vital!" "We are reacting to events rather than 
BEFORE decisions are made and if we are to overcome these crises then 
attitudes will have to change. We need to pull together as a whole labour 
movement with people supporting each other ... Shildon will be used to 
forefront the fight to protect regional economy." He went on to say that 
there was "no morality in parochialism, to steal someone else's work. 
Being selfish is the best way to lose public's support." Few at the 
meeting could quarrel with Howard's analysis, but all present knew that to 
"practise what one preaches" is never easy. 
-83-
The Rally on Saturday the 29th started at 9.15 at the Civic Hall with an 
assembling of speakers. The Rally proper began at 10.30 when the .march, 
lead by speakers, left the Works and proceeded to the park. En route 
Albert Booth, MP, Shadow Minister of Transport and Charles Turnock, 
Assistant General Secretary NUR, arrived in a taxi, having come from 
Darlington station. 
At 11.15 the speeches began with the Chairman of the Town Council, A. 
Walker, welcoming speakers to the meeting. Apart from Albert Booth, other 
MP'S attending were Derek Foster, <constituency MP and Chief Opposition 
Whip), Jack Cunningham, <Chairman of the Northern Group of Labour MP's), 
Ted Fletcher, and Roland Boyes, <constituency MEP). Councillors from 
the County, District, and Town were also official guests. 
Ken Sigginford, a veteran of the Consett campaign, also addressed the 
meeting. 
•Defend your jobs like an alsatian dog not fed for weeks would defend 
a piece of meat. The Consett campaign failed, frankly, because 
of the bickering and petty jealousies amongst the leaders of the 
unions at national level, unity was denied to us in the campaign. 
This rubbed off at local level and the rot set in. If you don't 
want to be routed there are some golden rules you must pay 
attention to; one, don't break ranks, remain united; two, you must 
not be tempted by redundancy money, and; three, don't let self 
interest destroy your cause. These rules are, to my mind, essential. 
How do I know? At Consett these rules were gradually broken. 
And the British Railways Board will exploit the slightest crack in 
your campaign. From my experience I can tell you that BREL planned 
how long its demoralising and softening period will last .. " 
"Evening Despatch" 2nd June, 1982. 
The constant warnings about unions falling out over strategy were ominous. 
The Works had had a long history of inter-union rivalry. In a sense, this 
was not unusual, but it was not a good base from which to make a joint 
fight for survival. 
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AThere was a nasty tie up with the AEU, Boilermakers, and NUR and 
the management and they wanted to keep everything between four walls 
sort of style, they claimed for greater efficiency. This was 
building up a very bad situation for the men, anyone could tell you 
and it was becoming a big cover up. Then a lot of NUR jobs were 
being sold out to the AEU with the officials all looking after 
themselves like and management turning a blind eye. It was really 
quite nauseating for the men. They even took the documentation of 
union out of the building so no one could see it and eventually the 
NUR, the biggest union, was becoming very unhappy about the way 
semi-skilled jobs were going to the craft union. Then there was 
friction between the boilermakes, the fitters and the welders. It 
went back to the shipbuilding days that. There used to be thirty 
nine different unions in shipbuilding and boilermakers and AEU were 
part of all that. And they could be called into a dispute over 
shipbuilding and it'd affect us in the railways. Then there'd 
be a dispute between AEU and the NUR and the Boilermakers would just 
sit on the fence. On another occasion it were only the boilermakers 
who were going into work and that definitely affected who got 
promoted because AEU and the NUR tended to work to rule more often 
so the management promoted boilermakers who didn't. Yes they 
definitely played that, one against the other, with wage grades as 
well. It was not a happy situation. It was a tragedy and I blame 
the management as much as anybody because in the end everyone 
suffered. You can buy off people for so long, they were buying 
peace with them and manipulating them at the expense of the 
workforce AND the men that were paying the union dues" 
Shop Steward at Works 
This pattern of behaviour between unions is not, unfortunately, all that 
unusual. It is not suprising, therefore, that many become suspicious, 
even contemptuous, of their trade union officials. Few can be bothered to 
actively involve themselves in their union anyway and if that lack of 
interest is reinforced by a suspicion that they are the victims of a 
cynical manipulation then problems will occur. To expect solidarity to 
evolve out of such circumstances is unrealistic and yet, come the 
inevitable crisis, that is what is asked for. 
The mass rally had been attended by 10,000 and had again been a morale 
boosting day for the people of Shildon. What seemed more important, 
however, was the growing rumour that the Works might be saved. On the 
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same day as the rally <29th May> the Northern Echo carried a report 
<reporters, Doug Meek and Jon Herbert) about a meeting between Margaret 
Thatcher and Derek Foster MP that was to take place "to discuss the 
consequences of the shutdown". 
•Yesterday's announcement that the Prime Minister was to involve 
herself with the proposals came as a suprise to the local union 
leaders. They said they were delighted with the news. 'It came 
out of the blue.' said John Priestly who, with the NUR and 
Boilermakers' Society convenors, had an hour long meeting with 
Transport Minister David Howell in London on Thursday ... 'The 
Minister said he would look into our case and appeared to agree 
with us that more freight should go by rail instead of road. We 
were very impressed by his sympathetic attitude' said Mr Priestly." 
Whether, given the Prime Minister's often declared scepticism about 
nationalised industries, the "local union leaders" were wise "to be 
delighted" is less easy to decide. It could, for instance, easily be a 
positive move in the WRONG direction. There were many in the town, and not 
all of them necessarily Conservative voters, who felt that if they had 
returned a Conservative MP they might have had any easier time with the 
present Government. They also recognised that this rather cynical "after 
the event" attitude was of little use, but that it did reflect a grudging 
nod in the direction of "realpolitick". These same people would no doubt 
recognise that a meeting between a Labour MP and the Prime Minister was not 
necessarily helpful. Obviously Derek Foster had a positive duty to argue 
his constituents' case with Mrs Thatcher, but whether this would alter much 
was more open to doubt. 
The various claims that a "reprieve" was at hand rested on the assumption 
that BR was fearful of a nationwide strike over a number of its proposals. 
The day after the rally the "Sunday Times" commented on BR's dilemma. It 
is worth quoting in detail because it outlines the dangers for Shildon as 
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BR began its negotiations with its client unions; if ever there would be 
the time for "trade-offs" between management and unions this was it. 
0 Although BR still doubts whether the workshops are viable, it is 
prepared to see whether they can win an extra lease of life through 
export orders. BR is anxious not to be sidetracked into a squabble 
over workshops which could divert attention from its looming 
confrontation with the NUR and the train driver's union ASLEF over 
pay and productivity. On Friday, BR offered the unions five per 
cent rises from September 6 on the condition that they agree to a 
package of productivity measures, including flexible rostering by 
the end of July. The NUR has agreed to give up the industry's 
rigid eight-hour working shifts, but ASLEF refuses. 
BR plans to send out new rosters for train drivers to local depots 
this week. If, as expected, ASLEF rejects them there will be 14 
days of consultation. After that, assuming there is still no 
agreement, BR will have to decide whether to implement flexible 
hours, although this will undoubtedly spark off a series of driver's 
strikes. 
So far, BR has secured only one of its six productivity demands-
that some stations be unmanned. Apart from flexible rosters, the 
main stumbling block is disposing of NUR guards on new rolling stock 
with automatic doors on the St Pancras-Bedford line <Thus setting 
a precedent for the rest of the system>. 
Talks are still progressing on single manning of traction units, 
reducing the number of staff on freight trains, and introducing the 
a new employee category called 'trainmen' who would have the 
opportunity to be promoted to driver." 
John Fryer, "Sunday Times" 30 May 1982 
As already mentioned how BR would use the workshop issue in any "deal" it 
made with NUR will remain unknown, except to those who made it. It is 
certainly true that BR was preparing to re-think because on the 4th June, 
two days before a one-day threatened rail strike in support of the Works 
was to take place, BR announced it was "postponing" its decision on whether 
to close the Vorks. A decision on the Works future was "to be made in 
early 1983." The local union leaders were "delighted that our 
industrial strength has brought about a change of attitude.", but the NUR 
officials in London were more cautious and felt that "postponement" was not 
enough. 
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The local press carried a notice that the Works were:-
"Saved!". The six week battle to save Shildon was won on Friday 
night when British Rail management postponed controversial plans 
to axe the whole work force from April next year." 
Jim Gilchrist, "Evening Despatch" 7th June 1982 
This had the unfortunate effect of making the task of those campaigning for 
a PERMANENT future for the Works more difficult. A split soon started to 
develop between those in the Works who saw the "reprieve as a small battle 
in a longer war" and those who felt they had already won the war. It was 
perhaps time then to remember Ken Sissingford's words at the 
rally ... "British Rail will exploit the slightest crack in your campaign. 
From my experience BREL planned how long its DEMORALISING AND SOFTENING 
PERIOD WILL LAST." <my emphasis) 
On the 7th June it was confirmed that BREL was tendering in Nigeria for an 
export order of 900 freight wagons. If this tender was to be successful 
then the future of the Works would look hopeful providing, of course, the 
work came to Shildon. Three days previous to the Nigeria announcement 
NUR had started its own investigation into why wagons for repair had not 
arrived at Shildon. 
Any management wanting to get rid of employees can always present arguments 
for the need to "trim back", reorganise, rationalise,"make more efficient" 
its workforce. It has many ways to make such a proposal appear logical, 
even in the "best interests" of the workforce. One very effective method 
is to manipulate the order books. If there appears to be no demand for 
the "product" then it must be sensible to get rid of the people who make 
it, until, so the argument continues, "demand picks up". The "market 
-88-
placen may be where that elaborate dance between supply and demand happens, 
but the tune is more often than not developed elsewhere. 
On the 4th of June the Evening Despatch carried a long article the "Missing 
Wagons?" 
The unions say that thousands of wagons have failed to arrive at 
Shildon engineering shops and they want to know why? They claim 
wagons are being overworked as scheduled dates for routine repairs 
are delayed. It is claimed that thousands of wagons on British 
railways are a safety risk because they are not being repaired on 
time. 
By the end of this year 3,053 wagons should have been re-bodied, 
but to the end of last year only 651 had actually been carried 
out. Shildon has done 1,672 fewer repairs than it should have done. 
John Priestly, chairman of the Shildon shop stewards action committee, 
said, 'Regarding general repairs andre-bodies we can assume there is 
a safety risk if wagons have not been in for repair. British Rail 
has forecast that 64 per cent will come to us this year - we are 
supposed to be the major wagon repair centre, and we want to know 
why we are not getting all the work?'" 
Jim Gilchrist "Evening Despatch" 4th June 1982 
BR replied to this accusation by saying that they had estimated how much 
repair work would be needed when building the wagons and that not all 
wagons needed a major repair. As management they, obviously, had their 
statistical evidence for these decisions, but it is equally obvious that BR 
had "created" those statistics in the first place. British Rail could 
alter its strategy at any time and then justify that change by any creative 
process it wished. This is not to say that all long term planning is a 
nonsense, but within any strategy there will always be wide margins of 
error. What is not in doubt is that when decisions concerning the 
livelihood of thousands of people are made on purely economic terms then 
injustices will occur. They cannot wait "until things pick up" because, 
for them, that waiting will cause great distress. We can never know 
whether BR's policy towards the Works was economically justified or not, 
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but that it would be a social disaster for the town was never in doubt. 
Despite BR's "postponement" of decision on the Works a slow run down of 
management started to occur. Senior management began to be transfered 
elsewhere, but when BR was asked to comment they simply denied staff 
transfers had anything to do with a possible closure. Wilf Edwards, 
Sedgefield District councillor and employee at the Works, addressed an 
emergency meeting to discuss these changes. 
AManagement and top people are being moved away to other works. 
It is a step to undermine the situation. They take away the 
management and skills and expertise from Shildon and then say 
'Look we cannot keep the Works open because there isn't the 
management or the skill. Don't be fooled, British Rail 
means business.'" 
It was not only BR who meant business. Norman Tebbbit, then Employment 
Secretary, speaking about any industrial action the railway workers might 
take gave a clear warning of Government intent. 
"If management and unions cannot arrive at a sensible means of 
operation, which provides commuters and taxpayers with a reasonable 
service for the vast amounts of money which have been invested, 
the time will come when they say enough is enough. Nowhere is it 
ordained that BR must continue to prosper, come what may, regardless 
of the behaviour of its staff. The threat of renewed disruption 
is ludicrous. It would undermine the achievements of other workers, 
but above all it could only hurt those who work on the railways. 
There was a limit on how much money could be made available to the 
rail system. If that money is to be squandered on wage increases 
without productivity gains or poured away through industrial 
disputes, there is bound to be less available for the future survival 
and prosperity of our railway system. And it will be no good anyone 
criticising the Government for this." 
By-election speech in Beaconsfield. 14th May 1982 
The style is familiar but effective. "Vast amounts of money" being 
"poured away" on "squandered wage increases". Disruption is"ludicrous" 
and wi 11 "only hurt those who work on the railways" . And anyway it has 
nothing to do with the Government. This was an electioneering speech and 
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should be read as such, but it does, nonetheless, contain a fair summary of 
Government policy towards the railways; indeed towards nationalised 
industries in general. 
If a government does not adequately fund its railways, does not, in other 
words, "pour" money in, then things will start to go wrong. The 
government, always quick to shift the blame, will then look for a 
scapegoat- this is invariably the railway worker. If this shifting of 
responsiblity can be somehow tied to calls of patriotism so much the 
better. The Falklands War featured regularly in the electioneering at the 
Beaconsfield by-election and the candidate, Timothy Smith, decided it would 
be useful to link the enemy aboard with "the enemy within". 
•I have not met Mr Buckton, ASLEF General Secretary, personally, but 
I suspect that he suffers from the same kind of intransigence as the 
Argentine junta." 
Report in the "The Times" 14th May 1982. 
This spurious attempt to link the ASLEF strike with a war taking place in 
the south Atlantic is blame shifting at its shabbiest. The worker in a 
nationalised industry is peculiarily vulnerable to this idea that they 
alone are responsible for the industry's problems. This curious notion 
that only one side of the equation between manager and the managed is at 
fault makes it easy for successive governments to appear innocent victims 
of policies they themselves created- a neat variation on the idea that the 
messenger is to blame for bringing bad news. 
In June 1982 it seemed just possible that the Works might after all be 
saved. It had survived threats before so it was not suprising that there 
was a growing feeling that maybe it was time for a relaxing of pressure. 
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Unless the people involved are professionals campaigning can be an 
exhausting process. At the start everyone is "on a high", even excited. 
A sense of solidarity takes over from the usual routine of the workplace; a 
sense of purpose in an otherwise dull day. People in adversity often seek 
comradeship, if only to share their fears, and this can easily lead to a 
new sense of community amongst people who had not shared such feelings 
before. 
But the struggle was definitely not over. On the 7th June Sir Peter 
Parker, BR Chairman, wrote to the Chief Executive of Durham County Council. 
0 Detir Mr Dawson, Thank you for your letter enclosing a pamphlet 
describing the first assessment of the effects of closing Shildon 
Wagon Works as seen by your County Council. You can be sure they 
have been studied carefully. 
You will now be aware we have decided, against the background of 
possible wagon export orders and the uncertainty surrounding the 
"Serpil Inquiry", <report on transport commissioned by the Government> 
to withdraw for the time being our proposal to close Shildon Works. 
"The firm workload for 1983, however, remains as described by the 
BREL Managing Director when he met members of the Sedgefield District 
Council, and both the short and long term prospects REMAIN BLEAK. <my 
emphasis) However a meeting with the Staff representatives will be 
held tomorrow to consider how the problem might be tackled. 
In all circumstances, therefore, I suggest no useful purpose would be 
served in the meantime by the proposed meeting with representatives 
of your County Council and the three District Councils." 
. 
It was clear from this that closure was still a strong possib~ity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CAMPAIGN. 
A meeting of the Se~~field District Council Shildon Shops Working Party 
was held on the 17th June, 1982 to:- i) discuss further strategy, ii) hear 
reports of progress so far, iii) meet with trade union representatives from 
the Works. 
There was some discussion as to what options were available to the Local 
Authority "with respect to the handling and approach to the campaign 
against closure". Three were suggested. 
"(a) For the Local Authority solely to present the social consequences 
as highlighted in the Joint Report. 
<b) For the Local Authority and the Trade Unions to jointly present 
the social consequences of closure. 
(c) For Local Authories to allow the Trade Unions to present the 
social consequences of closure." 
Sedgefield District Council favoured (a) arguing that whilst it supported 
any Trade Union presentation it felt both campaigns would have different 
emphasis. Discussion followed on the relative merits of each approach. 
There was feeling among some present that the District Council wanted to 
"run their own show" and would be somewhat reluctant to "share" a strategy 
with others. It was finally agreed that:-
"The following elements of the campaign be dealt with by the 
Organisations specified:-
a) The industrial aspects of the proposed closure to be dealt with 
and led by the Trade Unions 
b) The political aspects of the closure, ie questions of 
nationalisation/denationalisation/privatisation, at least initially 
to be Trade Union led. 
c) The social consequences to be dealt with and led by the Local 
Authority in association with other organisations as appropriate." 
The trade union representatives were then allowed to join the meeting. The 
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joint report was discussed with the trade unionists suggesting some 
amendments. 
"The knock on effect of any closure would, in the TU's opinion be 
substantially more than was revealed in the report and this could be 
seen when one considered that local traders within a 30 mile radius 
of the Works received business worth t5.6m per annum from the Works. 
The TU's referring to the lack of orders from BR indicated that they 
understood that BR's orders for new build <wagons) for 1983 were being 
allocated to private companies and that orders for 8,000 wagons would 
be allocated to the private sector in the next 3 years. Repair of 
rolling stock is much more labour intensive than new build and the 
majority of men at Shildon were employed on repairs. Shildon had 
built approximately 12,000 merry-go-round wagons <large coal wagons, 
specially designed to empty on the move) and felt that many of those 
wagons would be in need of repair. Since those wagons had been 
built at Shildon it seemed appropriate for the repair work to be 
allocated to Shildon. 
The TU representatives explained the book cost of the building and 
machinery etc, which would need to be written off was £6,688,000, 
made up as follows:-
Land .............................. 132,000 
Buildings ....................... 2,257,000 
Plant ........................... 4, 204, 000 
Office furniture ................... 60,000 
Road vehicles ...................... 35, 000 
TOTAL 6,688,000 
Details were also given of investment expenditure in Shildon Works at 
October 1981 price levels as follows:-
£ 
1971 .............................. 500,000 
1972 .............................. 625, 000 
1973 ............................ 1, 375,000 
1974 ............................ 1, 625,000 
1975 ............................ 1, 950,000 
1976 ............................ 1, 150,000 
19'17 ............................ 1, 100,000 
1979 .............................. 375, 000 
1980 .............................. 850,000 
1981. .......... <estimated) ........ 350, 000 
Reference was made to the unfair competition from continental 
workshops which, in order to ensure continuity of work, were 
substantially subsidised by their governments and particularly to the 
noises that the private wagon manufacturers such as Procor had started 
to make in respect of that competition. 
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"Since 1971 the Works had made a profit of t5.5m and in 1981 when 
BREL's total profit had been t1,3m Shildon was responsible for 
£800,000 of that profit. 
A t24m order at least part of which would have been done at Shildon 
<ie the forging and draw bars) had been allocated to BREL Derby 
and the union raised the question of where the forging for that work 
was to be done. Shildon had the only forge in BREL and, therefore, 
it seemed that the forge work for Derby's order would have to be 
placed with an outside contractor. There was a forge, <not as 
large as Sbildon's) at the Horwich works which before the proposed 
closure bad a full order booked for foundry work. <Horwich was 
the other BREL works scheduled for closure) Both these points 
strengthened the union's belief that privatisation was a major 
factor in the proposed closures ... 
.. . The TU representative explained that a lobby of MP's had been 
organised for Tuesday 25th May and although Horwich/Swindon works 
bad organised that lobby they bad since withdrawn from it ... 
... Both the Trade Union and the District Council's representatives 
agreed that their actions in opposing the closure needed to be 
carefully co-ordinated and wherever possible the Local Authorities 
and the Trade Union should be working along the same lines. 
Consideration was given to the question of whether or not the 
Council should liaise with the Local Authorities affected by the 
Swindown/Horwich proposal (for closures) and it was felt that a 
joint approach, if it could be made, might be worthwhile. 
There was general agreement at having regard to the need for the 
co-ordination and the representatives of the Council and the Trade 
Union should meet regularly." 
Although occasionally obscured by bureaucrat speak this summary of the 
offical minutes of the meeting effectively states how the official campaign 
was to continue. 
At the Town level activity centred around maintaining morale. In the 
1940's people were asked to donate saucepans to "build Spitfires", after 
the war it was revealed that this had simply been designed to make people 
feel involved- the saucepans were presumably discretely dumped elsewhere. 
So in Sbildon much of the activity at the Works centred around fund raising 
raffles which, although obviously useful in raising cash, also gave people 
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a sense of being involved. 
Save Shildon Shops. 
MAMMOTH PRIZE DRAW 
All prizes donated by 
Tradespeople of Shildon Tickets lOP each 
The list of prizes included many larger prizes such as, a "Portable 
Television" and the "Car Radio and Aerial", with a plentitude of smaller 
presents such as a "Knitted cardigan", a "Cuddly Toy Dog", "Two Tins of Car 
Polish and 2 Tubes Car Filler", a "Screwdriver Set", an "Autographed 
football from .Middlesborough FC". These, and many more, indicated a 
touching willingness by the townspeople to support the fight. 
Various groups were formed to express particular points of view. A 
Shildon Woman's Action Group spokeswoman, Margaret Walton, gave an 
interview to Mike Amos of the Northern Echo. 
•we will be asking to meet her <Margaret Thatcher) face-to-face and 
hope she will agree. We are quite positive she cannot appreciate the 
effect on family life this closure will have on places like Shildon." 
"Northern Echo" 15.5.82 
Whether Ms 'Walton, in thinking the Prime Minister did "not appreciate" what 
her Government's policies would do to "places like Shildon", was being 
sincere or merely sarcastic is not clear. In the event Margaret Thatcher 
did not, unsurprisingly, find time to meet the Group. 
Rev Vincent Ashwin, Chairman of Shildon Council of Churches also made clear 
his support for the campaign. 
"I felt proud to. join the 4,000 other men and women who marched 
through Shildon ... Proud because the town showed itself united against 
the threat to close the works of its main employer and I could join 
in that unity ... One side of the b~nner I carried said 'Don't kill 
this community'. We felt angry that the North was being punished 
again and having to take more than its fair share of the burden of 
the present recession ... My other worry is that the divisions in our 
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"society will grow deeper. As new barriers may be set between those 
who are employed and the unemployed, who will look with envy at the 
luxuries we have." 
News letter. St John's Church, Shildon. June 1982 
"New Chief says 1 I 1 m no executioner. 1 " On Monday, the lOth of May, Dennis 
Lees, acting Manager, arrived at the Works. He had replaced Derek Clarke 
who had been appointed acting manager at BREL's works in Doncaster. 
"It has always been my aim to have a works of my own. I would hope 
not to be the last Works manager here because I'm conscious of the 
great history and it is a shame if a way of tradition has to die. It 
is a fluid situation at the moment and until I know exactly what is 
happening it would be ridiculous to MOVE HOUSE HERE <my emphasis) if 
the Works did close. It's a combination of a life's work in the 
railway industry. I can't comment on the decision taken on the 
closure plan. I'm here to do a job and will do that to best of my 
ability." 
"Evening Despatch" 11. 5. 82 
This statement was hardly a call to arms. It seems fair to assume that 
when "promoting" Mr Lees BREL would have fully briefed him on what was to 
eventually happen at the Works. It is interesting, however, that BREL 
made this change. There is always a danger that a manager of a plant will 
"go native". That he or she will begin to identify with the place and its 
workforce rather than to a distant, and a usually higher echelon of 
management. Whether this had happened with the out-going manager, Derek 
Clarke, would be difficult to determine, but obviously BREL were taking no 
chances. 
By bringing in a new manager, especially one that did not intend to live in 
the area, <Mr Lees was from Derby), BREL had ensured that local 
considerations were unlikely to colour Mr Lee's judgement. If a manager 
has nothing in common with the workforce , except that they work in the 
same place at the same thing, it is unlikely he or she will be much 
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exercised by appeals to any concept of shared community interests. A 
manager who has perhaps a family living nearby is more likely to understand 
the daily concerns and thoughts of the community. Children may go to the 
local schools, wives or husbands work locally, shop locally, and so a 
network of influences will colour how that manager sees his or her duties. 
Remove that influence and it becomes much easier for the manager to become, 
in fact, the "executioner". 
During the closing weeks of May 1982, a build up of support from trade 
unions other than the railways began slowly to develop. This took the 
form of pledges of support with claims like "We oppose any compulsory 
closures or compulsory redundancies." <Alex Ferry, Confederation of 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions). At a meeting in London <May 5th) 
the Engineering and Electricians union also pledged support. The 
National Union of Mineworkers, a union which shared many of the problems in 
the North East, also agreed to give whatever suppprt it could. Although 
these gestures of solidarity were welcome to the campaigners they could 
only, realistically, remain pledges rather than offers of direct action. 
In a sense, BREL's postponement of a decision had somewhat defused the 
situation and whilst everyone concerned knew there were still plenty of 
hard times to come it did create a lull, a kind of truce. 
In any industrial dispute the period when both sides retrench after their 
initial skirmishes is the most dangerous. Management nearly always has 
the advantage of being able to pick the battleground, the comma ;,nding 
heights. If this has been done well all it need do then is wait for the 
union to tire whilst the latter must keep up the pressure come what may. 
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In the June of 1982 Sir Peter Parker, on behalf of the British Rail Board, 
wrote to all employees of BR. 
"YOUR JOB AND YOUR FUTURE AT RISK 
I am taking the unusual step of writing direct to you and to everyone 
employed by BRB, because the industry in which we all work is facinR 
the most dangerous crisis in its history." 
The title of Sir Peter's letter must have appeared ironic to the people of 
Shildon. For most of them the "future", unless BRB altered its plans, 
would consist of a weekly trip to the Jobcentre. 
Sir Peter continued. 
"We are going to lose about £165m in 1982, even after the government 
and local authorities have paid us over £800m. The latest estimate 
of the cost of the 17 days of ASLEF strikes is £80m. We can't afford 
to borrow the money we need to renew and repair the railway, and this 
is limiting the service we give the customers who are our bread and 
butter. 
Ve're in deep trouble. You could say we're broke. This time the 
threat to jobs will affect you all. I want you to think seriously 
before you are drawn into industrial action and into a fight which 
nobody can win. 
The real fight now is not between ourselves or with the government. 
It's for survival. Last January and February many of our customers 
found they could do without our services." 
BRB was, undoubtedly in a difficult situation. It had to operate in the 
sure knowledge that its main source of finance, the Government, seemed to 
regard it as a client that was poorly adapted to the "market place" and 
therefore one to be sold off as quickly as possible. The BRB could not 
openly admit this because that would be political suicide, but everyone 
knew that this underlying tension existed. 
"This is the background against which the Board, on 28th May, made 
the following offer: to increase rates of pay by 5% from 6 September, 
providing that negotiations on all the six items in the 1981 
productivity agreement have been completed by 30th July 1982. If 
agreement on the productivity items is not reached by 30 July 1982, 
the pay offer wi 11 be withdrawn." 
This linking of new working practices to a wage deal was the reason for the 
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letter. BRB knew that if it did not get a productivity agreement from 
the rail unions their chances of achieving much progress with central 
Government were slim. Of course they would also realise that if they 
were successful in getting a more compliant workforce it would make it 
easier for the Government to offer them for privatisation. They were, 
therefore, almost conniving at their own destruction and yet fated to 
continue doing so in order that they could counter Government criticism of 
inefficiency. 
The next paragraph must have had a particularily bitter taste for the 
Shildon workforce. 
"Perhaps you feel that you have been through a crisis like this 
before- and it will be all right in the end. But we can expect no 
help, whatever government is in power, unless we accept that we must 
change the way we do things. All around us, in other industries, 
some with long and honourable traditions of service like ours, people 
are facing up to the need for change and getting rid of restrictive 
practices. We will get no sympathy if we continue to resist change 
until it is forced on us, more painfully." 
When Ian Gardiner, then Managing Director of BREL, had called Shildon the 
"premier wagon works in Europe and the jewel in the crown of BREL" he was 
primarily referring to the ability of the workforce to ADAPT TO NEW 
PRACTICES <my emphasis), not to resist curtailing old "restrictive 
practices." The workforce had accommodated every bout of BREL's 
modernizing zeal and were, consequently, to be closed down in the cause of 
"best business solution". The Chairman's letter would not have been an 
easy read in Shildon 
The Chairman concluded. 
"So what happens if your union calls you out on strike, or orders some 
form of industrial action which wrecks the railway? The answer, I am 
afraid, is no pay increase, no job to come back to for many, no 
prospect of investment in electrification. 
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"What can you do to help yourself in this crisis? You can speak up; 
let those who represent you and negotiate on your behalf know that 
you want this industry to survive. If we fight the competition 
instead of each other, we can still save many jobs that are already at 
risk." 
Taking into account what was most likely to happen to the Works the only 
answer to Sir Peter's question "What can you do to help yourself?" was, for 
the people in Shildon at least, a simple one; put not your trust in BREL 
princes and fight like hell. 
Most working people have only one strength; their labour. It is all they 
have to sell and they must therefore try and sell it as dearly as possible. 
It is, while their strength lasts, their only asset and once it has gone 
they are, to all intents and purposes, finished. This basic fact of life 
is learnt early and permeates every working day. 
So if the workforce at Shildon were to follow Sir Peter's suggestion, <"You 
can speak up"> to whom should they appeal? Their local union officals, 
who probably knew little more than they did? Their union executive, who 
would be beleagured by considerations of "trade offs", regional rivalries, 
and inter-union battles? The BRB Chairman knew, as well as anyone, the 
limited options available to his workforce. If he could frighten enough 
people into refusing to strike he would have succeeded- that was the 
purpose of the letter. Behind the chatty concern the letter was a 
careful attempt at dividing the unions from their members. 
By June 1982 everyone knew the Government had small regard for 
nationalised industries. Profitability was everything; if you worked in 
industry that was showing a loss you would soon, if not already, be out of 
a job. When Sir Peter Parker drafted his letter he was well aware his 
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audience had been well prepared for his arguments, they had been softened 
up by the awareness of what could happen if they did not do as they were 
told. 
In the month of Sir Peter's letter an article on freight appeared in 
"Rail news" <a British Rail management sponsored newsheet). Written by 
Henry Sanderson, BRB Freight Director, it was a report on how "In such a 
tough year did Railfreight beat its target?" He answered his own question 
in the sub-heading "A truly modern and competitive Railfreight network is 
emerging from the ashes of the old uncompetitive Victorian system." 
Every so often a word will seem to take on a special meaning, it will be 
incanted wherever possible as if to make what is being said matter. To 
say a "dialogue" is "meaningful" is meaningless, but for while "meaningful" 
was used- as if to somehow try and make something that was often trite 
appear important. Other examples abound, but if one word were to sum up 
the public utterances of BRB at this time is would have to be 
"competitive", with "productivity" a close runner-up. It was clear the 
Government had got one of its messages across. 
Mr Henderson writes: 
"In a year when many things went wrong for the country and for British 
rail it is pleasing to be able to report that Railfreight had an 
extremely good year and was able to reduce its loss even more than 
forecast, from £55 million to £14m." 
What had "gone wrong for the country" had been a rapid decline in the 
manufacturing base of the country, partly caused by the cut-back in 
Government investment and development in those industries. This had 
affected BR along with everyone else.· 
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"Despite the good results of 1981, the prospects for 1982 were- even 
before the ASLEF strike- at best, of maintaining rather than improving 
on 1981 results. This is despite continuing improvement in all areas 
of direct expenses- train and yard working and locomotive and wagon 
maintenance, and despite vigorous marketing efforts to maintain 1981's 
tonnage levels in the face of continuing recession. 
Two major areas of concern are, again, admin costs and interest 
charges, both of which are still rising. The Chief Executive, 
railways, has launched a major attack on administration costs and 
there is every prospect that they will start to fall dramatically, but 
there is no prospect of interest rates falling for a year or two. 
Under our PRESENT GOVERNMENT <my emphasis) remit any losses which we 
make have to be financed by borrowing at high interest rates, and our 
failure to break even since 1978 and, particularly, the high loss due 
to the steel strike in 1980, is now coming home to roost in rapidly 
escalating interest charges <~22m in 1980: ~37 in 1982). 
Those static prospects were before taking account of the ASLEF 
strikes. This had cost Railfreight over ~20m, which, needless to 
say, has shattered our financial propsects for 1982 and will in 
addition, lead to still more borrowing and still more interest 
burden in the years ahead. 
Despite this discouraging start to 1982 not all is gloom and much 
can be done to make this better. Our product is now getting good and 
competitive ... In the area of expenses we must continue to improve 
productivity so that we get still more competitive with road 
hauliers." 
The two problems that mostly concerned BRB were then, according to Mr 
Henderson, admin costs and high interest rates. The third, but emphasised 
more in the Chairman's letter, was the fear of another rail strike. If 
ASLEF had cost ~80m what would a full strike of all members cost? 
The problem was admin costs, not out of date workshops? And what might 
"admin costs" mean? It can mean many things. Was the administration of 
BR so costly that it had become necessary to close down profit making 
workshops in order to balance the books? Was this another case of the 
bureaucratic tail wagging the working dog? 
Mr Henderson's difficulties with interest rates were being echoed 
throughout the private and public sector economy. The Government, by 
declining to grant more subsidy, was forcing BR to borrow at rates which 
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Government policy had caused to rise. 
On the 21st May a letter from the prospective parliamentary candidate in 
Darlington, appeared in Shildon's local paper. 
0 SOME MIRACLE WORKER. 
Most people would be amazed by your front page trumpeting of the 
reduction of the rate of inflation as if it were some kind of modern 
miracle achieved by Mrs Thatcher. The reality is that the figure has 
only just come down <May 17th) to the level she inherited three years 
ago. 
I doubt if the workers at Shildon Rail Shop, when viewing their 
prospects would regard Mrs Thatcher as a miracle worker. Nor would 
the three million people officially registered as unemployed. 
Further total production is down, manufacturing output is down, 
investment is down and real take-home pay is down. Taxation, of 
course, is up. 
As for the future, even the most optimistic forecasts see continuing 
high levels of unemployment and very little growth of output. 
Some miracle." 
Oswald O'Brien Letters, "Northern Echo", 21st May 1982 
Mr Henderson's article could not state the absolute connection between 
Government spending and BR's problems no more than Sir Peter Parker could 
warn, in his letter, that a strike MIGHT be in the Government's interest. 
"Privatisation" was another of those words that had come to take on a 
special significance and a rail strike might be just what was needed to 
make the Government appear, reluctantly of course, forced to "sort out 
restrictive practices that continually hold the country to ransom, etc." 
The fiction that BR was totally its own master was reaffirmed in an article 
in another newspaper local to Shildon. 
"Tory councillors today hit back at accusations that Shildon rail 
shops are being closed for political reasons. Coun Dave Warren said 
local tories are fighting hard as anyone to save the Town's wagon 
works. His comments came after the North East Labour party said the 
region was being turned into a 'jobs desert to ruin their vote. • 
'I'm sick and tired of reading this rubbish by people like Stan 
Haswell -it's pure nonsense' said Coun Warren of Great Aycliffe 
Council. 'The decision to close the works was made by British Rail 
and not by the Government. The Government is leaving the nationalised 
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"industries to sort out their own troubles and has not interferred in 
the slightest with BR. The Works would have been all right if it had 
not been for the ASLEF strike- that ruined BR and is forcing them to 
shut plants such as Shildon." 
"Evening Despatch" 24th May 1982 
If Councillor Warren really thought that by "leaving the nationalised 
industries to sort out their own troubles", whatever that might mean, the 
Government was truly uninvolved in the consequences then he was either 
worryingly naive or just plain dishonest. Whether naif or naff his 
position on Government responsiblity was clear - whatever went wrong was 
someone else's fault. 
Although the postponement of closure had, to a certain extent, eased the 
pressure on the Works there was still the lingering threat of a full strike 
by the NUR. Sid Veighall, General Secretary, had declared himself ready 
to call a strike over the closures, and it was still possible a strike 
might, eventually, be needed. 
"I was about to fly off to a meeting in Amsterdam when someone came 
to Heathrow and paged me. I had this note thrust into my hand saying 
that there had been a postponement on the decision to close Shildon. 
Parker <Chairman of BRB> had agreed with me that maybe we could 
find another way out. Vhen I had first heard about the closure, 
at one of the regular lunches Parker and I had started having, when 
he put this paper in front of me I said 'No way are you going to 
close Shildon, no way!' I was determined and he knew that. I had 
agreed, I had to realistically, that there would be cut-backs, but I 
was determined to try and keep Shildon going somehow. I knew that 
once you closed it down it'd never be re-opened. They never are. 
To close something is too easy and to start it up almost impossible. 
So he had backed down." 
Sid Weighall, General Secretary NUR 1978-1984 <interviewed 7th May 1990) 
Sid Veighall genuinely believed Sir Peter Parker was ready to negotiate 
over Shildon. Both men knew very well the pressures each was under. 
They had learnt early that they needed to co-operate with each other if 
their industry was to survive . 
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•I had a lot of respect for Parker. He was a passionate believer 
in a nationalised railway system. He had worked his way up. Had 
stood as a Labour candidate for Parliament. We were in sympathy. 
So much that shortly after my being made General Secretary he had 
suggested that when he went to Fowler <Norman Fowler, then Minister 
of Transport> we should go together. Presenting a joint team. 
It was the first time it had been done and was a good move. We both 
wanted the best for the railways. In both parties <Conservative and 
Labour> there was always a strong road lobby and Parker and I knew 
that we would have to pull together. It weren't only the Tories 
because under Labour we'd had just as much trouble. Take the Tunnel. 
I'd had a devil of job with Conference <TUG Septemeber, 1982) over 
that. The Seaman's union, the Transport and General for the lorry 
drivers, they were all against the Tunnel because it threatened their 
jobs. You could see their point, but it was wrong. We had to change 
our transport system, we had to adapt to change. But they said I was 
using the environmental argument just to keep my members' jobs. In a 
sense they were right, but that didn't make the general point of the 
argument wrong." 
Ibid 
The fine balance between management and labour often swings on whether the 
leading personalities of each side can reach some kind of rapport. To 
reach a situation where neither side can tolerate the other is pointless. 
If there is a breakdown because of PERSONALITY clashes then it is the 
membership who will suffer, not those indulging in often useless posturing. 
•Any daft bugger can call a strike. It doesn't take brains to do 
that, but you've got to think of your members when you do. Is it 
going to do more good than harm.? Look at the miners. Who would have 
said that a powerful union like that, one any government would think 
twice about, could be destroyed like it was. And that was because of 
its leaders. Badly led and men's whole lives, their livelihood was 
wiped out." 
Ibid 
And yet unions were there to represent their members. The need to be 
cautious about entering into too close a relationship with management had 
to be balanced against the need to be able to see the other person's point 
of view, to understand what is possible and what is not. 
Weighall knew Parker would have to make cuts somewhere. Government 
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policy would make that inevitable, but bow those cuts were to be made, 
where they could phased in so as to cause the least distress was his main 
consideration. Another was whether his membership would support him if he 
did call a strike. 
"I feel very annoyed about it all. <The threatened NUR rail strike> 
I've had my share of being mucked about on the railways and have been 
made redundant many times. When we fought for our jobs, we got no 
support at all. I will be made redundant again this year, but I 
know I'll get no support. They'll do nothing and I'll have to go and 
find another job somewhere else. These people who were screaming 
their heads off now thought it would never happen to them, but when 
it comes to their doorstep they want everybody to support them. 
I feel very hostile towards them <Shildon workers) and there's no 
one around here <Northallerton) who has any sympathy for them. Why 
should they put their jobs in jeopardy? A strike will finish the 
railways and the road haulage firms will move in and we'll never 
get the traffic back. There are hundreds of signalmen who have 
lost their job in this region." <Ray Allan Signalman at Leyburn 
near Northallerton, North Yorks> 
"The Northern Echo" May 25th 1982 
Whenever a strike, in any industry, is threatened it is fairly easy for the 
press to find a member who is against taking action. For most people 
taking any sort of industrial action is a frightening step. It can very 
quickly isolate people from their otherwise normal routine. People, like 
perhaps a lone signalman, can soon become nervous and then their support 
begins to waver, however worthy the cause. The "Red Flag" always sounds 
better sung by a choir, the solitary picket, singing to the wind is less 
effective. 
In addition to the action over the closures there was also the possibaity 
of a rail strike over wage negotiations. 
"Your Executive <NUR> changed every year. A third was always 
automatically up for re-election each year so you never had that 
continuity. And you never knew how the Exec~ive would be made up. 
You might have a left wing period and then a right wing period, it 
depended on that third coming in. Now if they were all left wingers, 
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"and remember it only took one majority vote, you could easily have a 
vote far a strike. I might nat agree with it, but that'd be haw they 
voted sa that'd be it." 
Sid Weighall. NUR General Secretary 1978-82 
Weighall was in a difficult position because he knew one of the reasons for 
BR's need far closures was because the ASLEF strike had caused much damage, 
bath economically and politically. 
"It had been a selfish action and it had resulted in an argument aver 
what were really petty details being the cause of a whale Town lasing 
its work, its very identity. A whale community of people were being 
sacrificed far a few selfish people. I was, to be frank, disgusted." 
Sa it was that in the midst of concern aver the workshop closures another 
rail strike threatened, one that, if it developed, could easily make the 
ASLEF strike of the winter 1981/82 look, by camparisian, fairly 
insignificant. 
"'Nothing moves' order is part of a national all-aut strike by the 
NUR. The union is heading far a showdown with BR aver its five 
per-cent pay offer. North East NUR official Alec McFadden <a 
member of the National Executive) said today 'The railways in the 
North East will close dawn completely- the strike will paralyse the 
rail network.' He was one of the National Executive who had voted to 
fight far an improvememnt in the pay offer which is described as 
'an insult and derisory'. 'The pay deal would mean we are standing 
still far six months and we are nat prepared as responsible workers 
hoping far a decent wage to stand for that. We never want to stop 
the system and we are hopeful that we can get a settlement before the 
strike starts. ' The strike is planned to start at midnight an Sunday 
June 27th." 
"Evening Despatch" 10 June 1982 
The need for compromise between BRand its unions was becoming crucial and 
bath sides knew that part of that compromise would have to involve 
acceptances, an bath sides, that if there were going to be any victories 
there would have to be lasers. 
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The threatened strike of the 27th June had other implications for Shildon, 
it would come just three weeks before the Works annual holiday. Anyone 
working for BR had a rail pass and a rail strike would, for many, mean a 
change in plans. 
"Some were more worried about their blooming holidays than about the 
Works! Instead of being pleased with having the threat lifted they 
moaned on about how their holidays would have to go. Only a few 
like, but imagine." 
Worker in paint shop 
Whilst the negotiations on pay went on BREL and the NUR also tried to find 
a compromise on workshops closures. BR offered a scheme of voluntary 
redundancies which, it was hoped, would help reduce the workforce. 
Everyone knew that there would have to be some_job losses and voluntary 
redundancies seemed a sensible way to start. The NUR response was 
cautious. At a local level there were some who felt such a scheme would 
be the "thin end of the wedge" whilst others, especially those looking for 
early retirement, thought it a good idea. The adrenalin of protest was 
slowly begining to ease into a quieter mood. There were still a few who 
wanted the fight to go at full pressure, but for many there was a slow 
acceptance that even if the Works survived its workforce would be 
drastically cut. 
"An NUR spokseman said, 'We have got rid of the confrontation and we 
are now trying to keep the industry as viable as possible. The 
Working Party will deliver its results in the next few weeks after 
looking at the problems we have- it is too early to say what the 
recommendations will be, but there will be no COMPULSORY <my emphasis) 
job cuts." 
"Evening Despatch" 17 June 1982 
A workplace operating "voluntary redundancies" is where rumours flourish. 
As the pressure to leave is imposed so a gradual erosion of confidence 
develops among those trying to guess who might be next to go. The younger 
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members of the workforce start to see their promotion prospects improve and 
soon a feeling that each person is on their own erodes any sense of common 
purpose. Where does someone go for advice? In most workplaces asking 
advice of one's union official is akin to broadcasting the news every hour 
in the works canteen. If not one's union official who else? Management 
are hardly likely to give unbiased advice. Everyone becomes interested in 
who is leaving and slowly their own job comes to seem as something 
transitory. What had once been an optimistic workforce becomes one riven 
with anxiety. 
On the 24th June there was a meeting of the the Works Working Party. A 
major topic was how the proposed Channel tunnel might affect the demand for 
wagons? The Government seemed determined that the Tunnel would be 
built, as much as was possible, by private capital and the meeting felt 
that a natural consequence of this would be a greater use of privately 
built rolling stock. The meeting was informed that private wagon 
builders were seeking government subsidies to off-set foreign competition, 
this irony was not lost on those present. Derek Foster, constituency MP, 
said that it was difficult to get accurate figures for private wagon 
building. One estimate argued that the private wagon fleet was 18,000 and 
that it carried 30% of all freight- this meant that the private sector had 
10% of total wagons and yet carried nearly a third of freight. These 
figures were disputed by a number of people at the meeting. It was also 
reported that there was evidence that some private wagons were being leased 
back to BRand that this was being operated at "reduced rates". Derek 
Foster noted that this relationship between BR and private contractors was 
not helping BR, but in fact working against it-public money was being put 
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into private pockets. It was suggested that EEC funds be sought to help 
establish what the social consequences of the closure would be and the 
meeting was informed that Ivor Richard, <European Commdssioner for 
Employment and Social Affairs> was to attend a meeting with Sedgefield 
District Council on the 14th July. The meeting ended with a comment from 
one union official that "Peter Parker had proved no friend of ours.", many 
present found it hard to disagree. 
Meanwhile the day of the strike approached amidst reports that support in 
the north east was not very strong. 
"Union bosses have denied reports that support for next week's 
national strike is crumbling. One report suggested that 2,000 
north east railmen were set to defy the NUR strike call was dismissed 
as 'rubbish' by the union's regional organiser Alex McFadden. 'It's 
true no one wants the strike, but support will be 100% if sanity does 
not prevai 1 . ' " 
"Evening Despatch" 21. 6. 82 
The meeting with the EEC Commissioner began at 2.30 <14th July> at County 
Hall, Durham. The Shildon constituency MEP Roland Boyes opened with a 
resume of events to date. He then went on to suggest that BR's 
postponement of closure had been made because they were nervous of 
"fighting a war on three fronts at one and the same time?" <ASLEF dispute 
over flexible rostering; closure of works; and pay deal). 
The Commissioner, Ivor Richards, had been unable to attend and had sent his 
advisor, Dennis Grennan, as his deputy. This sending of a"deputy", an 
"assistant", etc, was very much a feature of the campaign. 
"BR, in event, couldn't attend <meeting to discuss post-closure 
strategy> because they had more important business elsewhere. As 
if the fate of a town was not sufficiently important!" 
Tom Toward, Town Clerk to Shildon. 
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Grennan pointed out that that whilst it was perfectly proper for Roland 
Boyes to complain about BR's behaviour, he could not be seen to make 
adverse comments. "There is a need to be more discreet than perhaps 
Roland can be." (from notes of meeting taken by Tom Toward) He felt that 
it would be possible for EEC funds to be allocated for a survey on the 
social costs of the closure- a "pilot report on a one-industry town where 
unemployment had made the situation worse." He urged that the report be 
done by people local to the area rather than from some "outside experts." 
The Chief Executive of Durham County Council, <Peter Dawson) then asked 
whether there was "a need for this kind of help and what level of funding 
could the County expect?" Others present took up the point that they had 
already completed their own survey and wondered whether a new survey would 
be any different? Stan Haswell, Sedgefield District Councillor, asked 
whether Durham University should be approached with a request for 
assistance? 
It was pointed out that EEC funds could not be seen to be being used to 
help the workers in an industry where the "Government has said it has to 
close". The Study should aim at showing the dangers of being dependent on 
one industry, even if the Works were not to close. Mr Dawson felt that 
it was important that the survey be done in such a way as to be useful to 
other areas. Grennan again pointed out that any EEC funded report could 
not "be put forward as an anti-closure move". 
It was obvious that an EEC Commission could not be seen to be interfering 
in the government policy of a member state. The European Commission for 
Employment and Social Affairs had to tread very warily indeed because 
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although almost all of its concerns would be the direct consequences of the 
government policies of member states, it would not be able to say so. It 
was, as it were, reacting to circumstances rather than helping prevent 
them. Its work might, through discussion supported by research, help to 
form opinion and perhaps thereby change some government's policies, but in 
doing this it would have to avoid being seen acting "politically". 
It had to be seen evaluating the effects, but could make no comment on the 
causes. In this it was little different from the civil service of any 
member state and yet, because of its identification with the EEC as an 
entity whose concerns were for the whole EEC membership, it could easily 
appear to become an arbitrator between government and the governed. If it 
allowed this to happen it would then find itself compromised in the eyes of 
the government concerned. 
The meeting then went on to discuss the "social costs" of rail and road 
freight. One councillor pointed out that during the recent winter it had 
cost "t31m to clear snow in the northern region, but this would not be 
considered as being part of the overheads for road freight and yet, if it 
were rail freight, it would". "It's nonsense to have one industry casted 
as having high overheads when the overheads of its direct competitors are 
not taken into account." This led to comments on the social costs of 
road freight. "The damage a thirty ton lorry does to the road has to be 
paid for by the taxpayer, the local council. 
and danger to people." 
That's apart from the noise 
The meeting was then brought back to the main issue when Dennis Grennan 
pointed out that Shildon's problems were being replicated throughout 
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Europe. There were "steel closures in France and Germany, pit closures 
in Belgium, everywhere you can see the same problems." This prompted a 
discussion about the way various governments subsidised the authorities 
affected by the closures. 
At 15.25 Dennis Greenan left the meeting which then continued with a 
discussion on what to do next? One councillor asked whether we "should 
await the results of the trade union's survey?" Another thought any 
survey should be done by the County Planning Office, but it was pointed out 
that they had already completed a survey. One councillor felt they had 
seen some "sense and some nonsense. Shildon is a matter of political 
philosophy- the rail road dispute will go on forever." Walter Nunn, a 
councillor for Durham County, Sedgefield District, and Shildon Town, <who 
also took notes of the meeting> felt that it was time to "cut out emotion 
and use all our resources to help each other. There are good socialists 
in the universities, let's use them if need be." The meeting ended with a 
general agreement that a survey would be useful and that the "EEC seemed 
sympathetic". 
Obviously there were other unions involved in the closure and on the 28th 
July the Transport Salaried Staffs' Association wrote a letter to its 
members on the "BREL Workload and Manpower Requirements 1983." 1 ts main 
concern was to publish the union's manpower figures and see how they might 
be affected by the BREL policy of staff cut-backs. 
"It was emphasised at the meeting of the Informal Liaison Committee 
that the effects of the ASLEF strike together with the much reduced 
revenue and uncertainty as to investment can alter the figures. 
BR representatives, together with BREL management could not guarantee 
the 1983 workload. They had also indicated that since the Report had 
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been prepared there had been agreement between BREL and BRB to slow 
down the New Build Programme to cushion the situation." 
"Cushion the situation" presumably meant a policy of "running down" the 
Works prior to closure. It must be remembered that this letter was sent 
seven weeks after BREL's announcement that it had postponed a decision on 
whether it would close the workshops. It would seem that almost everyone 
concerned felt the postponement to be a mere prelude to actual closure. 
"It will be observed from the Report that the question of a 
supplementary redundancy settlement was considered by the Joint 
Working Party and I can advise you that at the Informal Liaison 
Committee meeting, agreement was reached on supplementation to 
Workshop Wages Grades on a formula which provides six months wages 
to be paid for staff aged 46-50 years inclusive with 15 more years 
service and for pro-rata tapering reducing payments to 51-64 years 
of age inclusive. 
BREL will now be approaching the Workshop Wages Grades inviting them 
to register for Voluntary Severance and , we understand, counselling 
teams will be circulating around Works to answer any questions that 
may be related." 
The situation regarding Salaried Staff has still to be discussed but 
there are aspects which need to be agreed prior to receiving the 
refined figures. Accordingly, a meeting has been arranged to take 
place on the 2nd August 1982 and if agreement can be reached on a 
number of aspects , the matter will be reported to the TSSA Executive 
Committee during that week and a further circular issued. 
Yours fraternally, 
Tom Jenkins." <General Secretary TSSA) 
Attached to the letter was a report from the "Joint Working Party into BREL 
Workload Allocation from 1983". A meeting had taken place on the 
23/24th June to discuss the proposed BREL manpower changes. 
"Particular concern was expressed regarding Horwich and Shildon, 
but it was appreciated that not only would it be most difficult 
to transfer suitable and appropriate work in any volume to ease 
the situation at these two Works, if in fact any work had been 
available for re-allocation, and it would only have increased the 
problems at other works. 
No shortage of labour is revealed on the basis of current information, 
however, such shortages might be revealed if volunteers for redundancy 
are sought. 
Whilst it is appreciated it is not TUC policy to recommend voluntary 
redundancy, this is nevertheless recognised as the only alternative 
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"to short time working and we recommend accordingly that volunteers be 
sought. 
In this respect it is apparent from an examination of the current age 
profiles, a traditional approach is unlikely to resolve the problem 
and consequently the need for some special supplementation of the 
current redundancy arrangements, with appropriate safeguards based 
upon limited duration and aimed at dealing specifically with the 
problem of staff surplus to requirements for the 1983 BREL workload 
is considered feasible and necessary." 
The TSSA, like the NUR, was no doubt trying to be realistic when it argued 
that although it was not "TUG policy to recommend voluntary redundancy" it 
would recommend its membership to take voluntary redundancy. Any union 
must try and protect its members from all circumstances, but it always 
needs to avoid becoming the mere bearer of management's bad news. By 
creating a possible threat management can sometimes get the union to take a 
position which it will subsequently find difficult to defend. If the 
union does not respond it can be accused of being complacent yet if it does 
it might find itself manoeuvred into doing management's job. 
The "possihlity" of the workshop closures was forcing the unions concerned 
to plan for their actual closure. If they did otherwise they would be 
betraying their members. 
The comment that it would "be most difficult to transfer <to Horwich and 
Shildon) suitable and appropriate work in any volume to ease the situation" 
is an interesting one. The argument is that even if there was sufficient 
appropriate work transferring it would simply increase the "problem at 
other works". It must be remembered that the meeting took place in 
Derby, a town with a long tradition of railway manufacture, but also a 
town, as yet, not threatened with any significant closures. It would be 
natural for all concerned to want to protect THEIR jobs and if this meant, 
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perhaps, sacrificing someone else's job then so be it. To transfer work 
to Shildon would obviously mean somewhere else would have to lose out, but 
where? Which other centre of railway manufacture would come forward and 
offer some of its contracts? 
Much would depend on how the argument for transfer was presented. The 
situation would have to depend on establishing a set of priorities. Who 
should give what and why. Could Shildon argue its case with enough 
conviction against its own union colleagues who were, at the same time, its 
competitors? In a situation like this the personalities involved would 
inevitably play an important part. Shildon men and women would be arguing 
against colleagues perhaps more used to industrial dispute. 
"Whenever you had 1:1 meeting of branches the people from Shildon always 
stood out. The others would be perhaps a bit pushy. Argumentative, 
but those from Shildon would be quieter. It was bit like they were 
not used to having to fight their corner. I know it may sound 
strange, but they were sometimes like country people, unused to 
meeting the sort of people you'd get at a general meeting. The Branch 
was a big one, one of the biggest, and yet it rarely seemed to have 
much clout. Bit subdued. Nice people though, but maybe a bit too 
accommodating." 
Sid Weighall General Secreatry of NUR 1978-84. 
Comment on the approaching strike began to dominate the press. Although 
the Falklands war was reaching a crucial stage- by the end of the month the 
war was virtually over- its dominance over all over news began to recede-
people were beginning to realise what a rail strike would mean. 
On the 7th June The Times reported on a "summit meeting" between Len Murray 
<General Secretary of the TUG) and Albert Booth <Shadow Transport 
Minister). It also commented on the growing dissension between the 
unions involved. The feeling of some in the NUR was that ASLEF were 
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remaining too unyielding over the demands for flexible rostering. Each 
day saw the relationship between Sid Weighall <General Secretary NUR> and 
Derek Fullick <General Secretary of ASLEF> deterioriate further. <see page 
81). Both men knew what was being decided would drastically affect their 
members' job prospects for the coming decade, even beyond. The pressures 
to get it right were considerable. 
"The offer <BR's pay deal) was dependent on ASLEF's position. I 
didn't want my union's negotiations to be tied up with that of a 
another union's. I strongly objected to this. We weren't going 
to the barricades every Monday morning. That's what some idiots 
wanted." 
Sid Weighall 
The Times (8th June) reported that Sid Weighall was prepared to "negotiate 
a separate deal for NUR. A move which is unprecedented in railway 
history." It is rare for a union to agree to separate negotiations 
during a multi-union dispute. Weighall, however, had threatened this 
before. 
0 I was in negotiations in Newcastle, with the Boilermakers. You know 
what the boildermakers were like- demarcation this, demarcation that 
every detail subject to this and that. ~ell I was sitting next to 
them and I had to sit through diatribe after diatribe. I couldn't put 
my point across. I didn't get a chance to speak. In the end I got 
that mad I stopped the meeting and said. 'Look I'm prepared to 
commit the NUR to negotiate separately on this because we'll not be 
involved with any more of this rubbish.' There was a shocked 
silence, it'd never been known. They never spoke to me for 
months afterwards. Eventually they did like, but for a long time I 
was shunned." 
Ibid 
This exasperation with his colleagues was to create many problems, not only 
with ASLEF, but in the NUR. 
"Sid Weighall is prepared to negotiate a separate deal ... There has 
been friction between Mr Weighall and his lay executive and last 
night's vote of 17-6 for an indefinite stoppage was carried against 
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"his advice. A vote of "No confidence" against Mr Weighall has been 
proposed." 
"The Times" 16th June, 1982 
On the 21st June the threatened strike was debated in the House of Commons. 
It is worth examining this debate in some detail because much of what was 
said was to have a direct bearing on subsequent Government transport 
policy. 
aAlbert Booth. Barrow in Furness: <Shadow Transport Minister) 
I beg to move that this House deplores the Government's refusal to 
respond to the Opposition's proposals to intervene to avert a rail 
strike, and recognising the contribution of the rail unions to 
manpower savings and productivity increases in BR, regrets the 
Government's failure to match this with the increased investment 
urgently necessary to re-equip and modernise Britain's railways; 
and calls upon the Government to authorise a corporate plan for 
investment including mainline network electrification." 
"Hansard" Volume 26. Session 1981-82. Period 21 June-2 July. 
In March 1981 BR had presented the Government with a detailed set of 
proposals for modernising the system; it had been, in effect, a description 
of what was needed to carry the network into the next century. 
Government's response to the proposals had been fairly lukewarm. Some 
trading had gone on, but a change of Ministers <Norman Fowler replaced by 
David Howell) had brought these small beginnings to nothing. 
ai'd said to Fowler that I'd be prepared to accept driver only trains, 
productivity deals on hours and wages, where necessary a scheme of 
voluntary redundancies- the lot in return for investment. For a 
proper electrification of East Anglia, the Edinburgh Line, in fact 
a real investment in the whole system so that we could have a viable 
modern transport system. And he agreed. It was a joint approach 
between me and Parker <Chairman BR). Then he left and Howell came 
in and we had to start all over again." 
Sid Weighall General Secretary NUR 1978-82 
Whether the departure of Fowler made that much difference can never be 
known, but it cannot have made the relationship between BR and Government 
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any easier. The BR proposals were an attempt to make the Government 
commit itself to greater investment in order to avoid a drastic 
deterioration of the network. 
"The rail policy document pointed out that the physical effect of 
continuing the level of investment that then existed would be that 
3,000 track miles of BR would be taken out of operation within the 
decade, that there would be a fal.l in mainline locomotive availabli ty 
of about 50% and that the availabQity of diesel multiple units, which 
cater for many of our feeder lines as well as some of our main lines, 
would fall to about 60%. In other words, there was no prospect of 
maintaining our existing post-Beeching rail network without an 
increase in the amount of investment expenditure in BR. The 
Government have yet to reply to that rail policy document submitted 
by BR last year ... On one of the major investment propositions- · 
electrification of the main lines- the Government expressed no 
willingness to adopt any of the five options that were unanimously 
agreed by the Department of Transport and BR. Instead BR has been 
subjected to a series of changes in Government policy on 
electrification, told that the bases of the five options were no 
longer acceptable, told to do.its calculations again line by line 
and told to calculate on the basis that the proposals apply only to 
those parts of the mainline network that will be viable in 1985. 
It was told to do the calculations again because there had been an 
ASLEF strike. Some people at BR's headquarters must be sick of 
doing new calcul .ations on investment proposals for electrification." 
The proposals did not ask for something vastly ambitious ... <Just that 
our) railways be brought up to the standard that the French attained 
in 19?0, the Belgians in 194? and the Italians in 1940. Our 
electrification is inadequate by any of the standards accepted by our 
European partners. 
If we do not electrify our mainline network we must replace our 
diesel locomotives with engines that are heavier, less economic and 
more costly to maintain than the electric locomotives ... Irrespective 
of whether we electrify, it is necessary for operational, safety and 
efficiency reasons to spend more on the railways. The Secretary of 
State knows that. Their response was not even to sustain the 
existing inadequate expenditure on investment, but to reduce it. 
Expenditure by the BRB on investment in 19?9, at mid-1981 figures, 
was £379m. This year the Board forecasts investment at t265m, 
which is a drop of tlOOm in expenditure on what was held to be at a 
level inadequate to maintain our railways in their present state." 
<Albert Booth) 
"Hansard" 1981-82 Volume 26. page 31 
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The interruption from the Government benches at this point was typical of 
many to follow and, given the circumstances, could appear to be fair 
comment. 
"Mr David Madel, Bedfordshire, South. The right hon. Gentleman 
is chastising the Government for not getting on with electrification. 
Does he agree that it is difficult to press ahead with more spending 
if, for example when we have a brand new electrified line between 
Bedford and St Pancras, management and unions still cannot agree on 
manning and new expensive stock is unused because of the inability 
to reach agreement?" 
Ibid 
The reluctance of ASLEF to work new rosters was constantly used to undercut 
the arguments of those proposing greater investment. 
This proposition that investment was held back because unions would not 
work any improved system circled around the counter argument that the 
unions, believing their industry to be under threat, were trying to use 
their influence to save it. 
"Mr Booth: What determines how much BR can spend on investment, in so 
far as there is Government control, are the external financing limits 
and the number of investment schemes that the Government are prepared 
to approve ... The amount spent is half what is needed for essential 
renewal ... Against this background the trade unions are negotiating 
about pay, productivity and conditions in the clear knowledge that 
their industry is running rapidly into crisis. Those unions have 
a good record of working with management ... Between 1970 and 1979 the 
number of staff required to run BR was reduced by 30,200, not at a 
time of negative productivity because of curtailed services, but 
when there was an investment programme that was making some headway. 
Such was the co-operation between trade unions and the BR Board that 
the board put forward a corporate plan for 1981 to 1985 in the belief 
that railway staff could be reduced by a further 38,000, if the 
investment programme was commensurate with that. The unions tried to 
formalise an understanding with the Board and there was an agreement 
known as the 'Balance Sheet of Change', between BRand the trade 
unions in November 1980." 
Ibid 
This "Balance Sheet of Change" had been an agreement that the unions would 
accept manpower changes, productivity deals, etc, in return for a proper 
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programme of investment. Both sides understood that given the present 
Government's attitude to nationalised industries it was essential that they 
work together. 
"Those who suggested that the unions have not responded or are 
standing in the way of progress should look at what happened in the 
two financial years up to April 1982. A further 15,510 post were 
eliminated from the industry. How long can unions go on sacrificing 
jobs against a promise of investment to enable the industry to perform 
better with fewer men when that investment was not forthcoming?." 
Ibid 
The couple of questions that followed this detailed comment on the railway 
union shows, perhaps, how inadequate Parliamentary debates can sometimes 
be. 
•Mr Tim Eggar, Enfield, North: So that the country may be in no doubt 
about where the right bon. Gentelman stands, will he tell us whether 
he supports the action being promised by the NUR and whether he 
supported the action of ASLEF? 
Xr Peter Snape, Vest Bromwich, East: Vhat a silly boy the bon 
Gentleman is." 
After this rather pointless piece of nonsense Booth continued. 
"Ve should be anxious, not decide whether we will support disputes, 
but take steps to avoid them and improve the performance of BR ... If 
the terrible worry that existed in the railway workshop plans as a 
result of the proposed workshop closures did nothing else, it at 
least caused the Secretary of State and myself to look carefully 
at what determined the work load of those workshops, particularly 
the one at Shildon. I am sure that the Secretary of State is as 
aware as I am that one reason for the closure proposal was that there 
is a much more efficient use of freight wagons following the 
introduction of modern technology. Wagon utilisation was improved 
by 25% last year. Vhen we talk about improving productivity we are 
not only talking about putting people out of jobs. The bitter 
attitude among railway unions has been caused by their belief that 
the Government has reneged on their part of the balance sheet of 
change." <Albert Booth) 
This attempt to open the debate on the threatened rail strike into a one on 
Government investment in railways was naturally resisted. Indeed the 
Shadow Minister's comments on Shildon, whilst, in one sense, pertinent, 
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could be seen as being positively harmful. If Shildon's increased 
productivity had helped to make the freight system more efficient then it 
would naturally follow there would be less need for more wagons; therefore 
less need for the Shildon workshops. 
The response of David Howell, the Secretary of State for Transport, was 
naturally to claim that Government investment was adequate. It is 
interesting, however, that in answer to questions on investment in specific 
projects he constantly refered to their either "being before me." or 
"before me for approval", but not what he intended to do about them. He 
described that there were "vast resignalling projects <that) are going 
ahead" and that "new electric railway coaches (200) and sleeping cars <210) 
are being produced," but the really significant investment- large scale 
electrification- remained, as yet, only "before him" for consideration. 
"Mr Howell: Of course it is recognised that a substantial increase 
in investment is needed. It is also recognised that the investment 
has to come not only from the taxpayer- from whom it does come in 
substantial amounts- but from resources generated in the railway 
system. The difficulty over shortage of investment funds arises 
not from the ceilings set by the Government, but from the amount of 
resources that the railway can generate ... the Government have, of 
course, endorsed the rolling programme of electrification and 
believe, depending upon productivity and BUSINESS PERFORMANCE, <my 
emphasis) that it should go forward." 
Ibid. 
"Business performance", more usually described as "market forces" will, 
then, determine whether electrification will finally be allowed to go 
ahead. The Government Minister is saying nothing new in this, but if 
"market forces" are to be the sole criterion for investment then what the 
unions were planning, a strike to get an improved pay offer, was also a 
product of "market forces". If they believe the "market" for their 
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labour will stand better pay then they must, according to "market forces" 
take the appropriate action. This response might be simply compounding 
one foolishness with another, but as it is the government who usually makes 
the rules then it should not be suprising if its "clients" follow suit. 
A more detailed examination of the present Government's transport policy-
especially as outlined in this Debate- will follow later, but this re-
statement of the Government's determination to see "market forces" 
dominate its transport thinking further indicates how difficult the 
campaign against closure would be. 
Three days after the Debate an estimate on the likely cost of the strike 
appeared in the press, "An earlier rail strike cost £600, 000 a day, but 
this dispute would cost even more given the lost trade that could result." 
<The Times, 24th June>. A few days later there was a further report that 
Sid Weighall had, 
"felt he had been penalised by both the BRand Government because 
having reached an agreement on productivity his union is being 
penalised for the lack of progress of ASLEF on the vexed issue of 
flexible rostering." 
"The Times" . 28th June 
As the day of the strike grew near it became clear that divisions within 
the NUR executive were worsening. The fear that there would not be 
wholehearted support for the action overlay much of the activity in those 
last hours. Weighall had not wanted the strike but had been out-voted by 
a more militant executive in favour of action; he was now forced to defend 
a position not of his choosing. 
The strike began at midnight on the 28th June. By the evening of the 29th 
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it had become clear to the NUR executive that it had failed. The figures 
for actual support were confused, but it was clear that a very significant 
number of NUR men and women had turned out for work and that consequently 
further action was pointless. The strike was offically ended by the NUR 
executive that same night. The fact that Weighall had opposed the action 
made little difference to the bitterness he felt. His assessment on the 
wisdom of having a strike had been proved right, but at a damaging cost. 
Any union executive which orders a strike must, naturally, think there is a 
chance its action will result in something positive. What is even more 
crucial, however, is that it be certain its membership is with it. If a 
strike is called and it fails because of lack of support from the 
membership the damage to that union's future negotiating position is 
incalculable. The collapse of the strike may or may not have been the 
straw that finally broke Shildon's back, but its failure certainly made the 
NUR appear weak, and therefore vulnerable; not a good base from which to 
argue a case. 
Any hope that NUR would be able to force BR to change its policy on 
closures collapsed when the strike failed. It was obvious, both to the 
union and BR, that few people would strike to save someone else's job. 
By failing to support the NUR strike its membership had effectively given a 
vote of no confidence in the union's executive; if they would not strike 
over their own pay they would certainly not act on behalf of others. 
Closure of Shildon now became a virtual certainty. The reluctant 
acceptance of that fact slowly altered the mood of those campaigning on the 
Works behalf. On the 3rd of August 1982 a meeting of the Joint Working 
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Party discussed redundancy payments. Terms were discussed; "supplementary 
benefit to be paid by BR and not the Government, men with over 15 years 
service or over 40 by 30th September to be offered terms. But that does 
not mean they have to go before or even at all." 
The workforce no longer discussed how to avoid closure, but how to make 
that closure as painless as possible. It was suggested that 
maybe the Works could be saved, for some at least, if a shorter working 
week was introduced? This, combined with voluntary redundancies, might 
make the Works viable. 
There were many who privately admitted that the Works was overmanned. The 
need to develop working practices which saved on manpower was not 
considered important during the years of low unemployment. In 
nationalised industries an attitude that jobs would always be subsidised 
helped forge a dangerously complacent attitude. Management and workforce 
grew slack believing that whatever happened in the private sector they 
would always be secure. Then, suddenly, the "market place" determined 
differently and they were caught unawares 
"Look I'll be honest, the Works could've run on half the workforce. 
There were some lazy buggers who thought they'd got a job for life. 
Now all was changing. We should have done something about it years 
ago. It was management as much as the men. They just let things 
drift and consequently nothing changed. It just went on as before. 
Then suddenly we were faced with having to justify our jobs, argue 
which were needed and so forth." 
Former shop steward in Works. 
This justification was now having to decide not only who did what job, but 
who would have a job; voluntary redundancy had replaced the "job for life". 
"We needed to get the balance right and to avoid compulsory 
redundancies. We thought that maybe another option would be a 
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Areduced working week. A reduction in night work so that the 
remaining work could be spread over more fairly. A roster to keep 
all going equally. There was some concern that the salaried staff 
hadn't been told anything, that maybe they would be protected. And 
as well as this there was the fact that jig and tool fitters were 
running out of work. Some fitters would soon have nothing to do." 
NUR Shop Steward at Works 
At a meeting two days later <5th Aug> one member of the Committee, 
responding to comments about the "lure of gold" in the redundancy payments, 
commented that "nine weeks ago we had unity, now we're a music hall joke." 
The early optimism was gradually turning to despondency. 
Management and workforce began to talk of "natural wastage", "surplus to 
requirements", or, more directly, "deadwood". These sad descriptions of 
other people's lives made the earlier solidarity now seem foolish, even, 
for some, embarrassing. 
An assessment of work vis a vis labour was issued <July 1982). The 
number of new constructions for 1983 was assessed at almost a quarter that 
of 1982 <907 for 1982 and 233 for 1983>. Repairs, always a more 
reliable source of work, were similarily slightly down. 
"Repairs- Classified 
Wagons - Traffic 
Wagons - Service 
Total repairs 
1982 
8122 
1248 
9370 
1983 
7235 
1630 
8865" 
Manpower requirements in the workshops showed a similar decline. 
"Category 4 Staff 
Electrician 
Fitter 
Metal Machinist 
Metal Worker 
Vehicle Builder 
Staff on books Requirements 1983 
12.6.82 
22 15 
521 392 
96 48 
125 105 
59 37 
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Surplus + 
Shortage -
7+ 
129+ 
48+ 
20+ 
22+ 
nwelder 254 128 125+ 
Other Cat 4 staff 94 50 44+ 
Total Cat 4 staff 1171 775 396+ 
Apprentices maturing by Dec. 1982 35+ 
In excess of anticipated 
natural wastage in 1983 34+ 
Net total <skilled) 465+ 
Other wages grades 
<Including Cat 1-3) 866 575 291+ 
Total wages staff 756+" 
Management labour assessment. Shildon Works July 1982 
Perhaps the saddest figures in this assessment were those of the 
apprentices. Just at the point when they had finished their training and 
were starting their working careers they had become part of that ever 
growing category; those deemed to be "natural wastage". Hardly an 
encouraging start to a working life. 
On the 18th August the Acting Works Manager, Dennis Lees, wrote to all the 
staff. 
"OUR FUTURE" 
As you are aware we are currently facing serious workload shortaRes ... 
It was agreed with the Special Working Party that we should first 
offer voluntary redundancy to all adult staff ... 
In the event that sufficient volunteers do not come forward, the 
alternative at the present time can only be a shorter working week 
for everybody as THERE IS NO INTENTION TO ENFORCE REDUNDANCY. 
(writer's emphasis). If we are to survive, it's absolutely necessary 
for us reduce our present staffing and our overhead costs. 
Every effort is being made to seek new work and to find new ways of 
reducing our costs. It is, however, vital that we reduce the size 
of the workforce in keeping with the workload available, as a shorter 
working week will increase costs and therefore not attract work to 
this factory. 
For this reason I am again asking for staff to apply for voluntary 
redundancy." 
There is no mistaking the purpose of this letter. A "shorter workinR week 
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will increase costs" and thus not solve the manpower problem, therefore, if 
there are insufficient "voluntary redundancies" enforced redundancies will 
have to begin. How else can the Works survive? Was this letter, in 
effect, trying to blame any subsequent closure on this reluctance of the 
workforce to take voluntary redundancy? Was the sub-text simply saying 
"If there aren't more of you prepared to give up your jobs then when we 
close it'll be your fault"? Whatever the purpose the message was clear; 
a large number of people in Shildon were soon to become unemployed. 
A meeting of the Sedgefield District Working Party took place on 26th 
August. The problem of what to do about "voluntary redundancies" 
dominated the meeting. Some felt that "this carrot being dangled was 
helping to divide the workforce". Another member described how "the 
atmosphere in Shildon now is the same as that you find when there is a pit 
closure on the way. Next it'll be compulsory redundancies and everyone 
knows it." Yet another complained that the "danger of the golden 
handshake" would eventually undermine the campaign. The NUR came in for 
some blame for accepting voluntary redundancies so early, but when asked 
what else could the union do the speaker could offer little that was 
constructive. 
Everyone present must have known their cause was hopeless. Yet another 
survey on the effects of the closure was proposed. A suggestion that "we 
send a deputation to Howell and Thatcher" was quickly rejected; all knew 
the chances of moving their Prime Minister to pity were nil. 
These gatherings had begun to follow a familiar pattern. All present 
lamented the pending closure, but had little idea what could be done to 
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avert it. Beyond setting up another survey, bemoaning the state of the 
railways, and expressing a collective anger little happened. Meanwhile 
the workforce began to quietly weigh up how much redundancy money they 
could expect. 
At a another meeting of the same committee (3rd September> a member noted 
that only "fifty per cent of the shop stewards bothered to turn up." This 
meeting decided to send a delegation to attend the Labour and Conservative 
conferences. It was also agreed to send a delegation to Brussels to lobby 
MEP's- they would fly with a total limit on fares and expenses being set 
at £1,600. This not inconsiderable sum worried some members of the 
committee. The workforce had given money to the fund, but there had been 
some complaint that there were some on the committee who did not have the 
full trust of the workforce. Whether this suspicion was fair or not is 
not important- there will always be some who will suspect everyone and 
everything- but what was important was that these suspicions were shared by 
a fairly large section of the workforce. The record of some of the 
people involved had not been one that would inspire confidence. 
"You wouldn't believe this, but some buggers used the fund to fill 
their pockets. We had a boilermaker on the trip to Brussels and 
every time we'd have to change plane or train, whatever, he'd be 
in the bar. He was drunk for most of the trip, and there were others. 
There was another bloke, when we were going to London, he got off 
at York and claimed the full fare. Only a few did that mind, the 
rest were straight, but it don't take many do it? To tar everyone 
with the same brush." 
Former shop steward at Works 
Following the Labour Party Conference, the TUC-Labour Party Liaison 
Committee published their "Transport Policy" document. There was little 
in it that would give comfort to Shildon. It seemed to suggest that, in 
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1982, the Labour Party had not significantly moved from a previous emphasis 
on road haulage. 
"We recognise that road transport for the future will be indispensable 
to the movement of people and goods. A simple anti-road position is 
counter productive to constructive policy formulation, but transport 
needs and environmental consideration have to come more into balance." 
"Transport Policy" Section 1. para 1.4 
Later, in its section on freight it stressed that: 
"The efficiency of the freight transport industry, in which road 
haulage plays a major role, is vital to the country's economic 
prosperity." 
Ibid Section 5. para 5.1. 
The curious stressing of "road haulage" here seems to suggest that some 
special pleading had gone on. This opening statement did not have to 
specify a particular form of haulage yet the whole paragraph deals almost 
exclusively with the concerns about "costs involved in road haulage", 
that "Government must seek to ensure that the operating standards of the 
road haulage industry are kept at a high level", etc. 
It continues: 
"The mass of frejght journeys will continue to be transported by 
road for the fo~seeable future, but fair means must be used to get 
as much freight as possible on to the railway without sacrifices in 
costs and efficiency." 
It is perhaps unfair to pick out these, perhaps innocent, constructions in 
an otherwise comprehensive document, but it is true that elsewhere the 
emphasis on moving freight was beginning to move back to rail. 
A report on the Shildon delegation to Brussels contained the following 
observations: 
"The main points ar1s1ng from the general discussion was the European 
acceptance of the need for an efficient up-to-date railway system 
throughout Europe and even beyond ... Next month the Chairmen of all 
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"Transport Committees in the European Parliaments would meet to 
discuss this problem. There was a general acceptance that railways 
should take priority over road transport ... There were still strong 
lobbies supporting road transport as opposed to rail and each group 
was capable of blocking progress within the European set-up." 
Durham County Council delegation to Brussels Report: 21st Sept. 1982 
It would be foolish to make too much of this disparity of approach, but it 
would, perhaps, be fair to say that the environmental need for less road 
haulage was being recognised earlier in Europe than in the UK. 
A further nail in the rail freight coffin occured in December when the 
Association of District Councils stated that the BR wagons currently 
carrying scrap metal would be "life-expired and withdrawn from service by 
May 1984". 
On the 13th of December a meeting of the Policy and Resources Committee, 
<Sedgfefield District Council), met to discuss the implications of the ADC 
circular. It was noted that if this withdrawal of service took place 
there would a serious increase in heavy road haulage. 
"The result of this is that there is a danger of not less than 
750,000 tons of scrap being transferred to road haulage with all the 
adverse environmental effects that could have .... The ADC refers to 
the need to alert all Authorities of the possible consequences ... 
In the short term the scrap would probably be carried in 34 ton tipper 
lorries with an average 20 ton payload- however, it is pointed out 
that there may be an increase in the maximum permitted weight of 
lorries from 32 to 38 tons and clearly this could be relevant." 
Minutes of Policy and Resources Committee, SDC. 13.Dec.1982 
It was clear from the ADC circular <Circular 92/171) that some Local 
Authorities would be applying for railway facilities under Section 8 of the 
Railways Act, 1974. This Act will be examined in more detail later, but 
in essence it allowed for a Government grant to be made to enable either 
private or public industries to build their own access sidings onto the 
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existing rail network. The implication for Shildon was that if there was 
to be a demand for new wagons, to replace those withdrawn from service, 
would those orders come to Shildan? The answer to this question came in 
the same report. 
The Policy and Resource Committee reported that:-
"Farseeing the position which will arise in 1984, a Working Party of 
representatives from BR, British Steel Corporation, and the Scrap 
Federation plans to introduce a nationwide rail service in new 
purpose-built wagons far which a grant from the Government under 
Section 8 <Railway Act 1974) is required if the scheme is to be 
viable .... The ADC points out that for such a grant to be forthcoming 
the support of local authorities whose road network would be affected 
by the lorry movement is required and Councils are asked to write to 
the Dept. of Transport supporting grant aid to the STANDARD RAILWAY 
WAGON COMPANY LTD which is PREPARED TO BUILD THE SPECIAL NEW BOX 
WAGONS." <my emphasis) 
The new wagons were to be built by private contractors. The main 
argument for the closure at Shildan had been an economic one; there was no 
demand for what they made therefore they should go. Now private industry, 
seeing a demand far new wagons, was seeking support from local authorities 
to get a government grant to build railway wagons. 
"'I think there's something very devious going on at National level.' 
said Caun. Stan Haswell. 'If we supported this grant application we 
would be cutting the throats of the people at Shildon Works.'" 
"Evening Despatch" 14.12.82 
1982 had proved a hard year far Shildon. On the 4th October the Daily 
Mirror ran a full two page feature on Shildan. 
"Walter Nunn has been a railwayman since January 1938 ... standing 
beside a replica of the Hackworth's locomotive he said, 'The process 
has already begun. The community is already divided by the "offer" 
of redundancies. What does the alder man say when the carrot of a 
pay-off is dangled? What does a man say if he is tired or ill and 
handicapped from an injury? It's a terrible dilemma, because we 
know when the redundancies are taken up, the workforce is weakened 
and fighting far survival then is much harder. No apprentices are to 
be taken on this year. This had not happened for 150 years. They're 
cutting the bloodline.'" (John Pilger, "Daily Mirror" October 4th 
1982) 
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That the "bloodline" had been cut was not now in doubt, but the reasons for 
that surgery were less clear. Christmas 1982 saw a divided and 
disillusioned Shildon; a community which now knew the closure would go 
ahead, but still did not know why? 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CLOSURE 
On the 18th February 1983 J.Palette, <Director of Personnel for the British 
Rail Board) wrote to the unions likely to be affected by BREL's planned 
closures. His letter was titled "BREL CAPACITY: The plan for 
closures." The preamble reiterated BR's need to cuts costs and then 
announced that:-
"BREL's future must be committed to that of a commercial company that 
can successfully bid for coaching and rolling stock orders in the 
export market and also competitively bid for future BR new build 
requirements and to do so it must eliminate its excess capacity. 
There is, therefore, only one correct course for BREL to follow and 
that is to structure its organisation in line with its future needs 
and to do so must result in:-
(a) The closure of Temple Mills Works by the end of 1983 
(b) The closure of Horwich Works (with the exception of the Foundry 
and Spring Shop) by the end of 1983. 
(c) To run down Shildon Works during 1983, with a view to total 
closure during 1984. 
I think I must also caution that unless BREL succeeds in increasing 
its share of the world market for traction and rolling stock 
requirements, the probability of another medium sized Works closing 
in the 1986-87 timesc~le cannot be ruled out." 
The letter accompanied a supporting outline on how the closures would be 
organised. This concluded with a description of how work would henceforth 
be distributed. 
"It is,therefore, proposed that the following workload transfers take 
place:-
Activity 
Freightliner Wagon Repairs 
_ .. _ 
EMU Repairs 
Wagon Repairs/ New Build 
LH Coach Repairs LMR/ER 
DML Repairs <unclassified) 
From 
Horwich 
Temple Mills 
Horwich 
Shildon 
Glasgow 
Derby Loco 
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To 
Derby LL/ 
Wolverton 
_ .. _ 
Eastleigh/ 
'Wolverton 
Doncaster 
York 
Crewe 
"DML Repairs <class 37) 
Service Wagon Repairs 
LH Non-Passenger Coach Repairs 
Doncaster 
Shildon/ 
Temple :Mills 
Doncaster 
Crewe 
Derby LL/ 
Doncaster/ 
Wolverton 
York. 
The workload transfers can be achieved without the need to recruit 
staff at the receiving locations." 
There was no mistaking BR's intention now, Shildon Works would close in 
1984. 
How did the people of Shildon react to this re-affirmation of closure? 
"Coli.n Russell, 42, had 21 years service at the Works and is the 
Vice-Chairman of the local NUR. He is also a born optimist. 'I still 
don't believe they'll close it. Why should they have bothered to 
reprieve it last year just to shut it again. In my opinion it's 
just a scare tactic to get more men to take voluntary redundancy.' 
Others were less sure. 'Any campaign will be a waste of time. The 
place is as good as shut. For anyone who reckons the place will stay 
open now it is just wishful thinking.' (John Humble, New Shildon Club 
President). 'This is a Town of dead men- Thatcher has decided to 
kill us. What sickened me tonight is how she said she'd do anything 
to help the Australians after the fires. I know Australia's in the 
Commonwealth but so is Shildon. ' (John Harbron, labourer in Works)" 
Martin Shipton "Northern Echo" 18th February, 1983 
The day before Palette's letter the "The Financial Times" had commented on 
BR's proposals. 
"The programme differs from that put 'forward' by the management of 
BREL last spring, which proposed that nearly 2,000 jobs would also 
go from Swindon and Derby locomotive works. This programme 
met intense opposition from the rail unions and particularly from the 
NUR to which about half the BREL workforce belongs. It was shelved 
by BR management in the hope of averting a NUR strike that was looming 
at the time. 
V\ The entire relatiq,_ship between BR and BREL is ex~mined in 
of the Serpell Committee into the future of BR, which, it 
it might be better if BR bought some equipment, including 
FROM ABROAD." <my emphasis) 
the report 
suggests, 
1 ocomot i ves, 
Hazel Duffy, Transport Correspondent. "Financial Times" 17th Feb.l983 
The Serpell Report was the work of Sir David Serpell, a former civil 
service head of the Ministry of Transport. It had been commissioned by 
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the Government in May 1982 to examine how BR could be run more cost 
effectively. A more detailed study of the Report will follow later, but it 
would be a fair to say that its recommendations were not going to be of 
much help to Shildon, nor, in fact, to BR in general. Its main 
recommendations were:-
1) that by 1986 British Rail should cut its costs by £220m 
2) that BR should place BREL in the private sector 
3) that there should be review of the fare structure to allow for 
substantial increases 
4) that the present 11,000 route miles be reduced to 9,000 
This response to the Report in one tabloid newspaper was fairly typical. 
uThe best thing the Government can do with the Serpell Report 
on the future of our railways is forget it. Fortunately, that 
is exactly what it looks like doing ... There will be fewer trains 
travelling to fewer station. Fewer passengers would pay higher 
fares for lower standards." 
Geoffrey Goodman "Daily Mirror" 21st January 1983 
There were, to be sure, more measured comments, but the "Daily Mirror's" 
blunt style effectively summed up most of the comment on Sir David's 
deliberations. What the Government thought would become clearer later. 
The response to the Report in Shildon was outlined to a special meeting of 
the Sedgefield District Development Committee on 2nd March. Sedgefield, 
like local authorities everywhere, saw that if the Report's recommendations 
were implemented some fairly drastic changes would occur. Their 
particular concern, however, centred on the sections discussing freight and 
the future of BREL. They noted that Serpell recommended that BRB:-
"avoid committing too many resources to the service <freight) unless 
there is reasonable certainty that traffic will be won. Serpell 
considers that £45m in costs can be.saved by 1986 <without 
specifying how), that the freight business is extremely vulnerable 
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"to adverse trends and that the Board should promptly withdraw from 
unprofitable traffic." 
Minutes of Development Committee <SDC) 2nd March 1983 
Serpell's comments on BREL were less equivocal. 
"'We consider it unlikely that BREL can make any major inroads in the 
international wagon market.' Three options for BREL's future are 
proposed:- a) that BREL should be sold to the Government. b) BREL 
should be privatised 'The Government should encourage competition in 
rolling stock manufacture by dividng the relevant parts of BREL's 
business assets and employees between at least two groups of consortia 
of private sector manufacturing companies. <Para 7, .30)' c) BREL 
should be absorbed into BR providing i) no facilities should be 
retained in new building where purchase from external manufacturers 
is cost effective. ii) where profitable, maintenance and repairs 
should be contracted out. iii) all resources should be planned on 
conservative estimates of demand. If there is insufficienct internal 
capacity then work should be placed externally. iv) no facilities 
should be retained for private work." 
The Development Committee concentrated its summary on the local 
implications of Serpell. 
"The Freight Business: Serpell's analysis for freight traffic <is) 
hampered by the absence of a clear national transport policy. The 
effect of Government action has been to increase road freight traffic 
<e.g. through the proposed increase in axle limits> and the 
the difficulties of obtaining Section 8 Grant <to enable applicant to 
construct sidings that connect with the rail network) as a result of 
discretionary financial criteria 
This latter aspect is particularly critical as Serpell sees the 
major source of new freight traffic being dependent on new 
freightline traffic and investment in sidings through the use of 
Section 8 grant." 
Serpell's plans for BREL were obviously related to the Shildon's Wagon 
Works. 
"Serpell implies that the repair costs for wagons will increase durinR 
the 1980's because investment in new wagons will not take place. No 
remedial action to overcome these problems is proposed. Similarly, 
Serpell does not look at BREL's ability to tender for new wagon 
business from the private sector or abroad and fails to examine the 
importance of leasing arrangements in attracting new business to BREL. 
The absence of these investigations tends to confirm the impression 
that Serpell is more concerned WITH PRIVATISING BREL <my emphasis) 
than with a thorough examination of its prospects. Indeed, Serpell 
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"gives maximum scope to the existing private wagon builders to take 
BREL's business. No doubt, this approach was stronRlY influenced by 
the Government's attitude to privatisation." 
Ibid. 
Whether the Government swallowed Serpell whole or only in bits would make 
little difference to the Shildon Works. With closure almost a certainty 
all that could be done now was to try and limit the damage to Town and 
community. 
On the 4th of March the Works Joint Committe had a meeting. Its prime 
purpose was to discuss BR's recent announcement about closure, but for some 
it seemed to be more like a wake. Derek Foster <MP) felt that the 
campaign had been a "tremendous achievement", but there was no escaping the 
fact that it had made little difference to the eventual outcome. Some 
present wanted the campaign to be stepped up, but for others it was more a 
feeling that "we've been through it all before". One member asked "what 
are we going to do because up to now it's been like a seminar?" 
It was becoming increasingly clear that a change in strategy was needed; 
that the campaign AGAINST closure would now have to become more concerned 
with planning FOR closure. 
On the 7th April the Shildon Task Group of Sedgefield District Council met 
to discuss such plans. Much of the meeting concerned itself with how 
Shildon could be helped by Government. 
"'The attitude of Government, particularly to regional aid and other 
incentives, but also more subtly in 'steering'footloose industry in 
Shildon's direction, is critical to the implementation of the 
required package ... It was also important for BREL to contribute 
significantly to secure an effective package." 
Minutes of Shildon Task Force. SDC 7th April 1983 
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One obvious problem was the reluctance of Government to change Sedgefield's 
status as an Assisted Area. There had been considerable communication 
between Durham County Council and the Dept of Trade and Industry over the 
establishment of Assisted Area <AA's), and Special Development Areas 
<SDA's). 
In June 1983 Norman Lamont, Minister for Dept. of Trade and Industry wrote 
to Councillor G.W.Terrans <Leader of the Labour Group- the governinR 
political party in Durham County Council) on this very issue. 
"Successive Governments have designated AA's with reference to TTWA's 
<Travel to Work Areas) since they are recognised as the smallest unit 
of self contained labour market for which employment rates are 
available. Any small unit would not be recognised as meaningful ... 
With regard to the Shildon closures, the Government has shown its 
concern at the implication for local employment by setting up a 
committee of BR, Local Authority and Government officials to examine 
ways of maximising assistance. The redundancies will fall in the 
Durham and South West Darlington TTWA an IA <Intermediate Area) 
eligible for selective financial assistance. However, the Government 
considers that it would be premature to try and predict the full 
effect of redundancies which are not to be completed until December 
1984. Five hundred redundancies have already taken place, but the 
current unemployment rate in the Durham and South West Darlington TTWA 
is, at 15.4%, just 0.6% above the corresponding IA coverage for Great 
Britain and is level with the IA rate in the Northern Region. At 
present therefore, I do not feel that there is a case for immediate 
upgrading to SDA <Special Development Aid) status as you request. 
I know this will be a disappointment to you, but I can assure you 
that the Government will continue to watch the situation in Durham 
closely." 
Norman Lamont. Minister for Trade and Industry. 23rd June. 1983 
Sedgefield District Council knew that it would be difficult to attract new 
industries to Shildon unless it could provide a package which included 
Government incentives in the form of grants and subsidies. The type of 
grant or subsidy would obviously depend on DTI area designation. It was 
crucial therefore, to continue the pressure on Government to change the 
area's status. 
-140-
Under the title "Other Industrial Initiatives in Shildon" the Task Group 
document outlined three possible job creating alternatives. 
"i) Opportunity Workshop. Sponsored by SDC and approved for Grant 
Aid under the Urban Programme, this development had the following 
aims:-
a) to create and preserve long-term employment in new small 
enterprises. 
b) to generate economic activity through the production of goods and 
provision of services. 
c) to provide theoretical and practical advice and guidance to persons 
wishing to set up their own business. 
The precise details of the project had still to be resolved. 
ii) Shildon Development Trust. To assist new and established firms 
by the provision of new levels of skill training to provide 
professional support and advice on project research, design and 
development. Also to encourage business enterprise including small 
businesses in the South-West Durham area. 
The Trust hoped to involve the Community and provide new jobs. Durham 
Business School was preparing an economic profile of the area and it 
was unlikely that the Trust would be able to do anything within the 
next 12 monnths although the economic profile should provide a lead as 
to how the Trust should operate. 
iii) Short and Medium-Term Assistance. The average redundancy 
payment at Shildon would be £4,000 although in some instances payments 
will be aq high as £12,000. Inevitably, some employees would want 
to use their redundancy payments to start their own businesses. In 
the short-term there was a need to ensure that there was advice and 
guidance available to those people and Durham Business School may be 
of some assistance in that regard. The short-term initiative 
needed to be available within the next six weeks and could not await 
the outcome of the studies on the longer-term job opportunties. 
However, there still remained a need to provide a medium-term 
initiative to meet the needs of the workforce." 
The mention of a Shildon Development Trust is interesting. The original 
purpose of this Trust was to give specific help to Shildon, but this soon 
changed when the Trust was combined into a Shildon AND Sedgefield Project; 
the "SASDA Package"<Shildon and Sedgefield District Development Agency 
Limited). 
A possible reason for this change was the realisation at District Council 
level that Shildon could be used to attract Government aid- via grants and 
subsidies- which could then be used to help unemployment, not just in 
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Shildont but throughout the District. The argument would be that it was 
in Shildon's interest to use its status to help the District because in 
that way unemployment in a District would be helped. It might mean that 
work might be created elsewhere in the District and that consequently 
Shildon people would have to travel to workt but that this inconvenience 
would be outweighed by the benfits to the District as a whole. 
Whether these arguments satisfied the people of Shildon will be dealt with 
later, but it cannot be denied that there was some logic in using Shildon's 
particular problems to help the District as a whole. How the "cake" was 
to be cut, and, more importantly, who was going to hold the knife, would 
have tu be settled later. 
The Shildon Development Trust, and its successor SASDA, was to be crucial 
to the subsequent development of Shildon. Most people involved in the 
campaign understood this, but there was still that residual feelinR amongst 
some that maybe the closure could still be averted. This optimism, 
whether misplaced or not, was bound to create its own set of problems. 
Whilst one half of the Town began to think about redundancy payments and 
another job, the other half went on believing the Works would continue and 
their jobs with it. There were a few who, depending perhaps on whom they 
had talked to last, managed to believe in both. 
In order to understand how this confusion could happen it is necessary to 
recall that a railway workshop had been in Shildon since railways had 
begun. Some families could trace a connection with the Works back 
through four generations. Even those not employed in the Works would 
feel this sense of continuity. It is not suprisinR, therefore, that 
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there were many in the Town who, despite a commonsense acceptance to the 
contrary, continued to believe everything would eventually carry on as 
before. 
owe could lay in bed and listen to the rivetting house. Remember 
there were three shifts and it got that you knew what job was running 
and what shift it was. If the weather was fine the rivetting would 
be done outside and you could hear it, the sound carried all over the 
town, by the wind and so you'd know. You could even get that you 
would know who the rivetter was, knowing who was on shift. Then 
there was the big drop hammer, you'd hear that all over. You could 
hear the thump thump as it drew out the con rods. So you got used 
to the sound of the town. Clocking on time and when the shift 
changes. In the years coming up before the war there used to 
be a steam buzzer and it'd go off at quarter to seven to wake them 
up and half past seven for the shift starting. Then at twelve and 
so on. It was like them bugles in a battle. You'd see them cominR 
off shift, big crowds of them going up and down, the same way at the 
same time. There would be bus loads picking up from Bishop 
<Bishop Auckland), Coronation, Eldon Lane, and Eldon. That's apart 
from them that came by train from West Auckland or Darlington." 
Retired foreman welder in Works. 
Shildon is not a large place. It would need no more than a fifteen 
minute walk to go from fields back to fields. In a town that size it was 
easy to know what nearly everyone else was doing and why. The place of 
work provided a social context as well as somewhere to earn the rent. 
"There was a pattern. Going to the job, coming back. Thursday had 
been my pay day for the whole of my life. It's the day I got my 
pools in, all my dues, you know. And even though I've retired it 
still matters only it's marked now with nothing happening. Yet it 
feels the same. Like losing a limb, one minute you've got it and 
the next there's nothing there. What's funny though is there's 
some men I'd worked with all my life, seen them every day, and then 
quite suddenly you never see them again. Not seen or heard of 
them since and they were people you had contact with every day. 
You knew about their activities, maybe you'd not be that interested, 
their hobbies and that, but it kept you aware of what was happening 
to other people. Now there's an absolute void. I'm busy with beinR 
a councillor and plenty of other things. What must it be like for 
them that doesn't have that?" 
Ibid. 
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By the middle of 1983 it was becoming clear that this "pattern" was finally 
coming to an end. There could be no formal declaration that the 
campaign against closure was aver because this would cloud the coming 
negotiations, but all knew it was just a matter of time. 
In the April of 1983 Durham County Council, with Sedgefield District 
Council, published an eleven page document "The Case Against Closure-
Shildon Wagon Works". It presented the unemployment statistics far 
South-West Durham and outlined the consequences, social and economic, that 
were likely to fallow an increase in unemployment. It did nat, however, 
say much that was new. To be fair there was little the authors could 
say that would be different from what had been said many times before. In 
a sense the publication was more a summary of what had gone before rather 
than an argument of what could happen next. 
By the autumn of 1983 most people in the Town were concentrating an what 
they could expect as severance money. 
"Workers at Shildon Wagon 'Works are to receive drastically improved 
redundancy pay offers. In a surprise move BREL has offered to 
increase the maximum pay-off to aver £5,000, an increase of £3,000. 
BREL are also sending a team of redundancy experts to the Works to 
give advice to the 1,000 men who face the dole if closure goes ahead. 
The increase will be seen as an incentive to the workers to accept 
BREL's offer. But the introduction is conditional on the unions 
agreeing to the closure of Shildon, Horwich, and Temple Mills. A 
BREL spokeman, Bernard Ault said, 'This extension of supplementary 
payments will increase the financial terms available to many 
employees not wishing to transfer to other areas.'" 
"Evening Despatch" 12th August 1983 
A bigger "carrot" was being dangled, but the end result would be the same; 
a job elsewhere for some, for others the dole. 
Shildon's 1983 Christmas was inevitably a rather subdued affair. 
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"It was quiet, bit depressed really. There was this sense of, well 
sadness you'd call it. You missed the crack. You even missed 
getting annoyed, like you do at work. By then a lot were leaving 
and although it didn't register much at the time looking back you 
can see how it had affected you. Affected everyone. Mind there 
were some who were enjoying it. Them that hadn't worked at the 
Vorks and perhaps had wanted to. And some had been lazy buggers 
there and now they would have to get a different job. They'd never 
thought that day'd come and it brought them up a bit sharp. But for 
most it was an end of an era. " 
Paint shop worker 
On the 30th April 1984 the local paper ran a piece about the imminent 
closure. Neil Kinnock bad visited the Town and had met some of the 
workforce. 
"Saturday's meeting, addressed by the Labour leader, was a lament to 
the Wagon Works earmarked for closure at the end of June. The 
redundant workers now face a new battle- to attract industries and 
jobs to the Town. Bishop Auckland MP, Derek Foster, pledged; 'The 
fight for the community goes on. We will show everyone that 
Shildon can do it.'" 
Gary Horne "Evening Despatch" 30th April 1984 
Kinnock's speech was indeed a lament. 
"I wish I could come here with good news,or a change of view 
by the Government, but I cannot. Reminded every day of Shildon by 
Derek Foster, <later Chief Oppositon Whip) my PPS, which, for Derek, 
stands for Preserve Production in Shildon I know what you have been 
through. Any other Government would have been impressed by the 
fight, the faith, trust and loyalty and would have changed their 
decision. The Prime Minister is constantly preaching 'Do it 
yourself', but what complete hypocrisy ... You have had accolades from 
BREL, even by Thatcher's ideals you have done enough to exist, but 
no, you can't exist due to dogma. Ve have a run-down British Rail-
she never uses it- and an ageing wagon stock ... The Tories cannot 
adjust to the idea that unemployment is not free and it is growing 
more expensive every year. We shed jobs when we should be investing 
in a properly up-to-date system. Other Governments see the need of 
railway networks, good connections, why not this Government? Instead 
we have a Government which seems to have declared war on work. With 
work you get income, freedom and rights, without you have to fall in 
line ... " 
Transcribed excerpts of Neil Kinnock speech, Shildon. 28th April 84. 
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It was announced that the Works would officially close on Saturday, 30th of 
June. It was widely understood, not just in the North East, that the 
closure at Shildon had a wider, almost symbolic, significance. The end of 
a Works that had, in effect, created the railways seemed, for some, to be 
an occasion to reassess their thoughts on travel in general. 
"'Shildon men should have been re-employed long ago, 'says Lord de 
Lisle, vice-president of the Automobile Association. 'I know the 
people of Durham well and respect them. It just did not make 
economic sense to go on manufacturing railway wagons,' he said. 
There is a great deal of railway property- sidings, goods, sheds, 
and land- that should be put on the open market and the money used to 
improve the road network. It would serve the public better." 
"Evening Despatch" 24th :May 1984 
The noble lord was, obviously, arguing his AA corner, but his suggestions 
only echoed what many in the Government felt to be commonsense. Running an 
efficient railway system costs money and, according to "market forces", 
this should come from the customer. What was clear was that "market 
forces" had done great damage to the people of Shildon. 
What was also becoming clear was that the closures at Shildon, Horwich and 
Temple Mills, were only stages in a longer series of BREL cuts and 
closures. 
"Staff at the doomed wagon works at Shildon have refused to back 
survival campaigns at similar plants. They say they won't help 
because their pleas for help were ignored 'I virtually went down on 
my knees and pleaded for help from other works last week. No other 
works has lifted a finger to help us.' said convenor John Priestly ... 
Just last week BREL announced that 4,000 more jobs were to go in the 
industry. At Swindon 1,700 jobs will go plus 900 redundancies at 
Glasgow and 1,400 at Crewe, Doncaster, Derby, and Wolverton." 
"Northern Echo" '7th May 1984 
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It was perhaps inevitable that scapegoats would be needed for the failure 
of the anti-clo~ure campaign. While there had been hope that the Works 
would survive the underlying tensions of the campaign had remained hidden, 
but now those tensions were starting to surface. 
"BITTERNESS AT SHILDON: Union leaders at doomed Shildon 'lagon 
Works have accused council and BREL chiefs of doing too little too 
slowly to help the town. Kenny Stabler, boilermaker's union 
convenor, said they had been left to continue the fight for cash and 
new jobs themselves. Mr Stabler, a plater at the Works for 12 years 
said, 'The lads here are very disillusioned and bitter. We feel as if 
we have been left high and dry. Nobody wants to know us any more 
because we have nothing to give in return- the whole thing is 
pathetic.' But Tom Toward, Town Clerk, said the council was pressing 
for top level talks between council and BREL officials and Derek 
Foster MP to get talks off the ground." 
"Evening Despatch" 8th May 1984 
There were bound to be some at the Works who would now look back over the 
campaign and see mistakes. Most people take little notice of what their 
local politicians say, unless, that is, it is of direct concern to them. 
And it is true to say that during the campaign local and national 
politicans had poured a great deal of rhetoric over the people of Shildon. 
Some of it had been useful, but some less so. 
"I remember being on the platform and watching the faces down there 
in the crowd. As the politicians and union leaders spoke you could 
see their faces changing. They'd been full of enthusiasm marching 
through the Town, full of hope. But as they listened to the tired 
old cliches coming out of their "leaders" you could see them losing 
heart. They started to leave before the end. On the fringes of 
the crowd, with the speakers still talking, you could see them going. 
Derek Foster, he knew what was happening, tried to rally them, to 
get them lifted again, but they'd heard enough." 
Official at the Mass Meeting. May 1982 
This disillusionment was now turning into bitter recriminations. 
"We've beard nothing about it for months <SASDA). A lot of idle 
promises have been made to the employees and none have been fulfilled 
It appears to have fallen flat and what can the agency do for us 
anyway- they can't pull rabbits out of hats. We are allowed to go 
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"along to the Job Centre every day, but there is nothing on offer. 
We are faced with the choice of moving to Milton Keynes or gardening 
for t1.50p an hour. Councillors have just been electioneering and 
we are sick of them gambling with our livelihoods" <Kenny Stabler) 
"Evening Despatch" 8th May 1984. 
BREL had offered Shildon a one year loan guarantee package of t300,000, but 
this was thought insufficient and there was considerable pressure to 
improve it. On the 7th June, just twenty one days before closure, David 
Mitchell, Parliamentary Under Secretary in the Dept of Transport, decided 
to set up a team within the Ministry to see if a better offer could not be 
agreed 
"' Mr Mitchell has intervend to try and persuade BREL to be more 
generous,' said MP Derek Foster, who had set up the talks. 'BREL 
have been dragging their feet. Ideally they should have set up an 
agency themselves like British Steel in Consett ... 'Chief Executive 
<Sedgefield District Council) said 'The cash BREL is prepared to 
give us is the key issue in getting the development agency off the 
ground. ' Sedgefield councillors meet tomorrow <8th May> to discuss 
the latest situation" 
"Northern Echo" 8th June 1984 
These last minute meetings about meetings, whilst perfectly understandable 
to those concerned, must have been unsettling for the people in the town. 
Why had the Ministry of Transport left it so late before pressuring BREL 
about an improved offer to Shildon? Why had the Government not taken a 
more positive role in helping the town survive the results of its policies? 
Why were the details of the SASDA package still being discussed instead of 
being in operation? 
"END OF THE LINES AT DOOMED WORKS. 
The last rites have started as Shildon Wagon Works' proud 150-year 
history grinds slowly to a halt. The doomed works are now echoing to 
the sound of the mechanical digger as the old tracks <connecting the 
works to the lines at Shildon station) are ripped from the ground ... 
The remnants of a once-mighty workforce looked solemnly on and knew 
there was no going back. Yard transport worker, Colin Russell, said. 
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"'They are cutting the head off before the body's died. 
It's a sign of the end and it's now irretrievable- there's no going 
back now " 
"Northern Echo" 25th June 1984 
It is often difficult to decide the exact moment when some thing like the 
Works dies. This time, however, it was not difficult; when the first 
section of railway track left the ground the connection between town and 
railway manufacture ended. 
The day before the Works closed the following letter appeared in the local 
paper.· 
"Tomorrow will be a sad, sad day; a day long to be remembered in 
Shildon, the historic railway town. A redundant force of workmen 
will,without doubt, be 'drowning their sorrows' in the pubs and clubs. 
Around these small groups of men having a 'last one for the road' will 
be some unseen 'lookers-on'. Will the ghosts of George and Robert 
Stephenson, of Timothy Hackworth, Daniel Adamson, Bouch and all the 
others, be gazing down on this the remnant of a loyal railways 
workforce? 
My own grandfather's younger brother was the first man to blow the 
steam buzzer at the works being a member of the original works fire 
brigade. He was, in 1881, one of the artisan representatives of the 
N.E.R. Corps at the centenary celebrations of George Stephenson in 
Newcastle. 
Would I be more than a trifle cynical if I thought that maybe, in the 
Boardrooms of the BREL and BRB a toast may also be drunk to the 
victory over one of the most hard-working 'fighting committees' in 
this railway struggle. 
For the Government, the BRB, and the BREL have hammered home the 
toughest nail in the coffin. The sorrowful thing of it all is that 
inside the coffin lies 150 years of hard work and loyalty. Will the 
phoenix rise from the ashes? 
Ralph Matthews, 19 Freville Street, Shildon." 
"Evening Despatch" 28th June. 1984 
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CHAPTER SIX: How "SHILDA" became "SASDA" 
A town that relies on one employer for most of its jobs is always 
vulnerable. If an employer is large enough to soak up most of the 
available labour in the locality then it is usually fair to assume that its 
economics will depend on factors outside that locality; it will need to 
sell its "products" elsewhere. The employer will usually market on a 
nationwide basis, perhaps also for export, and consequently will be 
constrained by considerations that are different from those who live next 
to the plant/factory/works- its employees. If this employer is part of a 
larger conRlomerate then the dangers are even greater. In such a company 
decisions will be made on a scale of economy that will almost certainly 
show scant regard for local consequences of its deliberations. If asked 
its public relations office will claim otherwise, but when the distant 
crunch comes the local cookie will indeed, always crumble. 
As has been shown, Shildon depended on British Rail for most of its jobs. 
As had also been seen this same employer, after praising the workforce, 
sacked them. Whilst this had come as a surprise to most of the town 
there were some who had been expecting such a move. The warning signs had 
been there. In the late 1960's and throughout the 1970's threat after 
threat had come only to fade, but it was reasonable to assume that one day 
it would not go away. 
The difference between pessimism and scepticism is, perhaps, that whilst 
the former despairs the latter prepares. 
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What is certain is that some in 
Shildon had started to prepare for the day when BR would go. Something 
of that preparation was to result in the formation of the Shildon 
Development Trust. 
Once the closure had been proposed these preparations moved with greater 
urgency. What had once been mere conjecture was now a reality. BR's 
time-scale for closure meant that anything that could be devised would be 
needed very quickly and yet the type of assistance required would take much 
time, AND MONEY , to develop. 
Throughout the summer of 1982, as draft followed draft, the idea of a 
development trust for Shildon slowly took shape. The details changed, 
but the central intention remained the same. 
"SHILDON DEVELOPMENT TRUST: A programme for the establishment of an 
Agency to develop and support community based enterprise in the 
creation of employment and new businesses in South West Durham ... 
This paper outlines a programme designed to provide for training 
(and vocational needs) of young people and adults in General 
Manufacture and Distribution trades and the higher level of skills 
and work training required in a post industrial society." 
Draft on Development Trust Scheme. Shildon Town Council June 1982 
It is worth looking at the "Introduction" in detail because it not only 
illustrates the writers' intentions, but also their guiding philosophy. 
"INTRODUCTION: 
1.1 Unemployment is the number one social problem of the country. 
1.2 Technical and structural changes now t~king place in industry 
nationally <and internationally) will inevitably result in 
large scale reduction in the demand for unskilled manpower 
resources. 
1.3 At the same time the demands on industry to remain competitive 
will require an educated, highly skilled and motivated workforce 
trained to high standards. 
1.4 The decline in heavy manufacturing industry including mining, 
shipbuilding and railways in the post war period has played a 
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fundamental and important role in the erosion of the industrial 
and economic base of the north east. 
1.5 The recession in international trade and the introduction of new 
working methods, technological innovation and involvement of the 
Third World in heavy manufacturing industry has also undermined 
the labour market. 
1.6 Communities which face large scale redundancies and long-term 
unemployment are seriously at risk and nowhere in the country 
is this more apparent than in the north east. 
The need for "alternative" employment and the creation of new 
businessess is of the utmost importance as is the support of 
the community in an organised approach to meet this most 
serious situation." 
Ibid. 
Whilst there is little here that is new it does show a ready appreciation 
that the changes needed would involve more than just tinkering. It is, 
in a sense, almost too all-embracing for its own good. To want to help 
create "an educated, highly skilled and motivated workforce trained to high 
standards." is perfectly proper, but to realise such an ideal would involve 
spending more than any post-war British government had ever spent. 
This "Introduction" describes, not just the needs of Shildon, but what was 
becoming increasingly necessary for the whole country; a fundamental 
restructuring of education and training linked to a system of skill 
training which could respond to a growing demand for adaptable, skilled 
labour. But where to start? Perhaps the answer to that question is 
simpler than it seems; in places like Shildon. 
Whether the authors of the document were being deliberate in setting their 
aims so high, or merely mischievous, is difficult to say, but such debates 
must start somewhere and where better than in small communities like 
Shildon? Unless such places are prepared to undertake the fundamental 
changes needed in a "post-industrial" society then all they will become is 
the victims of that society. 
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Shortly after BREL's announcement of closure <April,1982) Tom Toward, the 
Town Clerk of Shildon, <and main author of the Shildon Development Trust 
document) wrote a letter to Hector Macmillan of ICI. Macmillan had been 
seconded to the Northern Region of CBI-SPU <Confederation of British 
Industries- Special Projects Unit) to help liaise between the MSC <Manpower 
Services Commission) and industry. Tom Toward realised that if new 
industries were to be persuaded into Shildon he would need the help of 
people like Macmillan. Macmillan agreed to visit Shildon and both men 
were soon involved in trying to get a "package" together that would involve 
industry, the MSC, and the Town. 
On the 5th August 1982 Macmillan wrote to Toward aRreeing that he would 
bring Colin Martin <Area Manager for MSC) to their next meeting ClOth 
August). It was early days and all concerned were reluctant to commmit 
themselves to anything that was not carefully prepared, "this matter is in 
confidence, and no commitment will be expected by you or by Mr Martin of 
the MSC." <Macmillan's letter to Toward- 5th August). 
The meeting with Martin CMSC) obviously went well because on the 12th 
August Macmillan wrote to Toward suggesting that they "make, jointly, a 
positive contribution to alleviating unemployment in the Shildon area 
itself and also, perhaps, in so doing stimulate some new 
business/manufacturing projects." Macmillan closed his letter with a 
request for details of Shildon's existing employers and the numbers of 
skilled and unskilled labour- "both men and women". 
for, 
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He also asked Toward 
"Your ideas of the interested people whom we should consider grouping 
together to manage our project as and when, it begins to take shape 
and take off, ie a steering comndttee. 
l have my own ideas on the sort of people who perhaps we should 
involve, but would very much value your obviously first hand and 
experienced views." 
letter from H.A.Macmillan to Tom Toward 12th August,1982 
By late September Toward was able to write to Macmillan that the, 
"Town Council, at a meeting held yesterday evening, aRreed ... to 
support the introduction of an Industrial Training Scheme and a 
local Enterprise Trust in Shildon ... I should like to have the 
opportunity of meeting with you again to discuss the secondment 
of staff to prepare a short and long term feasibility report on 
employment prospects in Shildon ... " 
letter from Tom Toward to Hector Macmillan 21st September 1982 
On the same day Toward also wrote to Martin <MSC) about the raising of 
funds for the project, 
"In the meantime I have had informal talks with the 'Rowntree Trust' 
and it has been indicated that there is a possiblility of upwards of 
£40,000 might be made available towards the Industrial Training 
Scheme and that an approach to the EEC might bear fruit with grant aid 
from the Social Fund for the local Enterprise Trust ... The 'Rowntree 
Trust' also indicated that it would be willing to second staff to 
assist in the preparation of a feasibility report for the Industrial 
Training Scheme ... " 
letter from Tom Toward to C.E.Martin 21st September 1982 
"Hector Macmillan was an interesting man. He lived in a large house 
in north Yorkshire and was a distant relative of Harold Macmillan. 
But what was more important was that he was a very close friend of 
Leon Brittan <then Home Secretary and constituency MP for Richmond, 
Yorks). Through Brittan he could get the ear of the Cabinet. He had 
members of the Cabinet up for weekends, that sort of thing. And he 
was quite passionate about Shildon's problems." 
Tom Toward, Town Clerk to Shildou Town Council. 
In November Toward wrote to local industrialists telling them about the 
proposed Trust. A letter to Glaxo Operations of Barnard Castle was 
typical; after a resume of why the Trust was needed the letter concluded 
with a request for support. 
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"The Town Council is prepared to make available up to £25, 000 and 
ather national and reRianal organisations have promised financial 
assistance. Nevertheless, in order to ensure the proper fundin~ 
and continuation of the scheme, additional sponsorship is important 
and in this we would seek the support of Glaxo Operations either on 
a once and far all or a cantinuin~ basis- hopefully the latter." 
letter from Tom Toward to Glaxa Productions 15th November 1982 
In early November Toward had met Alan Roberts <Chief Executive of 
Sedgefield District Council) to discuss the Trust and haw it might fit into 
the SDC's plans far employment creation in South West Durham. In a letter 
confirming their conversation Toward wrote; 
"At the meeting you suggested that monies made available to the 
District Council by BREL might mare usefully be put to work through 
the Shildan Development Trust and I promised to let you have a sight 
of the enclosed discussion documents <draft proposals an haw Trust 
might operate)." 
letter from Tom Toward to Alan Roberts 16th November 1982. 
This letter touched an a subject that was to become an important factor in 
the relationship between Shildon Town Council and its "governing" 
authority, Sed~efield District Council; who would have control over 
"monies" the Trust might attract. Far the moment it seemed SDC were 
content to allow funds to be channelled through Shildan, but the sums 
concerned were, as yet, fairly insignificant. 
On the night of 13th December a meeting of all concerned took place at the 
Hardwick Hall Hotel, Sedgefield, Co Durham. In addition to those already 
involved Professor Charles Baker of the Durham University Business School 
also attended. This meeting, in effect, formally established that a Trust, 
or something closely resembling it, would happen. What is interesting is 
that three days after the meeting, in a letter to A.T.Ford of Barclays Bank 
bringing him up to date with the meeting's deliberations, Toward was to 
write; 
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"All of those present seemed to be most enthusiastic and they have 
either offered their support already or are to recommend accordingly. 
Sedgefield District Council who expressed a late interest in becoming 
involved particularly in the Shildon Development Trust was allowed to 
put a particular point of view which did not entirely coincide with 
the community concept. Towards the end of the meeting it was 
quite apparent that they were willing to consider taking part in the 
scheme(s) because of its importance to the area and because the use of 
the word "community" will be taken to have a wider significance than 
the older meaning of the word and will embrace an economic profile of 
South West Durham." 
letter from Tom Toward to A.T.Ford. December 16th 1982 
The relationship between Shildon and SDC now seemed to be causing slight 
concern to Hector Macmillan. In a letter to Toward he wrote, 
"· .. having had time for reflection I think the meeting at Sedgefield 
was very successful. It is to be hoped that <Professor) Charles 
Baker will NOT BE PUT OFF <my emphasis)- in any way- by anything which 
he hears from the Sedgefield District Council during his preliminary 
survey!" 
letter from Hector Macmillan to Tom Toward. 20th December 1982 
SDC's relationship with Shildon was fairly straightforward and yet one 
fraught with possible complications. Shildon was only one of four 
comparable areas in the District <the others being Ferryhill, Spennymoor 
and Newton Aycliffe). All four, with perhaps the slight exception of 
Newton Aycliffe, suffered from high unemployment rates. In addition there 
were smaller communities, mostly former pit villages, where there were also 
not inconsiderable pockets of people without work <Trimdon, Trimdon 
Colliery, Fishburn, etc). 
The District Council, when considering its strategy for attracting jobs to 
the area, had to think of the District as a whole, and not piecemeal. 
Shildon, on the other hand, saw its problems as being specific to itself. 
The campaip;n against closure had been subject to this kind of "doubling" of 
effort. As has been seen SDC had run a campaign through ITS own working 
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party whilst Shildon had operated through a separate working party. Both 
could quite easily justify their existence and yet the very existence of 
each could suggest that the separate groups preferred their own counsel. 
Now, as the campaign turned towards job creation, the groups still seemed 
determined to work, for the time being anyway, separately. 
On the 31st January 1983 the Steering Committee of the Shildon 
Development Trust appointed its officers. Hector Macmillan became 
Chairman, Vice Chairman was Professor Baker, Honorary Treasurer was 
A.T.Ford of Barclays Bank, and Honorary Secretary Tom Toward. Another 
member of the Committee was Rex Hewitt, of the Community Projects 
Foundation- a group dedicated to helping self-help groups around the UK. 
The early days of the Steering Committee were mostly focussed on 
identifying training needs, but it was becoming clear that unless the Trust 
could attract proper funding any plans for re-training would remain no more 
than just plans. One obvious source of funding would be BREL, but it 
wanted to channel its money through the District Council scheme(s) so, for 
the moment, its direct involvement remained uncertain. 
On the 18th May BREL's local man, Dennis Lees <Works Manager) wrote to the 
Steering Committee rep;retting that he will "be taking early retirement 
after the 30th June and therefore <will) cease to be a member of your 
Trust." It is worth remembering that this is the same Mr Lees who 
discounted the role of "executioner" and had been appointed to Shildon to 
"do a job and will do it to the best of my ability". Now, with a year to 
closure still to go, he was getting out. Whether Mr Lees would have been 
much use in getting BREL funds for the Trust is unclear, but to take early 
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retirement whilst his former employees negotiated redundancy terms seems to 
indicate little concern for them, or, for that matter,what would happen to 
them. :Mr Lees had only lasted one year so if not an "executioner" what 
else- perhaps caretaker? 
On the 24th June 1983 the Steering Committee of SHILDA met to discuss the 
report by David Crewe, Managing Director of David Crewe Associates. 
Crewe had been appointed by BREL to examine the role of BREL in any 
subsequent developments in the area. It was soon clear that his 
recommendations would suggest that any funds from BREL would have to be 
managed on a wider basis than was, perhaps, presently intended. 
"David Crewe put forward the opinion that despite other pressures 
sight must not be lost of the need, at a later date, to look at the 
wider geographical area for the role of the SHILDA, whilst recognisinR 
the short-term need to concentrate on the problems arising from the 
closure of the Shildon Wagon Works. He was of the opinion that the 
provision of alternative jobs for redundant Wagon Works employees 
might not be met only by concentrating on the Wagon Works site ... " 
Minutes of Steering Committee of SHILDA 24th June 1983 
The Chairman of the Committee also noted; 
" ... whilst not precluding the possibility that SHILDA might not be 
located off the Town in the longer term, welcomed the decision of 
BREL to concentrate its <and SHILDA's) activites at Shildon Wagon 
Works." 
It was becoming obvious that SHILDA had become, in a sense, a casuality of 
its own success. It was clearly being taken seriously by BREL and this 
could well mean eventual funding. Those with political and 
administrative interests in such developments were now concerned as to who 
would be in charge of those funds.? Crewe had recommended that a 
Director for the Trust be appointed and had suggested that BREL would 
accept the responsiblity for such a post. It seemed fairly certain that 
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if SHILDA was to grow into something significant then SDC would want to be 
closely involved. Whilst this was perfectly proper it did cause some in 
Shildon to wonder if the project was not in danger of being taken out of 
their hands. What had been a Shildon project looked now like becoming a 
Sedgefield project. 
The 1983 attendance figures of the SHILDA Steering Comndttee make 
interesting reading. After the initial meeting <24th January),when its 
officers. were appointed, subsequent meetings took place every month. The 
early meetings discussed the role of the Agency, the need for proper re-
training, how community projects might be funded, and the proposed study of 
job creation prospects by Durham University Business School. The 
Committee had a representative from both BREL and the trade unions at the 
Works. 
As would be expected the main officers attended every meeting; these were 
Hector Macmillan <Chairman), Professor Charles Baker, <Vice Chairman and 
representative from DUBS), Tom Toward, <Honorary Secretary). But the 
attendance of others became, as the months rolled by, less regular. In 
some cases this was understandable given the pressures of other business on 
those involved, but what does seem a little odd is that the two people most 
in need of information had stopped attending; BREL's representave <Mr Lees, 
Works Manager) and the trade union representative <John Priestley,Works 
Trade Unions). As mentioned before, Mr Lees retired in the June 1983, but 
Mr Priestley was still at the Works. 
With trade union representation at the meetings in 1983 consisting of only 
four out of the ten <two at the beginning of the year and two at the end-
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these figures taken from "apologies" for not attending) the workforce was 
effectively reduced to relying on rumour for information on the Agency; an 
Agency set up primarily for its benefit. It is surely strange that from 
28th February through to 7th November, a crucial time in the deciding of 
what was to happen following closure, no official trade union 
representative attended the SHILDA SteerinR Committee meetings? 
Alan Roberts, <Chief Executive of SDC) was also, according to the minutes 
of the meetings, another early absentee. He stopped attending after April 
28th to re-appear only once more on July 27th. For SDC to be poorly 
represented can only mean that either SDC did not care what SHILDA was up 
to, or, and perhaps more importantly, had decided that what the SHILDA 
decided did not matter. It seems reasonable to suppose that SDC DID 
CARE; it would have been an act of extraordinary administrative 
incompetence not to, so perhaps the latter was the case. If what SHILDA 
did was not now thought important to SDC then one can only suppose that the 
SDC had decided to prepare an alternative. Another curious development 
throughout the middle months of 1983 was the way Hector Macmillan 
constantly tried to set up meetings with BREL only to have his requests, at 
first ignored, and then only responded to in a most vague way. Macmillan 
wrote to Philip Norman <Managing Director of BREL) on the 11th April 
requesting an early meeting to discuss SHILDA. He wrote again on the 
29th April. 
"I wrote to you on the 11th April ... Professor Charles Baker wrote to 
you a week before and his letter was dated 7th April. To date 
neither he, nor I, have had a reply from you. We fully realise the 
pressures on your time etc, and in particular we appreciate the 
delicate nature of the negotiations which you and your Board are 
conducting with the Trades Union Representatives in the BREL workshops 
,, .However, I must tell you_ that the Development Trust <SHILDA) is 
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"making very good progress ... but it is essential that <we) meet with 
you yourself and/or members of your Board at the very earliest 
opportunity. We have proposals, and requests, to put to BREL which 
need to be considered now." 
This somewhat forthright letter finally brought a response. What was 
interesting about the Philip Norman's reply was his mentioning of a meeting 
that had taken place between BREL and SDC's Chief Executive, Alan Roberts. 
"As you probably know, we have held some informal discussions with 
Alan Roberts concerning the establishment of an Enterprise Trust 
arrangement, probably based on the SEDGEFIELD DISTRICT. <my emphasis) 
An informal meeting has taken place <attended by Mr Toward) at which 
we communicated our policy for alternative employment at Shildon and 
indicated our willingness to participate in the actions required to 
set up some form of Enterprise Trust. 
It seems to me that the first things we need to resolve is the 
relationship between Shildon and the District Development Trust and 
the Sedgefield Enterprise Trust- I would not have thought there was 
room for two organisations. Our view is that we would like to see 
a single organisation set up as quickly as possible so that when we 
are in a position to formally announce the Works Closure we have some 
organisation in place that can begin to work against an agreed plan." 
Letter from Philip Norman <BREL) to Hector Macmillan <SHILDA> 5th May 1983 
It was becoming increasingly clear to all at SHILDA that the SDC was now 
seeking to operate any proposed Enterprise initiative itself rather than 
let SHlLDA operate separately; the non-attendance of Alan Roberts at SHILDA 
meetings starts at this time. 
This is a perfectly understandable development given that SDC had, as 
mentioned earlier, wider responsiblities, but what is strange is the way it 
was being done. There is the curious sense that SHILDA was being slowly 
by-passed by SDC although this could not, of course, be openly acknowledged 
This, inevitably, meant that many in SHILDA began to suspect SDC's motives. 
Whether this was fair or not is not in question, but that it had happened 
is not in doubt. Those at SHILDA who subscribed to the "cock-up" theory 
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of history, were now, for the moment, outnumbered by the "conspiracy" 
theorists. 
Much, after all, was at stake. If BREL could be persuaded to make a large 
sum of money available then the control of that money would Rive 
considerable local powers of patronage. There were councillors who were 
on both the SDC and Shildon Town Council and these were quick to realise 
the implications involved in the controlling of BREL money. This is not 
to say that there was a "jobs for the boys" attitude developing, but it is 
a widely felt belief that human nature generally abhors a vacumn created by 
"unclaimed" money. 
Apart from who controlled the money there was a developing crisis over who 
should actually run the future Enterprise Agency? Again this involved 
crucial decision of control, not only over the purse, but also over policy. 
The choosing of a Director for the cominR Agency was not going to be very 
easy. 
Hector Macmillan had already raised with BREL the need to move quickly on 
such an appointment. In a letter <29th June)to Robin Stables <BREL 
Techincal Director) he had urged BREL to help bring about an early decision 
on who the Director should be. 
"STRICTLY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL: ... Both the CBI Directorate and 
the ICI Agricultural Division Board <Macmillan's employers) have been 
told, in the strictest confidence, by me personally, about the need to 
appoint a full time Director to SHILDA and that the appointment should 
be filled in the next two or three months. Both agencies were very 
interested and have promised, when the go ahead is given, to put up 
to you several candidates who could well fit the bill. In the event 
of the new authority wishing to employ an ICI man-either on secondment 
or on a permanent basis then, depending on the individual's 
circumstances, ICl would consider making up any difference of salary 
which may obtain for an appropriate period of time. 
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"It will be necessary to ask Alan Roberts of SDC if he has any 
candidates in mind and, no doubt, there will be candidates from BR." 
Letter from Hector Macmillan to Robin Stables 29th June 1983. 
The prepardness of ICI to underwrite some of the salary of the proposed 
director is an interesting development. Macmillan was, himself, not only 
the CBI's northern representative, but on secondment from ICI. This 
connection between Shildon and one of the biggest employers in the north 
east literally evolved around Macmillan's interest in Shildon. 
"Macmillan had taken a fancy to Shildon. It's a simple as that. ICI 
had given him a secondment to investigate the changing employment 
situation in the north east and he came to us. He liked the town 
and we got on and everything went from that." 
Tom Toward, Shildon Town Clerk. 
It is perhaps also fair to note that Alan Roberts viewed this 
connection with a little caution, 
"ICI obviously needed to trim its executives and being a responsible 
company tried to find a place for them elsewhere. It's not that they 
saw Shildon as a 'dumping ground' for unwanted people, but it did 
fit in with their plans to have someone in a place like SASDA and 
solve their manpower problems. Reasonable I suppose, but it 
needed watching." 
From taped interview with Alan Roberts, 3rd July 1990 
In the midst of deliberations about SHILDA and its possible Director, BREL 
sent a confidential memo to the Shildon Action Group. This was sent on 
Friday 13th of May- whether BREL were being ironic or not is not clear. 
"the proposal concerning Shildon is for a substantial reduction 
of staff by 31st December 1983, with a small on-going presence 
managed from Doncaster continuing beyond 1984. A general notice to 
this effect would be posted in the Vorks on 1st July 1983 followed by 
the issue of personal notices to Salaried and Wages Staff on 1st 
August and 1st October respectively ... " 
Memo from J.R.Stables <BREL Technical Director) to Shildon Action Group. 
This meant, of course, that the Works would be virtually closed from the 
end of 1983. The need to get SHILDA, or its alternative organised was 
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becoming even more urgent. In Macmillan's view, and one shared by most at 
SHILDA, this meant that the appointment of a suitable Director for the 
Agency was now crucial. 
The SHILDA Steering Committee outlined what they wanted when they drafted a 
job description. 
"The Director is chief executive of the Development Agency with 
overall responsiblity for the planning, co-ordination and 
implementation of alternative employment initiatives in the Shildon 
area within the terms set out in the Authority's memorandum and 
articles of association. The Director is also responsible for the 
administration and financial and personnel control of the Authority." 
"Role of the Director-Job Description" SHILDA Steering Committee July 1983 
A fairly straightforward description although it should be noted that the 
stress was on "initiatives in the Shildon area", not the Sedgefield 
District Council area. 
The most important matter next to decide is to whom would the Director be 
responsible and how much autonomy would he or she have? A Board of some 
sort would obviously have to be constituted, but could this then over-rule 
the Director? 
description. 
II REPORTING: 
Authority. 
committee." 
An attempt to resolve this came in the next part of the job 
The Director will be responsible to the Board of the 
He will chair the Authority's executive management 
It had been Tom Toward who had drafted the job description and it would be 
Toward who would also draft the articles of association. He was very 
clear about how he saw the relationship between Director and Board. 
"I wanted the Director to have proper control so that he could work 
independently of outside pressure. I had a feeling that unless we 
did this he could perhaps be tied to decisions that were not his own. 
With this in mind I especially wrote that the 'executive committee' 
be spelt with a small 'e' and 'c'. I wanted the executive committee 
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to be advisory, one that could be convened as a sub-committee when 
necessary. This way whoever we appointed would have proper control 
of things. When it came to the combining with Sedgefield <SDC) and 
the creation of SASDA they wanted a capital 'E' and 'C'. They wanted 
control you see. I said I'd fight them on this and Alan Roberts <SDC) 
had a fit. He said 'If I go back without getting Executive powers 
they'll have my head.' I think they had put very heavy pressure 
on him at Green Lane." <SDC Head Office) 
Tom Toward, Shildon Town Clerk. 
This undeclared "war" between SDC and SHILDA over who would be Director and 
what he- the possibllity that a woman might be appointed never seemed to 
have been considered- would be able to do was to prove a lengthy business. 
In many ways it rather neatly encapsulates the relationship between Town 
and District; great caution when dealing with each other and a marked 
reluctance to confer over what were often common problems. 
One very important consideration, if not THE most important, in this tussle 
between SHILDA and SDC was what BREL thought of either, or both. 
BREL had always shown a greater willingness to work through the SDC than 
exclusively with Shildon. 
In a sense this is perfectly understandable given the sums likely to be 
involved. BREL would need to justify its actions to BR's Board, and 
had, consequently, to make sure it appeared to be acting responsibly. In 
any dealings with a local authority there is an inevitable hierarchy 
involved and proper channels to be considered. BREL could hardly, when 
negotiating terms about the Works closure, be seen to be disregarding the 
Sedgefield District Council's authority in matters that concerned one of 
its constituent town councils. This problem of who to recognise as THE 
authority responsible for Shildon finally came to a kind of resolution at 
SDC's Shildon Action Group meeting on the 19th July 1983. 
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Item 6 on the Agenda dealt comprehensively with the "Shildon Development 
Agency." 
"BREL believed that the Shildon Development Agency was something 
bigger than a group of individual organisations together 
and during the last six months have sought to weld the Shildon 
initiatives and Local Government areas together." 
At the previous meeting of the Action Group (13th May> a Working Party, 
comprising of BREL, Dept of Industry, Shildon Initiative, SDC, and Durham 
County Council, had been established to discuss how the Action Group should 
proceed, but minutes of the 19th July meeting suggested that this Group 
"had not met" although there had been a number of discussions between 
representatives of BREL, Shildon initiative, and SDC. 
"It is true to say that the Shildon initiative was prepared to work 
within the Development Agency and SDC had agreed to support the 
principal (sic) of the Agency. The next stage ... was to formulate a 
detailed structure <on) how the Agency would work, including the 
appointment of a Director ... BREL did not envisage the Development 
Agency's Board formally involving all those parties represented on 
the Action Group although they were at pains to ensure that the 
County Council, Manpower Services Commission, and Dept of Industry, 
who would not be represented on the Board, did not feel that they were 
not involved in the work of the Agency. It was likely that the 
Board would comprise (of) representatives from BREL and SDC both of 
whom had agreed to contribute financially towards the Agency together 
with representatives from a Shildon initiative and representatives of 
those three Groups would be need <sic) candidates for the 
Directorship. BREL were keen to have a local man as the Director 
and with a view to having someone appointed very quickly did nat want 
to advertise in the national newpspapers. Therefore, BREL would be 
interested in hearing from the various organisations represented on 
the Action Group of any person that could be considered suitable far 
the position. 
BREL had prepared a draft job description for the Agency's Director 
which identified his main purpose as being the development, promotion, 
and implementation of employment and employment related initiatives 
within the area of Agency's operation with particular emphasis, at 
least initially,on people affected by the closure of the Shildon Wagon 
Works. It <sic) would be responsible far the financial and 
administrative activities of the Agency and would be required to 
establish effective and co-operative liaison with all relevant, 
central and local Government and other Agencies to assist the 
objectives of the Agency. It <sic) would also be required to · 
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"provide a counselling service as well as advice and support for 
people wishing to set up in business on their own account. Part of the 
Director's responsibilities would include the preparation of detailed 
annual business plans for the Agency, monitoring and control budgets, 
staff and administration. 
BREL hoped to be able to provide accommodation for the Development 
Agency within the Shildon Wagon Works and envisaged that the support 
staff would comprise an assistant to the Director with a clerk. 
BREL had suggested the Agency be called SH~A, but the meeting was 
asked if anyone could suggest a better name for the Agency 
The Chairman explained that whilst SDC in principle had agreed to 
support the Agency and recognised that BR's interest lay within 
Shildon, which had all the emotional connotations because of the 
proposed closure the Council would wish to include 'Sedgefield' 
somewhere in the Agency's name as the Council would intend that a 
successful Agency would take on a wider role in future years, for 
that reason Shildon and Sedgefield Development Agency <SASDA> 
appeared to be a sensible name." 
Minutes of SDC' Shildon Action Group meeting on 4th October 1983 
Although these Minutes have, at times, a rather wayward way of reporting 
events it seems fair to say that they do give an accurate account of how 
SHILDA became SASDA. They were, after all, subsequently approved at the 
next meeting and must, therefore, have satisfied those present at both 
meetings that this was what had been agreed. 
This change of name had been important to SDC. By including "Sedgefield" 
in the name the SDC had effectively made sure that they were now identified 
as being more than a simple background of the Shildon initiative. While 
Shildon retained what seemed to be an exclusive responsiblity for what 
happened after the closure the SDC could appear to have no more than an 
advisory role. With the inclusion of "Sedgefield" in the Agency's name 
the SDC now ensured that it would be formally identifed as a partner in all 
the Agency did. The term "partnership" can mean many things; it is 
often used as an euphemism for what is in reality control by a strong 
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CONSTITUENT in a "partnership". Partnership between true equals is, 
perhaps unfortunately, rarer than most would like. SHILDA, when it became 
SASDA, had undoubtedly acquired more clout, but at a cost. Control over 
the Agency was now, it seemed, slipping away from its originators and could 
only be re-established through the appointment of an independent minded 
Director able to defend the Agency against outside pressure. 
A few interesting points are raised by the Minutes of Action Group meeting. 
When discussing the formation of the Agency <SASDA) it clearly states that 
the MSC, the Durham County Council, and the Dept of Trade and Industry were 
not to be involved at Board level. It then goes on to say "the Board will 
comprise of representatives from BRELand Sl)C and ... the Shildon 
initiative." This seems perfectly reasonable, but how that representation 
was to be weighted could, in the view of some, be less acceptable. If, 
for instance, there were two representatives from SDC, two from BREL and 
one from the Shildon initiative then control would effectively be with SDC 
unless BREL joined with the Shildon representative. 
It should be remembered that the Minutes noted that there had been no 
formal meeting of the Working Party- set up to discuss the formation of the 
Agency- "although there had been a number of discussions between 
representatives of BREL, the Shildon initiative and SDC." This meant 
that arrangements had been made without proper accountability. An 
informal meeting can arrange anything, but without the meeting being 
minuted and reported the practice can become abused. This is not to say 
that that was the intention of those concerned, but it is hard not to 
wonder who said what to whom in these informal meetings? 
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"We had a meeting upstairs <Council Chamber of Shildon Town Council) 
between Hector <Macmillan, Shilda), Alan <Roberts of SDC), David 
<Crewe of BREL), and Professor Baker <DUBS) and myself to try and get 
agreement on what SASDA should be. We gave a bit, made concessions 
but Alan Roberts said there should be executive control. This 
Executive Commdttee idea. I said that no way was SASDA going to be 
run by an executive commd ttee. It would have to be. run by a Board 
of Directors. We wanted Alan Roberts, one of his council, a chairman 
someone from BREL, and ourselves. We got Crewe to agree, but Roberts 
got into a bit of a state. 'I've been told to demand executive 
powers he said'. I told him he was here to negotiate not demand. 
If he didn't like it he could bugger off. It got quite hectic. We 
argued that SASDA should not be controlled by any local authority, 
but by an independent Board of Directors. They wanted the Board, 
as I've said before, to be no more than a rubber stamp. In th8 
weeks that followed I waited for them to write the formal 
documentation and nothing happened so I wrote to them and forwarded 
them to the suggested members of the Board, but when they turned up 
they'd written their own version and, sure enough, they had given 
themselves executive powers. And there it was being passed around 
for signature. I couldn't say anything, it was the inaugural meeting 
and they would have said I was 'playing politics'. I wrote to Crewe 
afterwards to complain and he said he hadn't noticed that they had 
inserted a capital "E" and "C". I wrote to Roberls but he didn't reply 
to any of my letters. So what happened? Alan Roberts, one of his 
council and a member from BREL became the Executive Committee and ran 
SASDA. That way we lost everything, in particular the training 
element we had thought so important. We had wanted something that 
combined enterprise, with training, with development. All working 
together, it had not been tried before, we felt that then whatever 
happened would make sense. But we were stitched up" 
Tom Toward. Shildon Town Clerk. 
So control of SASDA did, in effect, pass to the SDC. Whether SASDA would 
have been any different run by an independent Board is impossible to say. 
As mentioned earlier the original intentions of SHILDA, although exciting, 
were very ambitious; perhaps too ambitious. Who knows what might have 
been achieved had control remained in the hands of those with perhaps more 
radical intentions? It is fairly clear that those who had helped SHILDA 
come into being had intended it to be very innovatory. The combination of 
a local government officer with vision <Toward), an active and enthusia~c 
executive from the CBI <Macmillan), and a supportive Town Council might 
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have allowed Shildon to become a test-bed for a whole host of new ideas 
about what to do when a Town's main employer ups and leaves. It is also 
true, of course, that being in opposition is easier than actually having to 
implement policy. 
SHILDA, having lost control of SASDA, or at least some say in that control, 
would now have to "battle" over who would be appointed as SASDA's Director. 
The Minutes of the 19th July SDC Action Group meeting had observed that 
"BREL were keen to have a local man as Director and with a view to having 
someone appointed very quickly did not want to advertise in the national 
newspapers." This desire to appoint locally, and "very quickly" would 
suggest that BREL, perhaps in agreement with SDC?, regarded SASDA as being 
I 
an organisation of fairly limited importance. 
To go through the detailed business of setting up a Development Agency and 
then appoint its Director "quickly" seems strange. This haste seems to 
suggest that BREL could not make up its mind whether the Agency was to be 
an important contributor towards creating job opportunities in south-west 
Durham or be yet another piece of enterprise cosmetic? Or, perhaps, 
like so many similar "enterprise" ventures, a bit of both. 
Most local authorities need some kind of "agency" in place through which 
they can "launder" central government and EEC funding. This does not mean 
the local authority concerned is up to mischief, but simply that these kind 
of funding bodies prefer agreed channels and it is easier to approach them 
on behalf of something with "enterprise", or one of its variations, in its 
title; everyone then feels they know what is happenning. 
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In the midst of this jockeying for control of SASDA the long-expected, but 
much dreaded, dismissal notices were posted by BREL. There had been many 
at the Works who had felt, sometimes secretly, that BREL would eventually 
back down and retain some kind of engineering presence in the town. These 
"notices" ended those hopes. However much expected, to receive written 
confirmation that your job is no more is almost always upsetting, 
especially if that job has occupied most of your working life. The format 
of such letter is usually fairly typical, but their message always comes 
as a kind of shock. 
"Dear........ Date: 1.Aug. 83. 
With the rundown of the new construction and wagon repair activity 
at Shildon Works, I regret to inform you that your services will no 
longer be required after 31 December 1983 and you are, therefore, 
given five months notice of dismissal from today." 
The letter goes on to outline redundancy arrangements then concludes with 
the usual pay-off. 
"I would like to take this opportunity of thanking you for your 
services to Shildon Works and wish you every success in the future." 
Thus ended, for some, over forty years of labour. Whatever SASDA did it 
could never alter the sense of betrayal felt by many opening their letters 
that day. 
"When you see it there. You know somehow that this is it. You 
could pretend it wouldn't happen, but when they write to you then 
you know they're not going to change their bloody mind are they. 
Some of them got very inward looking and they aged, they became 
old men, the shoulders came down. You saw them walking around the 
back lanes, odd ones on their own, just walking around. In a way 
some of them sort of hid. They didn't want to be seen hanging 
around." 
Fitter in the Works. 
The gloom that now fell over Shildon only served as an added stimulus to 
those trying to make SASDA work. The people in the town knew they were 
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going to experience increasing hardship and wanted to know what could be 
done to help? Those responsible for the town's welfare meanwhile had to 
try and maintain some control over whatever help might be forthcoming from 
either BREL, SDC, or wherever. 
On August 26th Hector Macmillan wrote to Robin Stables <BREL Technical 
Manager) about the recruitment of a Director for SASDA. He mentioned that 
there would almost certainly be candidates from within ICI, but agreed that 
the timescale meant a decision had to be made before October. He then 
continued:-
"My final point ... is the need to find a place for Tom Toward, who 
together with myself, was responible for the Shildon initiative right 
from the start. Tom is an extremely able chap with a great deal of 
understanding and experience of both political and community affairs 
in Shildon, and indeed SDC. He is also a qualified FCIS and is, 
therefore, a proper person to act as Secretary to the Board <SASDA) 
within the terms of the existing Companies Act. Alan Roberts differs 
from me in the sense that he feels that there is no need to have a 
formally appointed Secretary to the Development Board and, for 
example, the Director could also act as Secretary. I am afraid that 
I do not accept this proposition and feel strongly that the Board 
should have a qualified, competent, and independent Secretary- Tom 
Toward, in my view, has all these attributes." 
Assuming Macmillan was reporting Alan Robert's objections correctly the 
idea that SASDA should be run almost as a one-man band seems to suggest 
that the SDC was, like BREL, thinking of a much more reduced Agency than 
had been hoped for by those from the Shildon initiative. Combining the 
jobs of Director and Secretary could easily lead to neither job being done 
properly. 
On the 12th October Macmillan telephoned Toward expressing his "concern 
over the delay in implementing SASDA". He also mentioned that "the 
interview for Director <shortlist> was a shambles and I was embarrassed to 
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be involved. How did 'Smith' become involved, I would not have appointed 
him. David Crewe <BREL) said they wouldn't appoint him under any 
circumstances?" 
"Macmillan favoured Dr Ray Whittaker as a possible candidate for the 
Director's job. He was, like Macmillan, seconded from ICI only 
Whittaker was seconded to DUBS. A most able man who had a splendid 
record as an engineer, built the latest coal-fired power station. He 
was respected in academic circles and had written numerous papers 
and so forth. And his contacts with ICI were very useful. ICI 
had been told by the EEC that it had to upgrade its wagon fleet. 
They were to be checked and maintained once a year. And there 
were new wagons to be built. These new wagons would have to conform 
to EEC regs. It was obvious that ICI would allow Whittaker to 
remain on secondment, perhaps permanently, and that he could use 
the wagon works as a company tendering for ICI's wagaons. I mean 
we're talking of 6000 wagonSA YEAR! Enough for a siz~ble workforce. 
And then when they saw the shortlist! There was one candidate, and 
Macmillan, during the interviews for shortlist, stopped the meeting 
and described this man's record. It was atrocious. He was 
a crook! Macmillan said 'if you appoint this man I will resign' 
and we would have· all followed him." 
Tom Toward Shildon Town Clerk 
BREL continued to delay matters and on the 17th October Macmillan reported 
to Toward <transcript of telephone message 11.10 am 17th October 1983). 
":Met with Stables <BREU on 2 p. m Friday 14th and advised him that 
all local bodies concerned over the lack of response by BREL and 
SDC. and that this could not go on indefinitely. Three points. 
1) the shambles of the appointment of a Director; 2) the attitude 
of SDC; and 3) can see no reason why SASDA should not be taking 
early action. I'm concerned that we look like having to wait till 
next year (1984) for appointment of Director. DUBS concerned at 
treatment of their candidates. Why was Whittaker thought not 
suitable? Stables said that main responsiblities of Director 
were 'support services' and not job creation." 
Robin Stables wrote to Macmillan the day after having this conversation 
confirming that he now did:-
"want to seek on a rather wider net a list of possible applicants. 
I have not ruled out Roy Whittaker. I would like to meet with you 
Alan Roberts, and David Crewe when the shortlist is available to 
decide whether Roy Whittaker should be appointed or whether there 
are other people of promise who should be seen. I would like an 
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"informal meeting of SASDA Board of Directors to take place whether 
or not we have come to any conclusion on the appointment of the 
Director." 
Letter to Hector Macmillan <CBI) from Robin Stables <BREL Technical 
Manager) 18th October 1983 
The first meeting of SASDA took place on 26th January 1984. At this 
meeting a Memorandum of Agreement was put before the Board for signature. 
It was signed by A.Dunkley <Personnel Manager of BREL>, Councillor T.Vard 
for SDC, and Councillor P.E.Thompson for Shildon Town Council. 
This Memorandum had gone through many drafts. Objective 1 now read "The 
generation of alternative employment opportunities following the closure or 
substantial job reductions at BREL's Shildon Wagon Works." thus dropping 
Toward's <STC) version which had also stressed re-training and sponsorship. 
"We felt that the re-training element was crucial. The Works had 
been turning out men who were not trained for the new circumstances. 
They were not up to required standard that was being found in modern 
industries and we wanted SASDA to be involved in altering that, but 
SDC was not that interested. They seemed to want new industries, but 
did not see the retraining as being as important as we did. I wanted 
the retraining to be uppermost because if we didn't get the workforce 
prepared for what was coming we'd be back to where we started with 
a workforce vulnerable to any changes." 
Tom Toward STC Town Clerk 
However "Objective 4" had been significantly lengthened from the earlier 
intention "To assist SDC to extend its support activities in the field of 
job creation" into an acknowledgement that retraining would be needed:-
"SASDA will a) foster and facilitate the creation and/or expansion of 
appropriate economic activities in Sedgefield District as 
a whole; 
b) improve the work and employment opportunities of 
those entering or already in the employment market; 
c) facilitate the training and retraining of thqse in 
employment pool to better fit them for opportunities 
so created." 
Memorandum of Agreement for SASDA 26th January 1984 
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As mentioned earlier the final version changed the role of the executive 
from "an executive who will be appointed by and be responsible to the 
Board." to an "Executive Management Committee WITH DELEGATED POWERS <my 
emphasis) to support the Director in his day-to-day management role." 
There was bound to have been an element of nit-picking between the various 
interested parties. People from the Shildon Initiative felt that they had 
been "taken over" by SDC whilst some in SDC felt that the Shildon 
Initiative approach had been a little parochial. 
"We had always felt that whatever was to be done wou.ld have to involve 
Sedgefield <SDC), that was always our intention and it would have been 
stupid to have thought otherwise, but what irritated most was the way 
they operated. There was the distinct sense of our being kept in the 
dark about something WE had originated. That was wrong of them. 
Silly really. They put people's backs up unnecessarily." 
Tom Toward. 
The appointment of a Director was again delayed whilst everyone conferred 
as to who and what he or she should do. The other pressing problem was 
finance and then on the 7th March, Toward received a telephone call from 
Macmillan. He reported that BR had seemed to have finally agreed to fund 
SASDA sufficiently to ensure that, in the short term at least, it would be 
financially secure. 
"The main details are : 1. £125,000 cash to be matched by the 
SDC together with £25,000 contribution from STC. 
2. BREL to meet full costs of providing 
secretarial staff and back up together with office accommodation, 
heating, lighting, rent, rates, etc, of office accommodation over 
3 years. 
3. £300,000 soft loan guarantees during 
the 1st year- same figures each of the following 2 years making 
£900,000 in total. p.s. soft loan guarantees will only be 
available where there are particular cases supported by SASDA 
following discussions with Banks and Dept. of Industry. 
4. BREL will secure, maintain buildings 
and all existing plant and equipment by employment of technical 
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staff for one year certain, to be reviewed at the end of the first 
year. Person appointed to work directly and to be seconded to 
SASDA. 
5. BREL to be responsible for payment of all 
. outgoings including rates at Shildon Wagon Works subject to lettings 
and freehold sales etc." 
Transcript of telephone message from Hector Macmillan to Tom Toward. 
Wednesday 7th March 1984 
Whilst this indicated, if accurate, that SASDA was now to be financially 
viable, other problems still existed. 
There were, for instance, many in the STC who felt that the constant delays 
in getting "SASDA off the ground" were the fault of the SDC. At a meeting 
of the STC Finance Committee in April various councillors were very 
forthcoming in their condemnation of SASDA's progress, or, to be more 
accurate, lack of it. Apart from the lack of representation on SASDA 
there was a feeling that not much was happening. Councillor Walter Nunn 
commented that the:-
• ... history of action taken aver the preceding 16 months since the 
meeting at Hardwick Hall had shown a need for immediate action to 
protect the community. Delays had occurred <whether in good faith 
or not> by actions of SDC in attempting to promote additional funds 
from BREL at a late date even allowing for the appointment of a 
Director of SASDA in September 1983, some 7 months previous ... 
Cash should not be diverted away from Shildon to Newton Aycliffe or 
elsewhere within the district area. Central Government funds are not 
normally available to local authorities <particularily those labour 
controlled> but would <it is believed) be available to community based 
schemes." 
Minutes of STC Finance Committee 2nd April 1984 
Other comments- "There are too many personalities and this is a problem we 
must overcome", " ... present indications are that any further delays will 
create real problems for the town and its people." -gives an indication of 
the meeting's mood. 
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The BREL financial offer, reported by Macmillan <7th March), now appeared 
to have been a little too optimistic. Alan Dunkley <Personal Director of 
BREL) had taken over negotiations from Robin Stables and he reported that 
the cash offer was not £150,000 but £125,000. This brought a quick 
response from Alan Roberts <SDC>. He outlined the correspondence to date 
and then went on to comment on SDC's feelings about BREL. 
"The outcome of the discussions over the last year or more have led 
my Council to believe that there is no substantial commitment by BREL 
to job creation to help solve the problems caused by the closure of 
the Shildon Wagon Works- BREL being motivated by the simple desire to 
get out of Shildon as cheaply and with as little aggravation from 
whatever quarter as is possible." 
Letter to Alan Dunkley <BREL) from Alan Roberts <Chief Executive SDC) 
1st May 1984 
The following day Dunkley telephoned Toward at STC. This call seemed to 
suggest that BREL were tiring of SDC and were now hoping to resurrect 
SHILDA in preference to SASI>A. Dunkley reported that funding from BREL 
would largely depend on how successful SASDA <or an alternative) would be 
in its first year. 
"Bob Reid <Chairman, British Rail) and the Secretary of State were 
concerned that the scheme show results and that if it did then 
further support should be forthcoming ... These points were put to 
Alan Roberts at the meeting on Thursday 26th April at Spennymoor 
<SDC main offices) but the reaction was unfavourable to the extent 
that he expressed the opinion that members of the DC were looking 
for £1m minimum ... Dunkley was scathing at the mis-reporting and 
mis-representation of the decision of BREL and that this was acting 
against the interests of the Council <SDC) ... He welcomed the support 
given by the Town Council and the other members of <SHILDA) ie DUBS 
and Community Project Foundation. He gladly confirmed that should 
the District Council <SDC) not be willing to proceed or put 
insuperable difficulties in the way, he would more than willing to 
make the offer to SHILDA that he put to Alan Roberts at their last 
meeting. The stated aims of BREL are to help their ex-employees 
particularly in the Shildon connection and he will do all he can to 
assist with, OR WITHOUT, <my emphasis) SDC. In fact, the comment 
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was made that perhaps the matter should be settled one way or another 
in a matter of days and he personally would be delighted to join up 
with SHILDA and could arrange accordingly. 
Transcript of telephone message from Alan Dunkley <BREL> to Tom Toward 
<STC) 2nd May 1984. 
Toward wrote to Derek Foster <Constituency MP> outlining the gist of the 
above conversation and his concern that the differences between BREL and 
SDC could damage the prospects of help for Shildon. 
"We are, of course,all aware of some of the discussions which are 
taking place between the SDC and BREL on additional funding and 
whatever one's thoughts are on the rights and wrongs of the position 
adopted by either party, the end result is that any further delay 
can only have the most serious consequence for the people of the 
town ... By now you will also have received a letter dated 1st May 
from Alan Roberts to Alan Dunkley which does not improve matters." 
Letter to Derek Foster <MP> from Tom Toward <STC) 3rd May 1984 
An element of bluff is always part of any negotiations concerning money. 
As one side pleads penury the other weighs up the "going rate" for being 
rid of such pleading; it were ever thus. It was obvious that SDC were 
taking risks in their insistence on more funding from BREL. Those in 
Shildon who were involved in the negotiations were in a difficult position. 
They were rather like the impoverished wife of a gambler who has pawned the 
family treasures for one last fling- they were reduced to being mere 
onlookers as someone else risked THEIR future. 
SDC clearly felt there was more BREL finance to be had if only everyone 
would keep their nerve and hold out just that little bit longer. BREL, 
meanwhile, played one side off against the other. They knew there had 
been differences between SDC and STC and were now capitalising on the 
situation that had been created. 
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On the 3rd May Toward wrote two more letters; one to Dunkley and one to 
Roberts. To Dunkley he confirmed their telephone conversation and again 
expressed the need for an early implementation of SASDA with the funding 
agreed on the telephone. He concluded his letter with a reiteration of 
his fears about any delay. 
"In the event of a failure to reach agreement between the parties 
this will leave the people of Shildon in a very difficult position and 
members of SASDA sub-committee <STC'S own committee with a 'watching 
brief' on SASDA> are concerend that should that likelihood arise, 
they must reserve their position on what further action is necessary 
in the circumstances and I would hope to return to you on that matter, 
should it become necessary." 
Letter to Alan Dunkley <BREL> from Tom Toward <STC) 3rd May 1984 
In his letter to Alan Roberts Toward expressed the concern of the STC sub-
committee <on SASDA> that the negotiations between SDC and BREL were not 
proceeding very satisfactorily and suggested an urgent meeting of all 
interested parties. Dunkley had discussed with Toward the possiblity 
that the £300,000 loan guarantee might be converted into a "hard cash 
grant" and Toward argued that this was a "move in the right direction." 
He obviously felt that the hopes for "£1m" plus from BREL was unrealistic 
and that £300,000 would be enough as starting capital. He concluded his 
letter with a repeat of earlier fears that:-
" ... the scheme which is hopefully to be of real benefit and support to 
the community is not lost in its present form- it would be tragic 
indeed if a con ensus position could not be reached between the 
parties within the next few days." 
Letter to Alan Roberts <SDC> from Tom Toward <STC> 3rd May 1984 
Roberts replied the following day. He reported that the Xembers of the 
District Council had discussed Toward's letter and that they:-
" expressed grave concern" that any meeting along the lines you 
suggest ... will prejudice my Council's final attempt to secure an 
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"adequate support package from BREL. Clearly BREL will endeavqr to 
exploit local differences in order to minimise their commitment. You 
will be aware that Derek Foster <MP> is in touch with David Mitchell, 
Minister with responsiblity for Transport, in a last effort to see 
whether BREL's position can be moved." 
Letter from Alan Roberts <SDC) to Tom Toward <STC) 4th May 1984 
On the lOth of May Dunkley wrote to Roberts. It was a formal attempt to 
clarify BREL's position and, as such, was a clear warning that BREL was not 
going to be rushed into an agreement. 
•,, .BREL as a business had no autho~t y from the BR Board for use of 
corporate funds in either loan guarantees or grants to new business 
ventures. It was the view of the Main Board Members that 
clarification on the legality of using corporate funds for such 
purposes needed confirmation from the Secretary of State for 
Transport. Until this confirmation had been obtained no formal 
offer to you should have been made. It is recognised that to some 
degree you may have been misled." 
He then goes on to repeat the offers, including the £300,000 in a loan 
guarantee for one year to SASDA. He then continued:-
"I regret that this is the most that can be offered at this stage. 
I understand that the STC, from their point of view consider that 
this approach is sufficient to get SASDA off the ground and this is 
certainly my view." 
Letter from Alan Dunkley <BREL) to Alan Roberts <SDC) lOth May 1984. 
~ 
BREL now seemed to~passing the responsiblity of any increased package 
"deal" on to central government. With the inclusion of central 
government as ·a participant in negotiations BREL had, effectively, "passed 
the buck". It was becoming increasingly clear that as SDC continued to 
play for high stakes, so BREL was itself using the situation to involve the 
Government in spending, perhaps for political reasons, ITS money on 
Shildon. Whether BREL had calculated that the Government would welcome a 
chance to be seen as "benefactor" to a "threatened community"or not is not 
clear, but if it had gambled thus it seemed to be paying off. The irony 
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of seeing a Government first cause a "threat" then appear to be averting it 
was not lost on many in Shildon. 
On the 25th May Dunkley telephoned Toward to report on a meeting that had 
been held between himself, Derek Foster, David Mitchell <Ministry of 
Transport> and Bob Reid <BR>. He told Toward that Mitchell was very 
sympathetic to SASDA and that following a report from BREL would make a 
decision quickly as to whether Government money could be made available. 
He had suggested that Government funds might be channelled through the PSO 
<Public Service Obligation> grant system. 
•This would call for a large input of funds to SASDA without beie~ 4l.. 
charge or call on the resources of BR but could, to avoid confusion 
with other authorities and funding arrangements, be made as part of 
the PSO system." ... Apparently David Mitchell is keen to take a 
political initiative in Shildon and for it to be seen that this is a 
central Government move and not otherwise." 
Telephone message from Alan Dunkley<BREL> to Tom Toward <STC> 25th May 1984 
The problem of selecting a Director for SASDA had, meanwhile, been 
temporarily solved when SDC announced that their Industrial Projects 
Manager, John Robson, was to take on the duties of SASDA's Director. This 
"in-house" appointment by SDC meant that the District Council were 
effectively in charge of SASDA. 
•When they appointed John Robson they had more or less 'stitched us 
up'. Not that I've got anything against John Robson. He did a good 
job, as far as I can tell. But it wasn't done in a very nice 
way and there were plenty who felt it had been underhand. What it did 
mean was that from now on we would have to do without Roy Whittaker, 
who promptly took off. And who could blame him really? I think also 
that from then on Macmillan cooled off considerably as well." 
Tom Toward STC Town Clerk 
Now that SASDA had a Director, albeit one that shared his responsibilities 
with other work, the organisation could begin to function as something with 
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a recognisable purpose. The problem of how it would be financed was still 
being decided, but, for the moment there was enough funding from the SDC 
and STC to enable Robson to start planning SASDA's future. 
Once a Director had been appointed SASDA soon encountered the inevitable 
variables that govern any similar type of agency; the constant seeking of 
funding, the regular reviewing of purpose, the establishment of means to 
evaluate success- or failure. Apart from these eternal considerations 
SASDA's role as the exclusive agency which would, to a large extent, 
determine Shildon's future became established. 
Now the Agency existed what it did depended, certainly in Shildon, on what 
would now happen to the Wagon Works. If there was to be a development of 
new industries then there would have to be a site where this could happen. 
The now-defunct Works seemed the most logical place and those concerned 
soon began to debate how the site could be used. One thing was certain, 
whatever happened there would critically depend on the owners of the site-
BREL. 
One very important consideration was the rail-link between the Works and 
the Bishop Auckland/Darlington branch line. There was a considerable 
lobby within SASDA and STC who considered the retention of these rail-lines 
as being a crucial "selling point" in attracting new industry to the Works 
site. This would obviously be the case if the Works was to continue with 
any kind of railway work. As mentioned before there was the ICI 
connection to be considered- the manufacture and maintenance of an ICI 
wagon fleet- plus any other work which would match the existing skills on 
the site. 
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The SASDA sub-committee <STC) raised this point in their meeting in 
November. 
•<iii) That BREL be asked to confirm or deny the possiblity of the 
removal of the railway lines into the Shildon Wagon Works bearing in 
mind the assurances previously given and to provide a copy of the 
Consultant's report in which this recommendation is alleged to 
appear." 
Minutes of SASDA Sub-committee. 12th November 1984 
The "Consultant's report" referred to was the Owen Luder Plan. In May 
1984 BREL and SDC had commissioned the Owen Luder Partnership, <a company 
which combined architects, planners and landscape architects) to make a 
study of what might be done with the Works once BREL halted production 
there. The Report was a very comprehensive document <85 pages) and, 
although it later became one of many, did present a reasonably accurate 
assessment of the potential of the site after closure. 
It began with a summary of recommendations which concerned themselves 
primarily with; what buildings should be removed or retained; suitability 
of road access; how to market the site; how it should be managed; and how 
the new development should be phased in. 
In Section 5 it discussed:-
•ACCESSIBILITY -RAIL. Due to the cost of maintaining the rail link 
into the site, and its adverse environmental impact, it is recommended 
that the rail link be discontinued and all rails removed." 
Owen Luder Report. Recommendations. para. 5 
This recommendation had been "leaked" before the Report was officially 
published and Toward had alerted his Council to the possibility of the 
lines being removed, hence the minuted request, seen earlier, for sight of 
the Report. 
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"BREL had previously agreed that the railway lines from the Works 
would be retained, for at least two years. They had agreed this in 
writing and so it came a quite a suprise when the Owen Luder Report 
recommended that they be removed." 
Tom Toward. STC Town Clerk 
The Report argued that "Shildon is not particularly well served by road 
communications." and went on to urge that "Greatly improved road access 
must be an essential feature of any successful development plan". In 
discussing rail access it noted that:-
"This was the prime access to the Wagon Works. The rail link crosses 
Redworth Road by means of a level crossing. While this does cause 
inconvenience to local traffic ... it does not appear to be a major 
problem. Construction of the new bypass <proposed for 1988/89) 
will, however, allow through traffic to avoid this level crossing 
The main ... line is approximately~ mile away, so this length of line 
is maintained solely to serve the Works. There are large areas of 
existing track serving the ... buildings. Tracks previously serving 
the Forge ... are not required and have been removed. 
If the rail link were to remain the level crossing will have to be 
retained which will restrict development opportunties and detract 
from the efforts to substantially change the environment of the area, 
particularly the present railway siding image." 
Owen Luder Report. Chapter 6 para.2 
In a sense, the final sentance summed up one of the Reports main concerns; 
the rather "dilapidated" appearance of the site. The Report was, in 
effect, recommending a total break with Shildon's past. It is as if that 
past had become an embarrassment and that in order to attract new industry 
all connections with it should be banished from sight. 
"The image of Shildon as a dilapidated and deteriorating railway town 
is widespread- even if not completely correct., Anything that can be 
done to change that image to one of a progressive attractive place to 
live and work will be helpful to Shildon and to the Wagon Works site 
proposals." 
Ibid. Chapter 7. Section 7. para 7 
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In any town like Shildon there will always be a certain degree of tension 
between what the town was and what it must become. Change, for most 
people, represents an unknown future. There is security in familiarity 
and when that which is familiar is removed it can sometimes cause great 
anxiety, even illness. 
This process of change is further complicated when we discuss what has 
become known as our "heritage". The point at which some run-down old 
heap of stones becomes part of "Britain's Heritage" usually depends on a 
number of considerations; many of which are often, despite claims to the 
contrary, purely subjective. What is one person's eyesore is another's 
treasured link with the past. 
In 1981 the building of a supermarket in Shildon meant that the first 
railway ticket office in the world, the Daniel Adamson Coach House, had to 
be demolished. When enouRh people in the town, and outside it, learned of 
the plans they fought the decision and the Coach House was saved. An 
important participator in this fight remembers, during a visit to the 
building, being approached by a woman in the street. 
"She wondered what we were doing and when I told her we were trying to 
stop it being pulled down she said she was glad because she felt they 
trying to destroy what the town stood for. 'It'll look like 
everywhere else if we don't stop them won't it. Bloody boring and 
it'll have no soul.'" 
Audrey Sansick. Secretary to Daniel Adamson Trust. 1981-83 
In the 1960's much of our "Heritage" was destroyed by architects and 
planners who wanted to make our environment a more "progressive attractive 
place to live and work" <Owen Luder Report). It was not fashionable then 
to keep old mills, factories, in fact anything that was not already stamped 
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with the previous generation's taste for what it regarded as ITS 
"heritage". Then fashion changed and now mills, mines, and almost 
anything with an "interesting" industrial past is saved for "conversion". 
This impulse to remove the encumbrance of the past before building for the 
future is perfectly natural, but what should stay and what should go is 
never an easy question to answer. If it is left to the "experts" then 
had. 
we must reconise that these might well haveAtheir taste formed by criteria 
which could be very different from the those within the community they are 
serving. 
•The environment of the Wagon Works Site and its immediate 
surroundings are generally poor and require considerable upgrading. 
The site resembles an untidy rail siding and is unattractive. The 
main buildings have no aesthetic qualities and in many cases cladding 
is dilapidated and unattractive in appearance. Much can be done to 
improve the visual environment by removing large areas of rail lines, 
replacing these with an orderly road layout, good landscaping and the 
introduction of bright colours in appropriate places." 
Owen Luder Report Chapter 7 Section 7 para 1. 
Most people in Shildon would probably agree with the earlier part of this 
description, but would disagree with the suggested "improvements." 
Whether a building is "aesthetic" or not often depends on its function. 
When, for instance, a building is being used as a railway station, or a 
powerstation, then it will inevitably become grimy. Remove the grime and 
change the function to that of a community centre, an art gallery, a 
museum, or even a new type industrial complex and then what had perhaps 
been aesthetically unappealing becomes an attractive asset which might, at 
the same time, retain a cultural link with its past. 
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Some in Shildon suspected that the real issue was not whether the rail 
lines were "aesthetic" or not, but whether their retention would pose any 
future threat to BREL. It has to be remembered that by the time of the 
closure it had become clear Government policy to "Sectionalise" BR- perhaps 
prior to privatisation? This would mean that each "Section" would have to 
compete in the "open market." Any complex of buildings with an existing 
rail link and facilities for rolling stock construction could thus pose a 
considerable threat to BREL's commercial future. 
Toward wrote to Dunkley about his concerns over the rail link. Dunkley's 
reply was very much to the point. 
"So far as the comments on the removal of the rail line are concerned, 
this was discussed at the last Board meeting of SASDA and a decision 
has been taken to remove the rail lines which come within the 
boundaries belonging to BREL. This is necessary if we are to have 
any alternative employment in Shildon Works and again it is a decision 
taken by BREL in association with SASDA in order to implement the 
package offered to SASDA as an inducement to alternative employment 
for the development of the site in accordance with the Owen Luder 
Plan. 
The Owen Luder Plan, I might add, is available in the SASDA offices 
for you and any of your committee to view at any time and no doubt 
if you wish to view this report, you can make arrangements with 
John Robson to see it." 
Letter to Tom Toward <STC) from Alan Dunkley <BREL) 21st November 1984 
A number of things are interesting about this particular letter. Toward, 
as well as discussing the rail link, had passed on a request from the STC 
SASDA Sub-committee that SASDA have some trade union representation from 
the Works. Dunkley's response was really quite blunt, even a little 
shrill. 
"I should point out that there is no prescriptive right for trade 
union representation on the body <SASDA) ... I believe that the 
right of choice is mine and I certainly do not consider this is a 
matter for consultation with anyone." 
Ibid. 
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In the event he appointed, as one of his nominees, John Priestly, the 
former Trade Union representative on the SASDA Steering Committee. 
Another interesting factor in Dunkley's letter is that strange change of 
mood. In early letters to Toward he had expressed warm concern about 
SHILDA, had even contemplated abandoning SDC's SASDA in preference to 
return to SHILDA. Now his letter seemed to suggest a sense of almost 
outrage that Toward, who after all did represent the people most affected 
by BREL's decision to close the Works, should presume to dictate any 
conditions on what BREL should or should not do. He had not even 
bothered to send a copy of the Owen Luder Report to the STC; the town about 
which the Report had been written. It was as if Shildon and its concerns 
had suddenly become a nuisance to the deliberations of those acting on its 
behalf. 
To be fair Dunkley did relent and offer to let Toward see the Report. 
•If you as an Officer would like a site (sic) of the draft copy, 
on the firm understanding that this is not for discussion or 
circulation to Council Members, then I would be only too pleased 
to let you have a copy on a personal basis and I await your further 
observations on this point." 
Letter to Tom Toward <STC> from Alan Dunkley <BREL> 28th November 1984. 
One must only hope that it was the secretary of BREL's Personnel Director 
who had spelling problems and not the Director? But why not let the 
Report be circulated to the "Council Members" of the very Town concerned in 
the Report? This attitude seemed to suggest that some in the BREL 
management were almost contemptuous of those people who were directly 
responsible for Shildon's welfare. 
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It is not suprising that the next SIC's SASDA Sub-commdttee meeting should 
minute that:-
"Strong concern was expressed by Members at the tone of the letters 
and their contents ... <and) that the strongest exception be taken to 
the views as expressed by BREL." 
Xinutes of SIC'S SASDA Sub-committee 3rd December 1984 
It is difficult to discover what it was that had caused this sudden 
defensiveness. Something seemed to have happened because from this time on 
some on the STC felt that, despite being the elected representatives of the 
townspeople, they were being by-passed whenever crucial decisions about 
THEIR community were being made. The curious fact remains that MOST of 
those decisions would have been welcomed by the STC, but by seeming to 
exclude them from the decision making process SASDA created unnecessary 
resentment. Shildon is a relatively small community and like all such 
places has its fair share of people ready to see slights where none perhaps 
exist. People tend to enjoy rumour because it's often more exciting, and 
less trouble, than trying to unravel the mixture of half-truth, truth, and 
confusion that perhaps more accurately reflects what really "happened". 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: " ... if I'd been younger I'd have emigrated." 
But where to? To make iron it was once necessary to first make charcoal; 
consequently hundreds, perhaps thousands, of charcoal burners eked out a 
precarious and smokey existence in the forests of Europe. Then someone 
thought up a better way of forging metal and the charcoal burners were left 
with a few embers and no job. It was ever thus. 
The difficulties facing Shildon are familiar ones. Almost every country 
with a history of large scale industrialisation has seen the collapse of 
that industrial base. The question of whether such a rapid collapse of 
the heavy industries of Europe, and beyond, could have been avoided is much 
too complicated to be dealt with adequately here. Great industries come 
into being because there is demand for what they produce, if that demand 
ceases they become redundant. How that demand ceases, or is changed, is 
subject to constant debate. At one point in the nineteenth century the 
north eastern port of Hartlepool was the second largest in Britain, now 
most of the port is closed and the land used by Sunday yachtsman. 
Sunderland was once the world's largest shipbuilding town, now urban trails 
are landscaped into the dereliction that is all that remains of that great 
industry. Hartlepool declined first, but the pattern is always the same-
the industry either goes where it can operate more cheaply or simply goes 
because no one needs it any more. 
The speed, and scale, of the present collapse of heavy industry is, 
however, a relatively new pheno.menon. Since the mid-1960's the 
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industrial base of Europe, USA, USSR, has changed beyond recognition. 
Cities that were once great industrial giants, are now reduced to dreaming 
up "heritage packs" in order to attract tourists interested in their 
industrial "inheritance"; their past becoming part of a vast wax-work of 
nostalgia. These rapid changes brought much social distress to those 
unable to either move to where the jobs had gone or scrounge a job showing 
people around their now-defunct factory. 
This social distress was closely linked to an economic one, or, to put it 
more bluntly, to the fact that if you have no job you find it difficult to 
pay the rent; much that passes for "stress" in the modern world can often 
be located to not being in funds. 
The alleviation of that distress is often seen as the job of central 
government, usually operating through local government. The degree to 
which central government will aid distressed areas will depend on its 
proper understanding of that distress. At one level it can advise people 
how to find work, perhaps by moving or travelling from home via bus and 
bike. If this recommendation is recognised as being unrealistic it can 
then perhaps try to bring work to an area. Whatever the measures adopted 
part of their function will be to justify the government's previous 
decisions to allow the changes to have occurred in the first place. One 
of the functions of any government is to at least appear in control of its 
economies- the very speed in which industrial change has occurred has made 
this very difficult. 
Central government is not alone in having to adapt to a rapidly changinR 
economy; the trade unions are also having to understand that what was good 
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industrial practice once is now useless, often because there is not much 
industry left. 
This rather simple observation conceals, like most simple observations, 
much more than it reveals. The circumstances surrounding the Shildon 
closure are, in one sense familiar, and in another especial to its 
particular set of problems. A brief resume of both could perhaps help ·f.n 
the consideration of other such closures, campaigns, instances of 
industrial decline. 
A number of issues seem to be worth further examination :-. 
i> the position of trade unions in an increasingly "deindustrialised" 
J 
economy. Modern trade unions are having to face drastic changes in how 
they operate. In a sense the competition for membership, always a 
divisive issue, has been further exacerbated by the changing patterns of 
employment. Is what Shildon trade unionists experienced typical or merely 
the product of that Works' peculiar "isolation"? Does how a trade union 
react to a crisis depend on the personalities involved, from General 
Secretary to local shop steward level, or on how the membership defines its 
interest (s)? If the latter then how can unionists prevent self-interest 
from destroying any idea of "solidarity"? As membership, and potential 
membership, shrinks how can the trade union movement avoid becoming no more 
than a defused irrelevance? 
ii) the business of any trade union depends on the business of its 
employer. We have seen that the Shildon closure was part of BR policy. 
BR's fortunes were, and are, closely linked to whatever passes for the 
5 . Tra~port Polley of Central Government and consequently are as much affected 
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by political as by economic/business considerations. Was the closure, in 
strictly economic terms, avoidable? Did the Government want rid of it to 
make privatisation more attractive? Or was what happend in Shildon 
simply part of an inevitable decline in the demand for its goods? If the 
latter could this decline have been avoided? 
iii) the relatively rapid collapse of the UK's manufacturing industries 
has inevitably created high levels of unemployment. Following the closure 
unemployment in Shildon reached over 40% and, where similar closures have 
occurred, this kind of increase has been replicated throughout Europe. 
Assuming that some industrial change will always happen how can governments 
help those affected by such changes? Should government be involved at 
all? How much is it a local government problem and how much a national 
one? How can one help the other? What is the responsiblity of the 
industry<s) involved? Should the latter be statutorily required to 
assist, perhaps through funding, in the re-training of its former 
~ 
workforce? And if a workforce is toAre-trained, what should it be re-
trained for? 
These kinds of questions are part of a continuing debate about the future 
of work. Any "answers" will almost always pose as many further questions, 
but by tracing the details of one particular closure in RELATION to that 
debate it might be possible perhaps to put a "face" onto the statistics of 
what is meant by "de-industrialisation". 
What follows is a short account of some of the issues raised above 
alongside a re-evaluation of how they affected the events in Shildon. 
-193-
i) TRADE UNIONS: 
During the period studied the trade union movement began to see the 
inevitable consequences of a rapidly changing industrial economy. 
•The all-time peak membership of trade unions in Britain was reached 
in 1979 when 13.289 million people belonged to 453 distinct trade 
unions .... Between 1979 and the end of 1983 the number of trade unions 
had shrunk <from 453) to 393 ... The actual membership of these 393 
was down to 11,338 million, a reduction of 15 percent since 1979 ... 
Employment had been reduced by 8 per cent, so that trade unions had 
been shrinking faster than the workforce. Of course the virtual 
collapse of manufacturing industry in a number of sectors implied a 
sharp reduction in union membership, while the extension of new 
employment opportunities took place , to a considerable extent, in the 
service sector where it generated a large number of part time jobs for 
women workers. These people are much more difficult to organize than 
their full time colleages." 
11 Trade Unions and Politics" pp 7-12 Coates and Topham. 1986 
This degree of decline in full-time union membership would naturally create 
tensions, not only among members, but among separate, and often competing 
unions. In the Shildon Works there had always been an element of 
competition, where possible, for membership between the NUR and the other 
unions. Linked to this was the familiar pattern of wanting things to 
"remain the same", to follow familiar practices. Unfortunately this 
tendency to cherish the routine as being an end in itself does not help 
prepare people for when something goes wrong. Whenever an organisation at 
shop floor level, especially one that is old and somewhat set in its way, 
faces bad times it often tends wait too long before acting- as if hoping 
that whatever threatens will perhaps go away. Many trade unionists at 
Shildon, whilst in the main satisfied with the campaign against closure, 
felt that their respective branches should have acted earlier. There was 
also the feeling that the unions, at all levels, had not been sufficiently 
aware of the political background to the closure. 
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One reason for this is perhaps, especially in the UK, the way trade 
unionists see the relationship between their trade union- as something to 
do with their workplace- and politics. It is not unusual to find trade 
unionists at branch level often arguing that their considerations should 
keep "out of politics." Trotsky's observation that "You may not be 
interested in war, but be assured that one day it will most certainly be 
interested in you." could equally be said of politics, but for many trade 
unionists this perhaps sad fact of life is one they prefer to ignore. The 
obvious contradication implied by such an attitude, even its absurdity, is 
the problem that will always face the trade union movement; that of getting 
the workforce to see beyond the factory gates. 
The average trade union member joins because he or she thinks it will help 
improve their work conditions and perhaps their job- they may have to join 
in order to keep the job. The POLITICAL role of their union, unless it 
directly impinges on the job, is invariably ignored. And why not? .Most 
people have little understanding or interest in politics and if they take 
any notice at all it is only to comment that there are "just as many 
adventurers in trade unions as there are in politics." Whether this is 
the fault of politicians, trade unions, or the people concerned is too 
vast a consideration, but political apathy must start somewhere and it is 
true that the PRACTICE of branch level trade unionism is rarely a 
politicising process- usually the reverse. 
Clarion calls for united worker action have rung lonR and loud, but the 
indifference of the worker will always frustrate those urging action. Why 
people submit to what is often indifferent and poorly paying management is 
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not difficult to understand. The every day experience of all but the very 
rich is saturated with an anxiety about a whole myriad of seemingly 
threatening problems. Very few people have much control over their lives 
and the poorer the person the less control. Being constantly subject to 
the vagaries of someone else's decision is a degrading process. It brings 
a sure knowledge of how injustices operate and the dangers when confronting 
them. To spend one's working life in any industry is to know first hand 
how vulnerable that life is. Most people spend most of their time 
worrying about whether the people they work with, live with, see in the 
streets, know something they don't and if they do how they might use it 
against them. The greater the experience of defeat the greater the fear; 
and if there is one area that has suffered many defeats it is the north 
east of England. 
The founding impulse behind trade unionism was, perhaps, more political. 
"Unions and their members quickly found that they could not confine 
their activities to the_ immediate workplace: workplace issues had an 
inherent tendency to become political issues. There were two reasons 
for this. First, unions were regarded by the economic and political 
elites as a threat, possibly a revolutionary threat, to the status 
quo. Unions were inevitably drawn into politics both to convince 
these elites that they were legitimate organisations and to secure 
the removal of legal restrictions on their activites. Second, though 
unions were founded to protect pay and conditions these could not be 
divorced from wider considerations such as living conditions." 
"Trade Unions and Politics" pp 2-1'7 Andrew J Taylor 1989 
The degree to which an understanding of one's union would coalesce around 
an understanding that was political, political in the sense that it 
conformed to some kind of, however vague, abstract set of aims and purposes 
is less easy to discover. Much depended on what kind of leadership was 
offered. If it was seen to be weak, or at least incoherent in its aims, 
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then the membership would naturally suspect its judgement. This meant the 
leaders and membership would often be at odds with each other. Both would 
have the same general aim, but might differ on how it might be achieved. 
This could easily lead to a narrowing of purpose; a sectional approach 
rather than an overall strategy. 
HSectional bargaining was a direct consequence of two factors. There 
were the pressing grievances of daily life in the factory, pit, or 
wherever. These could often be resolved by quick decisive action ... 
There was also the failure of the trade union movement to hold out to 
its members a longer-term prospect of a radically transformed society. 
Without that prospect the movement was less a movement and more a 
collection of separate organisations looking towards the interests of 
particular groups of people. Without that prospect the unions could 
offer nothing to unite its people regardless of income, occupation, 
skill, etc." 
"The Union :Makes Us Strong" pp 166 Tony Lane. 1974 
This gap of misunderstanding, even distrust, between leaders and the 
membership often gives an employer, or government, the means of controlling 
a dispute. When Sid Weighall <NUR) called, against his better judgement, 
a rail strike <1983) to protest about the workshop closures <and for a 
better pay offer) the membership refused to strike and his position became 
impossible. This collapse between leadership and members had effectively 
given the Government the go-ahead to do whatever it thought was best in ITS 
interests. 
"Sectionalism had the effect of making the union leaders appear as if 
they had no clothes when negotiating with governments. They could 
never make hard promises because they had no ultimate control over 
their members." 
pp 167 Ibid. 
Since this description was written <1974) the relationship between the 
trade union leadership and its members has, if anything, become even more 
confused. The decline of the great industrial unions; the steel, mining, 
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dock unions, and the sectionalising of the railways, has drastically 
diminished any threat from a "united" trade union movement. Unions are 
now generally regarded as being no more than a shadow of their former 
selves. Whether this is an accurate judgement or not is not important, 
that it is held by enough people, including many trade unionists, is enough 
to seriously affect the morale of those arguing for a better deal for their 
workmates. 
One of the great problems of trade unions was their tendency to become 
bureaucratised replicas of their opponents. To function properly any 
union has need of a bureaucracy and it is in the nature of the latter to 
begin to operate as an end in itself. It would begin to make demands that 
were, although never acknowledged, primarily to satisfy the bureaucracy 
first, then the membership. This process began very early. 
"Government has always suspected unions, so from their earliest 
days they have sought to persuade governments that unions were part 
of society, not its enemy. Throughout the last century unions strove 
to secure access to the political process; by the end of the century 
unionists had become significant political actors with their own lobby, 
the TUG (founded in 1868), considerable electoral experience, <60 trade 
unionists served as MPs between 1874 and 1910) and several were 
interested in creating their own party ... Union political attitudes 
and behaviour were a complex contradictory amalgam of sectional-
occupational and class consciousness, but its rationale was to remedy 
the defects of collective bargaining. Legislation offered permanence 
and general applicability, so circumventing the employers' economic 
power, but the unions were <and for good reasons> ambivalent towards 
the law. They welcomed legal intervention which extended their 
rights and immunities, but resented attempts to restrict and control 
their activities." 
"Trade Union and Politics." pp 3-5 Andrew J Taylor. 1989 
This desire to be at the centre of the political process is a natural one. 
To be without access to that process is to be vulnerable. A trade union 
must concern itself with how large numbers of people are treated, to do 
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this it must have access to the power to change things. The problems 
begin to occur when the process of political power becomes as important as 
the exercising of that power. It is easy to believe in the illusion of 
power, especially if the beguiled are at all susceptible to its trappings; 
there is no more amusing sight than to see some one-time trade union 
firebrand tuck his flowing robes around a new seat in the House of Lords. 
The desire to be respectable is always a two-sided impulse; on the one 
side it can bring the respectful acknowledgment that the person, or 
institution, is something to be reckoned with, but on the other hand it can 
also bring a dangerous sense of self-importance. 
The danger of becoming part of the political process is that it can become 
all too easy to start identifying with that process rather than criticise 
its very purpose. 
"It's a club <House of Commons). But you see it's designed that way. 
That way you begin to identify with everyone there. You lose touch 
with why you're there, that doesn't seem to matter. You go on a 
Committee, say on child care, and there'll be two Tories, a Liberal, 
and maybe two Labour. Well you get to identify with the bloody 
Committee rather than with your party. You end up identifying 
with two of the buggers, the Tories, whose policies are causing the 
trouble for the kids, in the first place. It's an insidious 
process. Same with visits abroad. You go as a group and after a time 
you think, 'Well he's not such a bad bloke.' and you end up being all 
mates together. That's not what I'm here for? To be mates with a 
load of bloody Tories." 
From a transcript of an interview with Denis Skinner. MP for Bolsover 
The balance between being where political decisions are made and being 
party to making the decisions is a fine one. Often the one naturally 
follows the other, but if the reason for being part of the process is to 
check that it is acting in the interests of others, say the membership of a 
union, then some distancing from that process is advisable. Otherwise a 
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slow erosion between doing what is expedient rather than what is right can 
often begin to blur the orginal purpose of being there. 
In one sense the growing crisis in the trade union movement can have a 
positive effect. If trade unions did, in the end, fail to fulfill, let 
alone promise, a "radically transformed society" <Lane> then perhaps it is 
right that they should, in their present form, become defunct. It is 
possible that the changing circumstances in what has become known as the 
post-industrial society can offer as much as they appear to take away. 
The large, almost at times monolithic, unions of the past had great power. 
They could, especially under strong leaders, effectively control not only 
the Labour Party, but the whole labour movement. The union block vote 
gave enormous power over the decision making at Labour Conferences. 
Whether this power was used to the whole movement's benefit or more usually 
to the sectional interests of the union concerned is a matter that cannot 
be adequately discussed here, but that such power existed is not in doubt. 
This power could sometimes be abused. 
"It wasn't just the Tories who preferred road to rail. The road 
lobby in the TUG had great influence. And used it. Which meant that 
the railways were outnumbered. The Transport and General for road 
haulage. The Shipbuilders and Boilermakers. The Seaman's union. 
All would fight for their corner at the expense of rail. It meant 
that the labour movement as a whole was pro-road and anti-rail. 
Sid Weighall. General Secretary of NUR 1979-84 
The break-up of these great unions has, perhaps, begun to change that 
pattern. This re-grouping of influence, together with the changing 
structure of voting in Labour Conferences, may mean a certain diminishing 
of a certain type of union power, but perhaps this will bring about a union 
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movement better suited to a new type of membership. 
•Flux in the labour market and economic structure means that unions 
will, for the forseeable future, remain in the role of supplicants. 
In terms of their regeneration this is no bad thing, for the 
weakening of the state fixation will force them to direct their 
attention to their only source of power: their members and the even 
greater numbers of potential members. Economic crisis, mass 
unemployment, and ideological challenge compel the unions on pain 
of continued decline to begin to forge a new contract with their 
members by going back from when they came- to the factories, the 
mills, the mines, the offices, the warehouses, and so on to plant 
and nurture the seeds of their own revival." 
"Trade Unions and Politics" pp 197-198 Andrew J Taylor 1989. 
What is clear is that if this "revival" does not take place many working 
people are going to have firsthand experience of what our "industrial 
heritage" really meant. 
On 26th April, 1986 David Walker of "The Times'' reported on a speech by 
Lord Young, the then Secretary of State for Employment. The noble lord 
had been asked to give the Stockton Lecture of that year. His theme was 
"Enterprise", but he dealt primarily with industrial relations 
•The economic facts of life, Lord Young said, are as follows. If 
wages are constrained 'firms have lower costs' That encourages 
them to produce more and sell more- they then can set lower prices 
and enjoy higher profits. Real demand and output will increase. 
And where does that leave trade unions? The logic is plain: trade 
unions are.bad for business, business is good for workers, ergo 
trade unions are bad for workers." 
Walker continues his article with a comment on "What Right To Strike?", a 
publication from the Institute of Economic Affairs. 
"A new lEA pamphlet out this week is blunt <about unions) 'Modern 
unionism is an affront to the rule of law upon which the authority 
of the liberal state should rest. Hence the proper role of law would 
be to proscribe them.' Unlike the minister the lEA is unafraid to 
face the logic of its premise. Trade unions exist to stop labour 
being supplied. They should be declared illegal combinations." 
There will always be some who would wish to return to less troublesome 
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days. When public opinion stopped people stuffing small children up 
chimneys there would no doubt have been some who would have seen even this 
as an unneccessary increase in child unemployment figures. But these 
rather atavistic desires for the "good old days" do give voice, if rather 
crudely, to an underlying element of right wing thinking which is not 
confined to the UK. 
Claude de Brie writing in "Le Mende" <"How the hard right made its policies 
'respectable"' 9th May 1986> describes how the "traditional right has 
abandoned the ideology it held from after the war until the 1970's, that of 
an interventionist welfare state which steers the nation towards necessary 
reforms". In two lengthy feature articles he goes on to describe how 
French academics and economists on the right regard questions of equality. 
•Inegalitarianism and elitism would be the link between all the 
strands of the right ... in the beginning there was inequality, between 
humans, historical inequality between peoples, ethnic groups, 
cultures ... Inequality is not just an established fact but is in the 
very nature of things. It is a vital necessity that gives human 
adventure its spice and its variety. It is the mainspring of history 
yet finds itself threatened by the levelling forces of egalitarianism 
and universality." 
He concludes his first article with a resume of how the right could use the 
state to use "strong arm tactics" to defend "democracy" against threats of 
terrorism, immigrants, etc. 
•In the meantime free enterprise- that 'only begetter' of wealth 
and jobs- and the elites which control it would be left free to ensure 
the community's prosperity. Individualism and competitiveness would 
be exulted and natural hierarchies respected." 
At the other end of the spectrum there is equal confusion about how, in a 
rapidly changing world, workers rights should be respected. In the same 
month of the "Le :Mende" article (June 1986) Francis Blanchard, Director 
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General of UN Labour Office addressed his annual conference with the 
message that those in "organised work" now represented the minority. He 
was, of course, talking about the labour market world-wide, but much that 
he said had relevance to what is happening in western Europe; the break up 
of organised central places of work into small disparate units scattered 
across a whole range of locations. 
Blanchard's goal was to encourage the "'informal'world of street vendors, 
repair shops, tool makers, and fish dryers to 'organise themselves'. The 
road to a better life is not going to be via the factory floor." <"The 
Times, 6th June 1986). Although what he said mostly concerned third 
world economies, his message could be increasingly seen to be pertinent to 
Europe; certainly in those areas which have suffered the recent very high 
levels of unemployment. 
It will have particular relevance where, as in Shildon, large scale 
industrial employ~rs have been replaced by small factories employing a few 
dozen people in locations scattered around the outskirts of town. Whilst 
some employed in such places will have come from employment where union 
membership went with the job, many will not. Or, perhaps more importantly, 
have had bad experiences of union practice and now want to actively work 
AGAINST having a union represent them. 
In many ways the Shildon experience showed that unless trade union members 
are kept fully informed of what is being planned for their job- both inside 
and outside the factory gates- rumour will quickly replace debate. The 
notion, amongst some union officials, that an acquiescent membership is 
easier to lead is a dangerous one. It might suit short-term because it 
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seems to allow the official<s> more space within which to negotiate, but in 
the long-term it often makes the officials appear linked, however 
unfairly, with management- they can even appear to have become PART of 
management. 
In some cases, of course, they do become part of management, often for very 
good reasons. 
•After nationalisation <of the railways> we hoped for better things, 
but it didn't happen. Management remained the same, it didn't change. 
I became a shop steward to try change things. There was hell on with 
management trying to get them away from doing stupid things. Really 
to the detriment of the job. I could instance things over and over 
again. It was bad management and slowly I saw the unions, from having 
no power to them getting recognised and then the tail wagging the dog. 
But the unions could do this because of lazy, inefficient management. 
Very often, in all good faith, the unions were doing things that the 
management should have done and had failed to do." 
Former shop steward in Shildon Works 
It is easy to see how this "mutual-aid" between management and unions could 
quickly lead to a confusion about either's role. It becomes a short step 
from this to the union becoming an agent of, rather than mediator with, 
management. This, in turn, can soon breed disillusionment among the 
membership, especially if the union seems to be assisting in any run-down, 
or alteration of working practices. 
The relationship between union and employer is always a difficult one, but 
no union officials can allow a confusion to come between the interests of 
their members and the interests of the employer. Each may depend on the 
other, but they will almost always have different intentions- one to 
maximise profits, the other to get a fair share of those profits. 
As the changes mentioned above begin to bite so some unions seem to be 
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acknowledging the need for new strategies. Following the re-election of 
the Conservative Government <1987> Bill Jordan, President of the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union, described the need for change in his article 
"Unions: Self-reform is best" <The Times, 13th July 1987>. 
•the British trade union movement faces another five tough years. 
If it can break out of the iron grip of its history it will emerge 
in better shape to do the things it was created to do: improve the 
wages and conditions of its members ... The private sector continues to 
move away from manufacturing which housed the big battalions of 
unionized labour, towards a small-company economy, increasingly a 
service economy, providing poor pay and conditions. This sounds 
ideal ground for the unions, but in fact recruitment is difficult 
to organise." 
He does not go on to suggest much that might overcome this "difficulty" 
beyond arguing that the old style confrontational policies alienated many 
more people than it attracted. Jordan's views on fellow trade union 
leaders are well-known and it is not suprising that he condemns the 
"misguided" policies that lead to the miners' strike of 1984, but much that 
he says does make a kind of sense. 
•For trade unions, the best reform is self-reform. However getting 
out of the tramlines of tradition is not easy as demonstrated by the 
number of unions still bargaining autonomously in each establishment. 
Ideally we should have the sort of rational system the British trade 
union movement designed for West Germany after the war; single-union 
industries, or at least companies ... Policies should·be adopted or 
rejected because they are right or wrong, not because they are 'left' 
or 'right'." 
Perhaps the fact that the"single union" appeals to this particular trade 
union official is part of the problem. How, for instance, would such a 
structure help "organise" the "small company economy" he had described at 
the beginning of his article? It might be possible to attract members 
from such an economy via a large structure, but it is difficult to see how 
this would make the job any easier. It might, perhaps, prevent inter-
union rivalry, but beyond that there seems little here to attract the 
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underpaid part-time woman packer tucked away in the corner of same 
industrial estate. 
Unless the union movement can really democratise itself it will continue to 
be no mare than a bureauratic- sometimes useful- appendage to the majority 
of working people. To democratise, however, implies a degree of 
sophistication from the "electorate". This has, in mast cases, been 
absent from most shop-floors. How to overcome this lack of interest, 
indifference even, is undoubtedly the main problem. Perhaps the 
membership has became indifferent because it had indifferent leaders? 
Perhaps a better trained union official might understand more clearly haw 
to involve the members in real decisions? Perhaps worker representation 
at Board level might create a different respect far union officials? 
Trade unions are needed more now than at any other time since the war. As 
has been shown there are many who would like to do away with them 
altogether. In a sense unions are at the beginning again, they will have 
to recruit and develop in much the same way as the earlier unions 
developed; piecemeal and adapting to local circumstances. This may not 
create the great unions of old, but it might create that more 
"sophisticated" membership upon which their success depends. 
As this revival, if it occurs, develops it will face what is probably the 
problem of all; inter-union rivalry. Jordan argues for larger unions 
organised an the German model, but being the leader of a large union "he 
would wouldn't he". The inter-union machinations at Shildan were not 
unusual; they were the norm. This will have to change because the nature 
of large scale employment is changing, but as once large unions see their 
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membership dwindle, or be attracted elsewhere, they will fight. 
Power struggles are never pretty affairs. No doubt much workplace energy 
will be spent fighting other unions as well as dealing with management. 
The average member will be no more than a spectator and possibly become 
even more disillusioned than before. All the while the means of 
communication itself will become further debased. The spectacle of men and 
women using the jargon of comradeship to squabble and connive over control 
of their respective memberships degrades everything it touches. 
Throughout, the Government, governments, and all who want to have unions 
declared "illegal combinations", will continue to flourish in the sure 
knowledge that, for the moment, the trade unions are usually otherwise 
engaged. 
ii GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT POLICY: 
"I didn't know they had one." That is how John Prescott, Shadow Minister 
for Transport, described the Government's policy during the period of the 
closure. It might perhaps be worth asking whether any recent UK 
government has had a transport POLICY- as opposed to simply responding to 
situations as they occur- during the last twenty years, or even beyond? 
To have a policy implies some kind of strategy, whether modest or grand, 
accompanied by a developed philosophy on the transport needs of a country. 
If this perhaps crude, but reasonable definition is applied then the 
answer seems to be that no UK government has anything that could be loosely 
described as a POLICY since the invention of the wheel. 
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From the canal boom <1790's), through the development of the railways <1830 
onwards), and on to the building of roads for the car, all governments have 
followed developments rather than planned for them. Once a need was 
described they usually reacted, but it was just that- a reaction. It 
could be argued, especially if "market forcesn are about, that it is not 
the job of governments to have a transport policy anyway and that they 
should simply let supply follow demand. This might have worked during 
the days of the ox-cart, but it is worth noting that it was the slow and 
muddy progress of armies that brought about the turnpike, not that goods 
could not be moved- when a policy threatens a government things happen. 
One explanation of this reluctance of government to get involved in 
transport was the underlying suspicion that there was no profit in it. It 
was recognised that transport was part of commerce, but did not seem, in 
itself, commercial. 
"· .. the capitalist did not wholeheartedly comndt himself. And you 
can see why: only traffic along trunk routes really 'paid'. 
Everything else, the ordinary, everyday, unspectacular traffic was 
left to anyone who was prepared to countenance the very modest 
reward it brought. So the capital investment in tra~port gives us 
an estimate of the modernity or archaism, or rather the 'return' of 
the various branches of transport: capital investment in overland 
transport was low and in the inland waterways it was of limited 
significance; maritime transport aroused a little more interest 
but even here money was very selective and made no effort to take 
over everything." 
"Wheels of Commerce". pp 349-352 Fernand Braudel. 1983 
It is interesting to reflect that Braudel, when judging the "modernity or 
archaism" of a system, is referring to the 18th and, to some extent, the 
19th centuries. He suggests that it is archaic to regard transport as 
something purely concerned with profit and loss; that it must depend "on 
services provided by other people 11 <Braudel) who themselves will not 
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profit. Who else in modern times can do this, but the government? Does 
this mean then that any government who judges transport in purely market 
terms is archaic? 
Any transport system, except perhaps that based on the horse, helps destroy 
its environment. Since the invention of the internal combustion engine 
most countries have found great difficulty in keeping ahead of tranport 
developments. If too many goods travel by road our cities become 
polluted, and our highways disintegrate- as larger lorries create greater 
congestion so the rest have to squeeze through the gaps that are left. 
Houses crack, buildings crumble and ever increasing cost of repairs 
escalates. The speed with which the car has altered, often for the worse, 
the landscape of cities, towns, and countryside is clear evidence that most 
governments lacked a coherent policy. Such a policy needs to be planned 
well in advance because it will be, by its very nature, supply le .d and 
whatever "market forces" are they are not supply led. 
In the past the reaction to an increasing demand for more roads was to 
build roads and close the railways- one appeared to be replacing the other. 
It was argued that there was a demand for roads and not for railways. How 
this conclusion was arrived at is less clear. If, for instance, a 
government fails- through insuffienct subsidy provision- to build a railway 
it cannot then say there is no demand because no one queues up at the 
railway station. Those lost customers will have to walk, cadge a lift, 
or get a bus. If they can afford it they will get a car, but whether they 
would have used the train or not will have depended, not on "market 
forces", but on whether their government wanted them to have a rail way in 
the first place. 
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Now, as environmental issues become fashionable, this process is, at least 
in many parts of Europe, being reversed. As European public transport 
systems begin to make a come-back so railway/bus systems start to grow 
again. In a sense it could be argued that it was only when the 
~environmental costs of our ever~burgeoning transportation systems became 
better understood that governments realised the need for a planned 
response- a policy. That if they were not careful our means of travel 
could, instead of moving us more quickly, kill us. This growing awareness 
of the need for government aid for, and control of, how we move people and 
goods continues to develop- except in the UK. 
The crucial factor in any government's transport policy is how much it is 
prepared to spend That is, in essence, the crux of any POLICY; define 
the transport needs of the country early enough and then provide the funds 
to satisfy that need. Present Government spending on transport during 
the 1979-90 period, gives, perhaps, some indication of its priorities. 
"Mr Dalyell: More money has been put into the railways of Paris by 
the Government and the city than has been given to the whole of 
British Rail." 
Hansard. Volumne 26. Session 1981-82. <21 June- 2 July 1982) page 50 
In June 1982 the House of Commons debated the future of British Rail. The 
debate's discussion of a threatened rail strike has been referred to 
earlier, but the debate also examined the transport policy of the 
Government in general. The Opposition's main criticism was on the lack of 
Government investment. The Government, David Howell MP, Secretary of 
State for Transport and Reginald Eyre MP, Under-Secretary of State for 
Transp :ort) countered this by accusing the rail unions of blocking progress 
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and therefore endangering any further investment. 
"Mr Howell: ... I beg the right hon. Gentleman and his friends to tell 
the industry, which is in a very dangerous condition, that its future 
is in its own hands. The demand for more taxpayers' money merely 
promotes the delusion that there is an easy way out of the 
difficulties. There is not. Such a demand postpones recognition 
of the railway's vital need to keep and win customers. It is worth 
bearing in ndnd that customers can and will go elsewhere. Indeed 
some have already done so as a result of the futile interruptions 
earlier this year <ASLEF strike) in the rail service. The customers 
cannot be taken for granted, and may not- possibly will not- come 
back if rail ways are constantly interrupted." 
Ibid. 
It is easy to take a statement out of context and inflate its importance, 
but this description of an industry from a State Secretary responsible for 
that industry does give some indication of how Government, at that time, 
saw its role vis a vis transport. It seems to come to this; if the 
railways cannot attract customers then the problem lies with the railways, 
not the Government. There is a curious feeling that the Government 
exists as something apart from responsiblity; as if it is in being to 
observe, on behalf of the tax-payer, what others decide. 
Later in the debate Harry Cowans MP presented the Secretary of State with 
an interesting comparison with the transport policy of other countries. It 
came as part of a general account of how the industry viewed its future and 
provides a worthwhile summary of the problems facing the industry. 
NMr Harry Cowans <Newcastle upon Tyne),,.Despite what the Secretary 
of State says there has been a chronic lack of investment in the 
industry. Nowhere has this been better highlighted than by the 
unique occasion when the ten major organisations that represent the 
road and railway industries-management and unions- got together and 
agreed to submit a document to the then Secretary of State ... <It said) 
'It is not an understatement to say that the whole transport industry 
is deeply concerned at the continuing decline in public investment in 
public transport. We believe that public transport is vital to 
Britain's industrial development and that it is essential to restore 
investment to the levels of the mid-1970's. In collaborating in 
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nthis way we are making it clear that we are concerned not simply with 
the comparative claims on resources of road and rail, but with the 
fundamental need to maintain and develop the necessary infrastructure 
to enable road and rail to make the most of what each has to offer. 
We would wish to press on the Government, therefore, the view that 
failure to increase the level of investment in transport is deterring 
the economic recovery which the nation is seeking. We see action 
in this area not only as supportive of national recovery, but it is a 
'forerunner of it'. The views are not mine; they are of those of 
management and trade unions throughout the transport industry. They 
pointed out that, compared with investment in transport infrastructure 
in the rest of Europe, Britain lags b~hind. In 1977 Germany devoted 
1.3 per cent of its GNP to rail and road investment. France devoted 
1.2 per cent, Italy 1 per cent and the UK 0.8 per cent. Yet both 
Germany and France already have superior road and rail networks to our 
own. Two other documents, "The Challenge of the 80's" and "Balance 
Sheet of Change", were presented to the Government ... Where has 
investment been synchronised with productivity? Even if one accepts 
that half of the productivity was agreed- a premise I cannot accept-
one would have thought that half of the investment would be 
forthcoming. Productivity can be generated only if investment is 
made. Productivity cannot be generated by constantly reducinR 
investment, but the Government has done just that. Whatever the 
Secretary of State may say, investment is half that required by the 
board <BRB) in its 1981-85 corporate plan, and half of what it was 
10 years ago, and the external financing limit has been set so low 
that actual investment is less than half what is required. The 
Minister mentioned the public service obligation. There was an 
increase before he took office, but there has been a £15m reduction 
in the currently PSO and even that is £80m less than the board asked 
for merely to retain and maintain rural and commuter services The 
board's total investment in 1982 was £265m. In 1978 it was £351m . 
.. . One does not need to be a bachelor of mathematics to know that 
that is not an increase ... It is equally easy to calculate that it is 
only 47 per cent of the investment required. Where is the 
synchronisation? Where is the Government investment to balance 
the unions' productivity? .. Lest it be thought that that is merely the 
unnecessarily gloomy view of a potentially biased NUR-sponsored 
Xember, I quote the best authority in the world on the subject-
Xr R.B.Reid, chief executive of BR. Mr Reid said: 'Initially 
investment is urgently needed to catch up on the backlog of renewals 
and repairs to BR's network to make it suitable for electrification. 
There will be little benefit from electrifying a worn-out railway."' 
Ibid. 
The first response to this speech was from the Conservative MP <Tim Eggar) 
who asked if he could be forgiven for "not following the speech. I 
recognise that he felt he had to earn his official sponsorship fee in the 
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debate." He continued, in an attempt to be more constructive, with a 
reiteration of how rail unions were to blame for whatever was wrong with 
the rail industry. 
"I understand the reluctance of railway unions to change. They are 
after all part of what is, through an accident of history, a declining 
industry that has been declining for a number of years. Jobs have 
been lost because there has been a lack of demand for the services and 
because technology has changed. The unions are naturally anxious to 
preserve their membership because it gives them political and other 
power." 
Ibid. 
Tim Eggar was not speaking for the Government, but as a backbencher, 
although his co1lllllent about "other power." is an interesting one. As 
mentioned earlier the considerable change from rail to road haulage had 
other implications. When most freight travelled by rail the unions 
concerned had, if they wished to use it, the power to seriously hamper the 
economy. Road haulage, however, was in the main poorly unionised and 
therefore posed less of a threat. 
The main Government spokesman closing the debate was Reginald Eyre MP. He 
again stressed that union intransigence had caused the Government to be 
reluctant to consider higher investment. He also claimed that investment 
was not inadequate. 
"The figure for last year was £907m and the figure for this year is 
£902m. The change is insignificant since the figure is virtually 
the same as that for last year ... we cannot go on indefinitely 
increasing the resources that the railways pre-empt from the 
economy. Private business and, indeed, other nationalised 
industries have to live within the financial resources available to 
them and we all know what the country can afford .. " 
Ibid 
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The comments- "resources that the railways pre-empt from the economy", 
"there is a limit to what the country can afford"- again suggest that the 
Government is somehow defending the nation against the profligate and 
mischievious incursions of people and institutions who are, in some curious 
way, separate from the rest of us. 
The Secretary of State continued: 
"Overall the board's <BRB) investment ceiling has remained at roughly 
the same level for the past 10 years ... In this financial year the 
ceiling stands at £462m. Of course the Government would like to see 
more investment in the railways, but the investment ceiling is not to 
blame. It is the failure to reduce costs and improve productivity 
that has eaten into the funds available for investment. On this, 
as on everything else, we return to the problem of productivity." 
It is difficult to understand how the Minister could argue that investment 
is good if the ceiling for that investment has "remained roughly at the 
same level for the past 10 years". Given normal levels of inflation this 
would suggest that investment had fallen throughout the preceeding ten 
years. The rest of his speech simply repeated the Government's basic 
position; that Government investment in the railways was sufficient, and if 
it wasn't then it was the fault of the unions. 
Parliamentary debates are as much about point-scoring as they are about the 
matters under discussion. They do, however, give some indication of what 
the Government of the day is thinking about the topic. Ministers come and 
go, but they are briefed by officials who stay. Therefore a Minister's 
statement will, despite the twists and turns of political ob· fu.._~ation, show 
something of Government policy- or lack of it. 
Perhaps another way of trying to assess Government commitment to transport 
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is to look at its expenditure proposals. On January 22nd 1985 Peter 
Rees, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, published the White Paper on 
Expenditure for the period 1987-88. He claimed it represented " a 
restatement of the Government's unchanged and continuing strategy for 
public expenditure ... Constancy is the single most important issue." 
"Constancy", as far as transport was concerned, seemed to mean standstill. 
<from 1985 ~4,758m to 1988 ~4,830m- an increase from 4.7 bn to 4.8.bn) 
Transport did slightly better than spending on the arts and libraries <0.6 
to 0.7) and certainly better than housing <3.1 to 2.6), but compared to law 
and order (5.2. to 5.6) and social security <40.1 to 44.0) it did less 
well. The environmental lobby, yet to become fashionable, was to remain 
throughout at 3.5. The White Paper suggests that the Government was 
committed to a policy of simply maintaining the transport infra-structure 
rather than improving it. 
The policy of the Government's EEC partners is quite different. A list of 
comparisons with European rail investment was published in the BR Annual 
Report for 1988-89. Even allowing for the somewhat biased source- and 
the possibility therefore of some statistical massaging- the figures make 
clear that there is a wide gap between the UK and European investment. 
Country Govt Support Subsidy per % of rail spending Rail investment 
per train km head per yr. from govt. ~m % of 
operating costs 
UK ~1.95 £17 28 412 <12. 4) 
France ~5.83 ~2 35 604 <14.4) 
W.Germany £5.37 £48 32 1190 <16.7) 
Netherlands ~3.45 £28 41 172 (31. 1) 
Denmark £3.19 ~8 n.a. 131 <33.5) 
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Other comparisons shaw that there bas been a greater increase of passenger 
traffic in other countries than in the UK and that the decline of freight 
traffic is exceeded only by France. It is possible that the higher rate 
of rail freight traffic in Germany might come about because of the greater 
control there on heavy goads vehicles on roads. 
Country Rail change % change 1976-86 Train km per staff 
Pass. Freight member 1986 1976 % 
UK +8 -19 2413 1817 +33 
France +17 -25 2010 2096 -4 
W.Germany +11 +2 2173 1750 +24 
Netherlands +9 +15 4125 3909 +6 
Denmark +37 0 2332 2242 +4 
The Report also showed that as a percentage of the GNP the UK spent 0.22% 
of public spending an rail whereas the average for eight other European 
countries was 0.67%. 
European investment in high-speed links shows, perhaps, more clearly how 
much the UK lags behind its European partners- and competitors. High-
speed links are being built in France, Germany, and Italy. Lines are 
being upgraded in Switzerland <part of a "Rail 2000" plan approved by 
referendum), Austria <a "Neue Bahn" modernisation programme), Spain <a 
"Rail Transport Plan"), and the Netherlands <a "Rail 21" prospectus). All 
of these, with the Channel Tunnel, are designed to form a network. 
<"Proposals far a European High-Speed Network", Community of European 
Railways 1989.) 
The commercial importance of rail, public transport in general, is also 
becoming better understood in Europe. 
"The spirit of the law which established us is that transport is a 
service good for Paris and a major investment in the economic life ... 
The employers here count their VERSEMENT TRANSPORT <a tax paid by all 
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"employers in the Paris region>in their cost of production; they 
have made an investment in a good system of transport ... It is not a 
matter of left wing or right wing. Our role is to raise the 
expectations of the city and to propose solutions." 
Jean-Pierre Balladur, Finance Director of the RATP <Paris equivalent of 
the London Regional Tranport> "Le :Monde'' 10. 3. 89 
The UK Government seems, as yet, not much impressed by the policies of its 
European neighbours. A speech given by Cecil Parkin :son <Secretary of 
State for Transport) to a conference on transport was reported in the 
"Independent" of 23rd May 1990. The conference on European transp ort 
had been sponsored by the "Financial Times". Nicholas Faith, writing for 
the "Independent". was more than a little critical of the Secretary of 
State's stated position 
"If the Government is right in not putting money into new railway 
lines, then an awful lot of other people- the French, Germans, 
Italians, Swiss, Austrians, Spanish, and Koreans- who have accepted 
that railways are on the way back and are planning and constructing 
new lines and improving old ones, are all as wrong as only foreigners 
who disagree with Mrs Thatcher can be ... Even Mr Parkinson had to admit 
that subsidies on social grounds were justified ... but went out of his 
way to dampen speculation about building and financing the fast link 
and singled out freight as a sector where BR had to justify its 
existence. The idea that it might be worth a bob or two to take a 
few juggernauts off the road does not seem to have occu~ed to him, or 
to the :Ministry of Transport. Their Sir Humphreys manage to justify 
investment in roads on social and environmental grounds while if BR 
wants to invest it has to provide a commercial rate of return." 
Nicholas Faith then elaborated on the problems caused by BR's expected rate 
return on investment. 
"The rate of return was upped from 5 to 8 per cent in real terms 
just as inflation was starting to explode: so whereas two years ago 
BR could justify a scheme if it yielded a nominal rate of 8 or 9 per 
cent, the target is now nearly double that figure." 
It is not only the rail lobbies who are concerned about the Government's 
apparent lack of investment. Another Secretary of State for Transport 
said: 
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"We know the great advantages that spring from setting free the 
entrepreneurial spirit giving customers a better service and 
increasing efficiency." 
Paul Channen MP <Secretary of State for Transport 1988) 
<This rapid turn-over of Ministers responsible for Transport is, possibly, 
another indication of Government priorities?.) Whichever Secretary of 
State it is they do not appear to convince some businessman that all is 
well. Colin Stannard, a banker brought in to become joint chief executive 
of Eurotunnel- he subsequently left to advise Ove Arup on their plans for a 
Euro-rail link- commented that the BR link, as proposed, "could 
cripple the British economy in the decades to come." What he was 
complaining about was that unless proper provision was made in the UK 
benefits of being linked to Europe would be lost; irrespective of which 
consortia eventually ran the Tunnel. This disquiet amongst the 
businessmen involved in the Tunnel project was a described in a lengthy 
article, again by Nicholas Faith, in the "Independent on Sunday" 4th March 
1990. 
"CHUNNEL PLANS OFF THE RAILS: ... This major new crisis, for the rail 
link is the single most important transport decision for the decade. 
Because of that, it is also the planning and economic decision of 
great historical significance for Britain. The stakes can be spelled 
out quite simply: without a new railway link that can take enough 
trains travelling on all Britain's main routes at high speed and 
carrying passengers and freight this country will be relegated to the 
periphery of the European economy, overlooked and ignored by major 
trans-continental industries. Yet while virtually every Western 
European country is building new fast lines, the planning of an 
adequate new line to link Europe with Britain's industrial heartland 
is being left to two ad hoc private consortia." 
What is at stake is the use of public money. The Government is, as has 
been seen, reluctant to countenance, beyond maintaining an existing 
network, any large scale rail investment. It argues that public money 
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must seek a good return on investment and that, unless there are 
overwhelming social reasons, rail investment must be determined by strictly 
commercial criteria. Those concerned about the lack of public funding 
for the Channel Tunnel argue that under-funding the project could seriously 
affect Britain's economic future. 
"'Without a proper line' says Mr Stannard, 'BR will not be able to 
attract its due share of freight traffic simply because customers on 
the Continent would not be willing to confine themselves to the 
relatively small wheels and small containers available on the BR 
loading guage.' The artificial isolation would inevitably increase 
its marginality <BR's) when international companies are forming their 
industrial plans." 
Whatever the eventual outcome, whether about rail-links to Europe or 
developing the UK system, the Government, for the moment, seems intent on 
spending more on the roads than rail. It argues that this way tax-payers 
get a better return for their money. In a report published by Transport 
2000 Ltd, "Rails for Sale", there is an analysis of how the Government does 
this. It shows that by using a cost-benefit analysis- which values, 
among other things, the saving in drivers' time and accident reductions 
<loss of life= £500,000)- the Government can appear to be getting a better 
return on investment. However:-
"this way of traffic forecast using such analysis have been much 
criticised by the Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit 
Office <"Road Planning: House of Commons Paper 101" May 1989; 
Dept of Transport, Scottish Development Department and Welsh Office 
Road Planning",NAO October 1988). Environmental benefits are also 
taken into account in the roads planning process and in policy-making. 
There are therefore several differences from rail: 
-t there is no attempt to make roads "pay for themselves" or even to 
see if they do; 
• a range of factors are included in assessing road investment which 
are not assessed for railways; 
• there is no external financing limit for roads spending." 
"Rails for Sale" report by Transport 2000 September 1989. 
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Transport 2000 claim that 80% of CoBA benefits are: 
" ... in driver's time saved, and much of the rest is in reducing 
accidents <priced at £500,000) a life. In other words, the more 
traffic you forecast to congest the existing road network, the greater 
the benefits <saving in drivers' time and accidents> that CoBA shows 
in building new roads, because the more drivers there are to benefit. 
So if traffic increases by 280% instead of 140% were projected 
road spending would soon show a 5.1 return." 
"Transport Retort" Vol 13 No 5. June 1990. 
Transport 2000 came into being because of a growing fear amongst transport 
unions, users of transport, and environmental groups, that unless such a 
pressure group existed the UK transport system would face long-term 
disintegration. It is not suprising to learn that it is unpopular with 
the Government who, no doubt, see su~h organisations as contrary to the 
iron rule of "ma.rket forces." Mr Parkinson, at a meeting reported in St 
Albans Observer, certainly showed small regard for such groups. 
"If any group ever misled people it is the Friend of the Earth who 
give the impression that everybody is dying to live in rustic 
simplicity and walk to work. It is you people who pretend there 
are simple answers to the problems while it is people like me who 
have to deal with the problems of congestion ... I suggest you put 
away your abacus and start trying to understand how things are really 
financed ... " 
"St Albans Observer" 14th April 1990 
It is undoubtedly true to say that being in office quickly teaches a 
politician the hard financial facts behind trying to run the economy. 
Parliamentary opposition thrives on the notion that it can suggest 
alternative policies in the sure knowledge that it will not have to 
implement them- not yet anyway. The same goes for pressure groups, like 
Transport 2000, but without informed opposition Governments will do 
whatever they like. They will, of course, claim to be acting in the 
"interests of the nation" but as this invariably means them staying in 
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office its utterances are, in the end, not much more reliable than those of 
the pressure groups. 
One thing that is certain about politicians is their desire to be re-
elected. If environmental issues begin to interest the electorate so 
politicians become interested in the environment. This can create 
interesting paradoxes. 
•chris Patten, the Secretary for State for the Environment, will 
revive the Whitehall battle over rail subsidies ... by pressing for 
environmental benefits to be taken into account in future financing 
of the railways. His case has been strengthened by the report 
yesterday of the central Transport Consultative Committee, which 
warned Cecil Parkinson <Sec', of State for Transport) that the 
subsidies for the commuter system were at an irreducible minimum. 
Network Southeast has been set the target of eliminating all subsidy 
by 1992. This is believed to be part of a strategy of preparing 
BR for privatisation. Mr Patten believes that rail finance should 
be balanced by the measure of the advantages -called 'cost benefit 
analysis' that rail travel brings ... Robert Key, Mr Patten's 
Parliamentary Private Secretary was among a group of Tory MP's that 
met Mr Parkinson to impress on him the need to increase government 
aid for services on one line to the Vest country. But some came away 
angry at Mr Parkinson's rejection of the 'cost benefit analysis' ... 
They warned that the Ministry's policy was driving more people to use 
the :M4 motorway into London." 
Colin Bell. "The Independent" 2.8.90 
It is an interesting irony that it is the Secretary of State for the 
Environment who is arguing for more Government funding for the railways, 
not the Secretary of State for Transport. 
As mentioned in Bell's article much of the current debate on rail concerns 
itself with the possibility of privatisation of, if not all, at least large 
parts of the system. This process has already begun. BREL was 
privatised, through a consortium including the managers of workshops, in 
1989. :Most of the hotels owned by BR have been sold. Sealink, BR's 
ferry subsidiary, was sold to Sea Containers Ltd in 1985. Seaspeed, BR's 
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hovercraft, was sold through a worker buy-out. British Transport 
Advertising was sold to its managers in 1988. Travellers Fare, 
responsible for station catering, was sold to a management buy-out in 1989. 
On-train catering, on provincial lines, has been contracted out. 
Franchising of station shopping sites is almost complete. BR's Property 
Board has become increasingly involved in joint development projects with 
private developers such as the Broadgate development in the City of London 
and proposed development at Kings Cross. 
The development of privately owned freight wagons is, in the Shildon 
context, the most interesting one. There are now 180 private freight 
terminals around the country, many funded through Government grants <under 
Section 8 of the 1974 Railways Act finance is available to companies 
wishing to have their own access/sidings to the rail network). The larger 
freight users usually have their own wagons or lease them privately. If 
coal wagons are excluded, 80% of the total wagon fleet on the network is 
privately owned. One company, the mineral company of Foster Yeoman, even 
has its own locomotives and pays BR for use of its track. 
This piecemeal privatisation did not occur overnight. During the 
negotiations over the closure of the Shildon Works, and the others that 
followed, BR must have been planning for just such a privatisation. Not 
to have done so would be have been an act of gross negligence. 
In 1988 the then Secretary of State for Transport, Paul Channen MP, 
reported to the House of Commons that: 
"This year I have put BREL and Travellers Fare well on the road to 
the private sector. But that's not enough. I want to look at the 
whole of BR's future to see whether privatisation is the way ahead. 
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"Although we cannot do it in this Parliament, I have set work in hand 
to study the options because before we make any decision about whether 
to privatise, we need to be clear about how best to do it." 
Rt. Hon. Paul Channen. "Hansard" 11th October.1988 
This statement, just four years after the closure at Shildon, suggests that 
privatisation plans must have been well advanced during the period studied. 
The Government made no secret of the fact that it regarded BR's "monopoly " 
as something contrary to its overriding concern, that wherever possible 
"market forces" should determine income. It has repeatedly claimed a 
mandate for its policy of reducing Government spending. It argues that it 
bas always made its intentions about privatisation clear and that, in the 
main, its privatisation programmes have been popular with the electorate. 
Whether these claims are reasonable or not is not the concern of this 
study, but it is important to remember that throughout the period examined 
some form of privatisation for BREL, and perhaps much more of the system, 
was always thought inevitable. 
Two basic factors are involved in this policy- ownership and competition. 
It is argued that transfering ownership from the public to the private 
sector gives better access to private capital. It is also possible that 
such a move will reduce state control and regulation. 
The sole purpose of such a policy is, the Government claims, to give the 
customer a better service. This improvement will come because the 
"market" will determine, via competition, how the service will run; if the 
service is bad people will go elsewhere. If the service is good people 
will flock to use it and it will thus flourish. This will be facilitated 
by having a service which is more flexible and less bureaucratic. There 
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will be a greater incentive to proviue a good service because everyone 
concer·ned will know that if they fail their job fails with them. 
Competition is also thought to bring greater consumer choice. By freeing 
the providers from the restrictions common to public: .ly owned enterprises-
excessive bureaucratisation, absence of consumer pressure due to lack of 
competition, a workforce often indifferent to effects of its actions- it is 
hoped, a better customer relationship evolves. Anyone having to use 
public utilities will have some sympathy with these aims. Unfortunately 
there are just as many disadvanteges to a rail privatisation. 
There would be the obvious need for some kind of regulatory body which 
would have to have quite formidable powers. Each day the railways move 
millions of people about the country and their safety would have to be 
protected. If the system were to be broken into parts that process would, 
inevitably, become even more difficult than it is now. 
Rail travel is a mixture of profitable lines, and less profitable; the one 
subsidizing the other. If the system were to be separated this would no 
longer happen. Profit making lines would attract investment, but what 
of the lines which were not profitable? When the bus industry was de-
regulated the rural areas soon suffered a diminished service whilst the 
more profitable areas became choked by a superabundance by the development 
of numerous bus "wars". 
In the past, when railways were run privately, the difficulty of making 
connections between the separate companies often led to duplication; some 
towns having, for instance, more than one station. Information was not 
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always shared and the traveller was often confused as to when trains were 
available. In some cases common ticket arrangements were difficult to 
agree with the result that the traveller had to buy from each company. 
The proposal of "sectorising" parts of BR <Inter-City, Provincial Lines, 
the South-East network, etc) has already started to develop problems 
similar to those described. This is best seen in the link between 
Edinburgh and Glasgow where the competiton between Inter-City and 
Provincial could result in each having its "own station with each having to 
pay to use the other's lines, signals, etc." <Don Kent, Transport 2000's 
northern representative> 
Whether BR is privatised or not will almost certainly depend on the next 
general election. The Conservative Party has already privatised much that 
was formerly publically owned, if re-elected it will, no doubt, continue 
that process with BR as a prime candidate. If they are not returned then 
it is likely that BR will remain, for the time being, under public control. 
Whatever happens it seems very unlikely that BREL will be re-nationalised; 
although there will no doubt be some public funding for new construction 
and refurbishment of rolling stock. What is sure is that whatever happens 
it will now make little difference to Shildon. 
Whether Shildon Wagon Works could have participated in the privatised wagon 
market cannot be known. Whether the removal, by BR, of the railway track 
had anything to do with a fear that such a facility would produce unwanted 
competition cannot be known either. There are those who claim the Works 
was deliberately denied access to the new market, there are others who say 
that there was too much needed doing before the Works could have competed 
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with the modern facilities elsewhere. These are, in the end, technical 
arguments and beyond the scope of this study- what is clear, however, is 
that Shildon ended up with a redundant BR trained workforce unable to 
participate in a market that is almost certain to expand. 
ii) "TRAINING FOR THE FUTURE" 
High levels of unemployment have, since the early 1970's, become almost 
commonplace. It would be tempting to argue that this is primarily a 
phenomenon of industrialised economies, but it is very likely that there 
are just as many people without work everywhere; their presence perhaps 
e 
being less notic"able than in the more "developed" economies; What is 
fairly certain is that no one knows what to do about it. The levels, in 
some countries, appear to have stopped rising, but how much this is due to 
real changes in employment and how much to simply changing how we measure 
unemployment is less clear. 
What has changed is that: 
"states with mixed economies who had ·enjoyed 'full' or near full 
employment since the early 1950's have been haunted by the spectre 
of rising unemployment over the last decade <see table 1.1). 
Annual average unemployment rates in selected OECD countries 1971-83 
1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 
France 2.10 2.25 4.80 6.30 8.00 
Italy 3.20 2.S5 7.10 7.40 9.70 
Sweden 2.10 2.00 1. 80 2.00 3.50 
United Kingdom 3.00 2.52 5.70 7.40 13.10 
USA 5.90 5.60 7.00 7.00 9.50 
West Germany 0.70 2.65 4.60 3.10 8.00 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlooks <OECD Standardised unemployment 
Rates.)" 
"Unemployment in the UK" pp 5-6 Jeremy Moon and J.J.Richardson 1985 
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Moon and Richardson go on to discuss the "differentials" in how governments 
respond to these figures- job creation, job subsidy, etc- and also suggest 
that compulsory military service in some countries will alter youth 
unemployment figures. What is clear, however, is that however one 
qualifies these figures they do represent unusual rises in unemployment. 
That the changes occurred is not in doubt. Why they occurred is less easy 
to determine. Moon and Richardson <pp 7) suggest that the 1973 Middle 
East war, with its traumatic effect on world oil prices, started the 
process. They argue that increasing costs of production coincided with a 
slacking off of consumer demand with the consequence that only the more 
efficient producers, and exporters, were able to survive. Shawler and 
Sinfield <"The Workless State" 1980) are less specific in their analysis 
beyond noting "that the rising trend in unemployment in the 1970's was 
principally a consequence of an inadequate pressure of demand for labour". 
The latter is obviously more a consequence than cause, but they do go on to 
describe that during this period of "inadequate" demand there was also a 
growing labour supply; especially among the young. 
What most commentators seem to agree on is the notion that we are entering 
into a kind of "post-industrial" society. 
"'Deindustrialisation', with one millen jobs disappearing in the 
manufacturing industries during the 1970's, has already created many 
social and economic problems that are perhaps most visibly revealed 
in the large number of redundancies. A quarter of a million 
payments were made from the Redundancy Fund in 1979 alone, with a 
third of these coming from mechanical engineering, the distributive 
trades and construction industry, and many more from textiles, metal 
manufacturing, vehicles and electrical engineering. It is not known 
precisely how many more people lose their jobs at the time of a 
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Hredundancy, as many leave early or do not qualify for a redundancy 
payment. Various estimates put the total affected by redundancy 
at two to three times the official number of payments." 
"The Workless State" pp7-8 Brian Shawler & Adrian Sinfield. 1981 
"Deindustrialisation", as mentioned earlier, seems to be very much the 
creature of monetarism. During the last decade old economic theories, 
those that placed great stress on interest rates and money supply, have 
been re-heated to provide us with a "new11 way of measuring economic 
prosperity. Belief in the efficacy of any particular economic theory 
often depends as much on faith as on conviction. Economists, like so many 
latter-day alchemists, labour long over their econometrical deliberations 
in the hope that what they might discover will turn baseness into light. 
If any "theory" is going to take root, especially in the minds of those who 
believe themselves part of a process which "run things"- politicians, 
commentators, administrators- it needs to be simple. It must have that 
quality of being succinct and yet apparently profound. All great religions 
have this. Monetarism has "market forces." 
"Market forces", as a tool to help us understand economics, is, in many 
ways, part of a reaction against the post-war Keynesian concensus that 
tried to control inflation by taxation and prevent unemployment through 
government spending. Keynes tried to account for the economic traumas 
of the 1930's, high unemployment, trade wars, and monetary collapses, etc. 
His " General Theory" rejected the notion that the interest rate determined 
investment and savings decisions. 
"The failure of the rate of interest to achieve this reconciliation 
<between investment and saving) assumed in classical theory was, 
according to Keynes, the result of a possible liquidity trap where 
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"liquidity preferences could, in a deep depression, become highly 
interest-elastic, whilst the investors' demand for money is likely 
to be highly interest-inelastic" 
Ibid pp 34-36 
This "inelasticity" could, therefore, lead to a diminution of investment 
just at the moment when it was needed most. The consequence of this was 
that once an economy appeared to be in decline the reaction of investors 
would be such as to hasten the collapse. The only effective way of 
reversing this process would be for the government of the day to intervene . 
. 
"It is undeniable that postwar governments have accepted a responsibUity 
for the level of economic activity and employment and a degree of 
intervention that was unthinkable in the prewar context."<Showler and 
Sinfield pp37). 
This process of the government "accepting responsi bil1ty" for how the 
economy determines levels of employment has in the UK, since the election 
of the Conservative Government in 1979, been drastically modified. 
Throughout the 1980's governments in the developed countries encouraged- in 
Japan's case demanded- that industry invest much of its profits in research 
and development. In the UK the policy was to let industry have the 
freedom "to manage" its own affairs. The Conservative Government's 
conversion to the belief that "market forces" was all that was needed to 
solve its economic problems meant that the economics of laissez faire- the 
economic theories of the late eighteenth century- were back in favour. 
As large sections of the economy slid slowly into oblivion the workers in 
those industries became more anxious, more militant. This in turn led to 
these same workers being blamed for the departure of their industry; their 
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only means of achieving a modicum of prosperity. The Government argued 
that if management was simply left "to manage" all would come right in the 
end. Meanwhile, while managements got down to managing, the economy could 
be trimmed of "excess fat." The "deadwood" of old and outworn practices 
could be discarded and replaced by the industrial practices of the future. 
A government basing its policy on "market forces" would hardly view the 
social consequen;ces of its actions as being relevant to that policy. It 
would be inconsistent if it did. If a policy is powered by the 
philosophy of the "market" then, by the very nature of the arguments used 
to justify the policy, those same "forces" would eventually solve any of 
the problems initially created. If those pursuing the policy did not 
believe this then their whole theoretical argument would collapse. 
Whether this is a wise policy is a separate issue, but the degree to which 
it can be trimmed, to suit electoral considerations for instance, is an 
interesting example of theory giving way to pragmatism. 
Any government presiding over a manufacturing decline- on the scale 
experienced in the UK during the last ten years- would, it seems reasonable 
to suppose, have some plans for what might come next. If the old 
industries- coal, shipbuilding, steel manufacture, etc- were now to be 
something in the past then what would take their place? "Market forces" 
might have the answer, but this would mean waiting until the "force" was 
with whatever was coming next. 
do to help? 
What, in the meantime, could Government 
One the problems of "market forces" is that it is not always clear how to 
prepare for their twists and turns. How can training be developed for 
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an economy which is subject to the vagaries of the market place? If 
education itself is subject to the market what then, beyond, primary 
skills, does the school teach? If technology is going to make labour-
intensive industries redundant then what is to be done with the redundant 
labour? The answer is, of course, to retrain it, but for what? 
In a past there were two sorts of industrial workforce: the apprentice 
trained skilled and the casual unskilled. The former had largely 
developed out of the idea of the journeyman whose: 
"organisation was based around the possession of an occupational 
skill and their economic objective was to preserve and increase the 
value of that skill. To achieve this they attempted to monopolise 
the supply of their skill on the market. Using Weber's terminology 
we can say they adopted policies of 'closure'. They attempted to 
close social and economic opportu~ies to outsiders in order to 
maximise the advantages their skill could bring group members." 
"British Industrial Relations" pp 96-98 Gill Palmer 1983 
Anyone working in Shildon Wagon Works, or anywhere in an industrial 
setting, will readily recognise this description. The whole network of 
working practices, rules of procedure, maintenance of manning levels, even 
what tools should be used, began in that labyrinthine defence network of 
job protection. 
This protectiveness is, of course, not confined to industrial workers. 
There is no more protective a pair of associations than those of law and 
medicine. These "associations attempt to control or influence recruitment 
to training; the length and content of training; qualification of the 
practi tioner"etc. <pp 98 Gill Palmer> In this they are not very different 
from the industrial pattern except that their standards are much higher and 
entry more controlled. The professional needs time to learn his/her work, 
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the industrial apprentice could often learn all that was needed in half the 
time allowed, but as this would have meant being paid a higher wage earlier 
it was discouraged. 
One of the most important purposes of trade skills was to keep out the 
"unskilled" worker. By laying down a series of rules, sometimes spurious, 
sometimes essential, groups of workers could appear to have some control 
over their workplace. As in so many things their development evolved as 
much from a feeling of insecurity as from being something that might be a 
necessary part of the daily routine. The need to have authority when 
negotiating with a management meant skilled trade unions needed a 
disciplined membership. It was, however, but a short step from this to 
having a "rubber stamp" membership. Having a reasonably acquiescent 
membership was fairly easy when it was in a shipbuilding yard, a mine, a 
steel works, etc, but less easy when the workforce is in small disparate 
scattered groups. Strength in negotiation would now no longer simply 
evolve around numbers, but on communicating to a membership across "skill" 
boundaries. 
As the workforce becomes more disparate, less orientated to a specific 
skill, so the business of training becomes more difficult to organise. 
What, for instance, should one train for? Today's demand might be for 
machine tool operater; tomorrow it might be for someone who operates, via a 
computer, the robot working the same machine tool. 
The decline in apprentice training, or shortening of the time allowed, has 
also led to some trade unions fearing "'dilutees' equ~d for skilled jobs 
by means of special training schemes". <"The Workless State" -Chapter 4 
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"Unemployment and Government Manpower Policy" Michael Hill 1980). The 
idea of a workforce trained by agencies "outside" a particular industry 
inevitably causes concern for those who want to maintain a role in 
representing that workforce. <Hill) On the other hand there has been some 
criticism that government training agencies have deliberately set out to 
create a non-union attitude amongst its trainees. 
Another criticism of the various training agencies is that they seem 
primarily designed to remove the unemployed from otherwise depressing 
statistics. If someone has no job then place them on a training scheme 
and they are no longer unemployed; they are training- the theatre 
profession calls it "resting". The method of calculating the 
unemployment figures has changed twenty nine times since the 1979 election. 
Many of those changes involve placing the unemployed- especially the young, 
into some form of training. Whilst someone is being trained they are not 
available for work and are not, therefore, unemployed. This manipulation 
has had its critics. 
"Sir Claus Moser, former head of the Government Statistical Research 
<GSS) and Sir David Cox, a former president of the Royal Statistical 
Society <RSS> identify the turning point in the history of British 
offical statistics as the White Paper in 1981 entitled Government 
Statistical Services. 'In two and half pages there were seven 
references to efficiency, five to value for money, four to 
economies, and two each for saving and cost effectiveness. Integrity, 
validity and reliablity merited one mention each and objectivity got 
two. Before the Raynor Review ( a Government based review ,which cut 
funding for the GSS by 25 per cent and changed the responsib~ity 
for the Central Office of Statistics from the Cabinet Office to the 
Treasury> the purposes of the government statistical services were 
to serve several masters, first and foremost the Government but also 
industry, academics, and the public ... I don't know of any government 
that has actually falsified figures. But there are different 
grades of interference. There is non-publication or limited 
circulation of figures. Then there is changing definitions or the 
method of collection of statistics in such a way that something 
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"misleading is produced. At present I worry most about the 
unemployment statistics, the poverty data and any suggestions of 
tampering wi tb the Retail Price Index. ' <Sir Claus Moser)" 
Rosie Waterhouse "The Independent" 9th Ocotber 1989. 
Later that month the London School of Economics hosted a forum sponsored by 
the Association of Learned Societies in the Social Sciences and the 
Association of Social Research Organisations. The forum published a 
"statement of principle" which spoke of "widespread concern about the state 
of official statistics in Britain today. Accusations have been made in 
the media, supported by the business community and leading statisticians 
that statistics are doctored, misrepresented, or subject to interference by 
governments." Professor Catherine Hakim, director of the government-
funded Economic and Social Research Council National Data Archive, said 
"The Government bas swept away information which reveals increasing 
inequality such as the distribution of income and wealth or the mortality 
rate in different social classes ... Problems have been caused by the 
changes in the categories, questions and coding schemes: this leads to 
difficulties in making comparisons over time. Statistics provide factual 
information vital to our understanding of what is happening in the world." 
<Independent 31.10.89) 
In the following December The Statistical Society held a special meeting to 
discuss Government's use of statistics. Most speakers again stressed that 
manipulation of statistics would lead to bad planning. 
This disquiet about the way Governement statistics were being used had been 
voiced before. In August 1989 the Bank of England, in its "Discussion 
paper 39. 'The relationship between employment and unemployment'" 
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attributed "much of the steep fall in unemployment in the last three years 
to the Governement's special employment measures, such as various job 
training schemes rather than a growth in jobs." It goes on to outline 
that: 
"Our results suggest that, although unemployment is falling because 
there are more jobs, it is also true that much of the decline in the 
claimant count which has occurred since mid-1986 has been due to the 
shift in unemployment-employment relationship resulting from changes 
in the Government's range of special employment measures." 
When "training" is used as much for statistical convenience as for 
preparing people for new jobs its clients cannot be blamed for becoming 
cynical as to its real purpose. If training becomes compulsory then 
these suspicions only grow. In April 1987 the Government issued new 
guidelines about training. If anyone "unreasonably refuses offers of 
training they can lose their benefit and up to 40 per cent of income 
support for six months." This would also apply to those leaving training 
courses "without good cause". Anyone "selected" for a training scheme who 
failed to turn up for the interview was removed from the unemployed 
register. 
Any government facing the unemployment levels common in Europe must re-
train its people for the jobs that do exist- or might exist in the near 
future- but to appear to be using training as some kind of punishment is 
certainly not going to help either the unemployed, or, in the long term, 
the government. Another problem with "forced" retraining is that it 
debases any good that might come from the exercise. For those people who 
felt they had "failed" at school re-training could easily suggest a return 
to further humiliations. 
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In the early 1980's training did seem to offer, apart from its statistical 
uses, a way for the Government to create a better trained workforce. The 
rapid rise in unemployment had frightened the unions into a grudging co-
operation with some Government training schemes and industry seemed 
prepared to acknowledge the need for more training investment. 
It is obvious that industrialists want a better educated workforce, but 
this usually means educated for their business requirements. 
"The serious unemployment problems facing Britain will be solved only 
when, led by politicians, society devotes all its energy to reform the 
education and training systems to instil the right work and managerial 
ethic into all its young people ... <We) along with other companies 
would be happy to take the risk of faster expansion, to create even 
more jobs than is planned at the moment, if we knew that our biggest 
problem, the pupply of a well-educated labour force, hungry for work 
and responsibility had been solved." 
Gary Hawkes, Managing Director of a Trusthouse Forte Division. 
"The Times" 20th June 1985 
Few businessmen would quarrel with this, but many educationalists might. 
Do we educate people to become good workers or to become better equipped to 
UNDERSTAND their changing world? Do we educate people towards a good wage 
or towards a greater adaptability when faced with change? Neither option 
need exclude the other, but it is how they are emphasised in education and 
training that matters. 
Another article in the above series showed a growing awareness that 
Britain's ability to trade was becoming strongly connected with the 
success, or failure, of our educational and training systems. 
"The direction and pace of change places great emphasis on people's 
competence and adaptablity, and the signs are that this will become 
still more pronounced as time goes by. All this highlights the 
connection between education, training and work. How do our 
arrangements match up to the increasing demands being placed upon 
them? One way of judging is to observe what other countries do. 
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"Last year the National Economic Development 
published 'Competence and Competition' which 
training> with West Germany, USA and Japan. 
important questions. 
Council and the MSC 
compared <our education/ 
The report prompts some 
• is it satisfactory that the number of young people entering 
apprenticeships every year in Britain has declined from 100,000 to 
40,000 whereas in West Germany in 1982 no fewer than 620,000 young 
people PASSED EXAMINATIONS completing their apprenticeships. 
• why have we been content to accept that the majority of school 
leavers still seek to enter the labour market in Britain at 16 while 
the normal age in West Germany and the USA is 18 and in Japan 20. 
• can we compete in the engineering field if we produce 15,000 
engineering graduates a year while the Japanese produce between 
60,000 to 70,000?" 
John Cassels 
Office. 
Director General of the Nation Economic Devlopment 
"The Times" 13. June 1985 
Neither of the people quoted above would be regarded as being particularly 
critical of the Government of the day, nor did they say anything that is 
suprising, but they did represent a growing awareness that Britain's 
educational and training provision was not all it should be. 
These criticisms of the British attitude to training were again voiced a 
month later. 
"All over the country, even in the areas of highest unemployment, 
employers complain about a shortage of skilled labour. I ask the 
employers: What are you doing about it? How much are you spending 
on training this year? Why not set a target of 5 per cent of the 
payroll for 1985/86 for training? At a time when profits have on 
average increased sharply shouldn't there be a conscious decision to 
invest a share of them in training? ... Employees who have not received 
training recently should ask their employer why? If the employer 
seems unenthusiastic they should consider ways of undertaking the 
training themselves. In some major companies in West Germany more 
than half the employees are undertaking self-improvement courses in 
their own time with part of the cost paid for out of their own pocket. 
In this country we tend to leave the initiative to employers with the 
result that we are undertrained and less skilled than our 
competitors." 
Tom King <then) Secretary of State for Employment. 
"The Times 11 9th July 1985. 
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Everyone seemed to know what should be done, but beyond exhorting each 
other in the press and on television little actually changed. In July 
1986 the Government announced that they would be extending its pilot TVEI 
project <Technical and Vocational Education Initiative- designed to help 
young people bridge the gap from school into work) into a fully operating 
scheme by the autumn of 1987. But although it was generally welcomed 
some worried about its funding. 
•rhe scheme is worth supporting and its extension is welcome. But 
it could be hard for schools to find enough science and technology 
teachers. And another big problem will be finance. £900m over 
ten years sounds like a lot of money. But so far only 3 per cent 
of the pupils between 14 and 18 are in the scheme. As the government 
has only doubled the money available, how many of the 97 per cent are 
they really going to be able to cover?" 
Caroline St John-Brooks. "New Society" 11th July 1986 
And even if funded properly did the funds go to the right place for the 
right reasons. On the lOth of February 1987 the National Audit Office 
issued a report on the cost-effectiveness of Government training schemes. 
Of the MSC it said: 
•rhe Commission has no national or local data base recording the 
skills possessed by the working population, and since the introduction 
of voluntary registration for employment in 1982 it had kept no 
inventory of the skills of the unemployed ... Although some data from 
surveys are available the Commission does not have the information 
which would enable it to be certain that training is not being 
provided in skills already in good supply or in surplus and available 
for use." 
Amidst the confusion of what schemes should be funded by how much a 
further problem arose in that it is not always certain what people meant 
when using terms like "education" and "training". Are they necessarily 
the same thing? We toilet train a child, but educate a graduate. Does 
one follow from the other? Is one superior to the other? We would find 
it difficult to train without educating or educate without some training? 
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When we learn to use the toilet we also learn an important fact about 
civilised behaviour. When a graduate studies he or she submits to a 
disciplined pattern which is made easier through some training. These 
distinctions are important because how we use them often determines our 
expectations of what they might provide. 
"While the distinction remains within a recognisable educational 
context it represents a question of subtle interpretation, but once it 
leaves that context and becomes a general policy making fact then 
complications will occur- especially where the distinction is not 
even acknowledged as a possibility." 
"XSC and Further Education" John Sansick 1981 
In the above study an MSC officer responsible for a TOPS PREP course 
remarked that all that was required of the course was that the student "Be 
able to read instructions in a factory ... Just be able to understand any 
signs, not to be able to read as in school. It's training, not school." 
This is all the more remarkable when it is realised that the officer's 
prime responsibility was for courses designed to help unemployed people 
suffering from illiteracy. This kind of (mis)understanding is not that 
uncommon among people who ask that we improve our educational standards. 
The official saw training as a way of making people more employable. 
Perhaps he thought education was about helping the unemployed endure the 
time spent waiting for a job? 
This relatively junior training official is not alone in his confusion 
about what training should be. Over the last ten years anyone involved in 
the "training" industry would need of a fairly extensive glossary of 
acroynms. 
"Whenever a course seemed to be running out of steam, or was thought 
to be not working the usual answer was to change its name. Once 
you'd done that you re-issued its guidelines under the new name and 
called it something like 'A New Intiative' or'A Programme for Change.' 
-239-
"Nothing actually really changed though. The same people ran the same 
courses for the same reasons. They decided the course content and 
providing it appeared to be doing something that was it. Without an 
external system of assessment- a nationally agreed set of criteria 
it was left in the hands of local officers. They, in turn, had to 
try and follow the policy as IT changed in Sheffield <MSC Head 
Office), Everyone involved, from top to bottom, knows it can't go on 
like this but also knows no one can do anything about it." 
Senior Careers Officer responsible for Government Training Schemes 1979-90 
Throughout the 1980's the principal agent for training had been the MSC, 
but in 1987 the MSC metamorphosed into the Training Commission which in 
turn announced <1st September 1988) its own demise when it became the 
Employment Training Agency <ET). ET was designed to bring all training 
under one central control and to give six months training to the long-term 
unemployed, who would be recruited via Restart Centres. It was soon to 
attract a familiar pattern complaint. 
The principle criticisms of ET were two-fold; that financing was still too 
inadequate and, perhaps more importantly, that it was a "back-door" method 
of introducing the American system of "work-fare"- where the recipient had 
to work before being eligible for benefits. Whether this was the 
Government's original intention it soon became clear that "compulsory" or 
not the schemes offered were not attracting enough people. 
"Minsters have accepted that the t,L 4bn Employment Training Scheme is 
likely to attract little more than two thirds the orginal target. The 
Government scheme has been attacked on the quality of its training and 
critics say it has met with little enthusiasm from potential trainees 
or employers, particularly in the private sector." 
"The Independent" 7.12.89 
Those who did go on the schemes also found that the training provided was, 
in the main, little different from what had gone before. A further 
difficulty was discovered when the National Audit Office discovered: 
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"widespread inadequacies in the financial controls of government-
funded training schemes ... It found that weaknesses in the system 
created scope for overspending, mismanagement, and fraud. The NAO 
estimated that excess of payments of £4m through non-recovery grants 
was based on Training Agency office records." 
Brian Clements "The Independent" 2nd September 1989 
In January 1990 the Department of Employment announced, perhaps in response 
to accusations of poor financial management, it was to cut back some of its 
funding for training. The Department argued that the cuts were due to 
"falling unemployment", especially among the young, and consequently 
"provision has been cut by £120m in 1990-91 and by £230m in each of the 
following years." <"The Independent" 30.1. 90). 
In May 1990 the Government then announced it was to cut its funding on the 
Training and Vocational Educational Initiative <TVEI). This scheme, 
designed to prepare 14-18 year olds for work, had been supported by many 
local authorities, who believed it an ideal platform with which to alter 
the training base of school-leavers. 
Later in May further cuts, this time in Youth Training places, was 
disclosed via a Department of Employment leaked document. 
"Challenged during Commons questions Michael Howard, Secretary of 
State for Employment, said that over the past four years government 
spending on training had risen by 60 per cent when unemployment had 
fallen by 50 per cent. 'It is not suprising that some adjustment this 
year should be necessary.' Tony Blair <Shadow Minister for Employment) 
claimed that the 'switch to unit pricing for places, where employers 
offer a fixed number of places at a given rate, rather than grants 
being related more closely to individuals, had particularly hit 
special training needs. The figures showed thousands of places and 
hundreds of trainers' jobs at risk ... If we were in power now we would 
not be cutting training. The fact that there could be fewer people 
requiring training should be an opportunity to upgrade the quality of 
training, not to cut basic training provision." 
"The Independent" 23. May 1990 
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Even allowing for the usual political point-scoring it is difficult to 
argue with Blair's analysis. If the figures did show a fall in 
unemployment- and it has already been noted that these figures are 
themselves often rather suspect- then improved training provision could 
have become more possible. 
Another of the Government's particular concerns- privatisation- was also 
added to the training debate. This, in turn, created further worries for 
the National Audit Office. 
"The National Audit Office is to investigate whether all potential 
purchasers of the Skills Training Agency were given equal information 
over the planned sale of its 60 skill centres in the privatisation 
completed this year. The move follows complaints from bidders that 
they did not know that government cash to 'sweeten' the move into the 
private sector was available ... Mr Macleish <Opposition Spokesman on 
Employment> said there were 'serious doubts above how fair the bidding 
process has been. Forty five of the skill centres went to Astra 
Training Services, a company created by three senior civil servants 
in the Agency who were given £10.7m by the Government as part of a 
'management buyout.'" 
Nicholas Timmins. "The Independent" 14th. June. 1990. 
And so the story continues. 
It would be fair to say that whatever the Government intends- whether 
"massaging" figures, trying to train "on the cheap", or simply reacting to 
an long inherited problem by pretending it isn't there- it is only 
following a pattern that has changed little since the Education Act of 
1944. 
The current policies on training are perhaps more important than ever 
because unemployment now is of a kind that will not go away if and when 
"the economy picks up." Any government which fails to ensure proper 
provision for creating a skilled workforce will eventually have to suffer 
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the consequences of that neglect. The present administration seems 
unaware that that process is already well advanced. 
It is, perhaps, appropriate to end this chapter with a reference back to 
the first draft of the SHILDA Industrial Training Scheme. 
"New technology offers industry a chance to become productive and to 
create new and better jobs selling goods and services to the rest of 
the world. But in order to do so we require and need a better 
educated, better trained and more adaptable workforce. 
Our major competitors successfully tackled this training problem 
many years ago and in Continental Europe some of the main 
countries now provide 80% or more of their young people with further 
education and training of some kind. In Britain, in 1979, the 
figure was less than two thirds ... We have assumed that the training 
given in a person's life is all that they will need for the rest of 
their working life. The result is that the present system of 
training is failing to produce the numbers of skilled people required 
by a modern competitive economy and it is just this situation which 
the Industrial Training Scheme would hope to improve." 
SHILDA Industrial Training Scheme. pp 3-5 
The Scheme, as described, never happened. Maybe it was too ambitious, 
perhaps lacking in a realistic assessment of what could be provided, but it 
cannot be faulted for its analysis of what was, and is needed, not only in 
Shildon, but throughout the UK- a massive investment in proper training for 
the future. 
"We lost £40,000 for training from the Community Projects Foundation, 
a Home Office funded body, because they didn't want anyone else on 
the Board. Training was forgotten and it should have been the 
most important part of the whole scheme." 
Tom Toward discussing the move from SHILDA to SASDA. 
While we continue to regard training as something peripheral, something to 
be "fitted in" when things are slack, the rest of the world's developed-
and developing- countries steadily increase their spending on training. If 
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the people trying to run Shildon see what is needed, what stops our central 
government(s) from drawing the same conclusions? Who knows, perhaps they 
too are reluctant to have "someone else on the Board"? 
Shildon's Works closed largely because those in charge of the Government's 
"transport policy" thought it proper that it should close. The same 
people, give or take the odd civil servant and politician, decide what to 
do with the people made redudant. One thing, at the moment, seems fairly 
certain, if the people of Shildon want to learn new skills they are, 
perhaps, better advised to put their trust in their own efforts and not in 
those who caused their problems in the first place. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: "So what! The North's finished anyhow" 
This was how one ex-worker in the Wagon Works responded to a question about 
the closure. The comment is a natural one given the feelings of many in 
the area, but how much is it a true assessment and how much a simple 
expression of indignation? 
The "North" this man had grown up with- full order books in the Tyne and 
Wear ship building yards, mines working to capacity, and steel manufacture 
continuing to provide jobs in Consett and Middlesborough- has gone. But 
does this mean the North is "finished?" As the interviews progressed it 
became clear that what was being lamented was the loss of these traditional 
industries. Nothing unusual in that- radical change frightens all but the 
most placid <or indifferent)- but how much is this concern simply a desire 
to be safe inside old certainties and how much a worry about lost jobs. 
Bit of both probably, but wanting things to always remain the same can be 
dangerous. 
Should we regret the demise of our industrial "heritage"? Most, if not 
all, of the "lamented" industries were dangerous and exploitative- spending 
one's life down a hole in the ground, or dodging dangerous loads in dock 
and shipyard has little to recommend it. There was always a certain sense 
of pride in having to do dangerous work, but this is an easy attitude to 
exploit. Such work nearly always depends on a locally "tied" workforce 
which can quickly become trapped inside a dubious sense of dependency-
having no choice but to work in the local yard, pit, or factory is not a 
good basis for negotiating improved conditions. 
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Working in such places 
was always hard and injurious- many endured the work only to end their days 
crippled by the disease and injuries that had been part of that work. 
Then public ownership came along but did much change? The industries 
often most affected by decline were publically owned, but did this ·make any 
difference when they closed? When you're sacked, whether by the state or 
by 11 market forces 11 , you're sacked. 
From the early 1970's, perhaps even earlier, it was becoming increasingly 
obvious that a drastic change was needed in how we manufactured things. 
s That the changes would happen was not much in doubt, but as each succe~ive 
government 11 modernised 11 so it was faced with the inevitable unpleasant 
consequences of that process. Tony Benn, in his introduction to "The 
Politics of the UCS Work-In", neatly sums up the problems for politicians 
as they sweated through "difficult,. decisions. 
"The death sentence on UCS <Upper Clyde Shipbuilders> was unexpectedly 
delayed because Rolls Royce went into bankruptcy first, and Mr Heath's 
government did not feel able to handle two such major examples of 
their hard-line policy simultaneously so the UCS crisis was deferred 
until Rolls Royce had been saved by nationalisation in the spring of 
1971 11 
"The Politics of the UCS Work-In 11 pp 12. Foster & Woolfson. 1986 
He goes on to describe the events immediately following the decision to 
close UCS. 
"At first Harold Wilson was very angry with me, as the Shadow 
Secretary of State, for the support which I gave, but then he realised 
that he could not stand aside and began in a discreet way to associate 
himself with the campaign for jobs while carefully distancing himself 
from the stewards and the occupation <the work-in which followed the 
closure announcement>. Victor Feather, the then General Secretary 
of the TUC, also found himself drawn in because of the support of the 
unions, but he, like Wilson, was anxious lest the leading role of the 
shop stewards might undermine the normal hierarchical discipline of 
the unions,. 
Ibid. 
-246-
This jockeying for positions that can appear sympathetic yet remain 
uncompromised seems, as we have seen in Shildon, to be a familiar part any 
fight against closure. 
UCS, like Consett, like two thirds of the mining industry, like most of 
Sheffield steel mills, like Shildon, like so many others, went in the end. 
Foster and Woolfson <pp 422-428) argue that the UCS work-in helped to forge 
an increased political consciousness amongst the Clydeside workers and that 
this was a victory over the divisiveness of old "craft sectionalism". 
How true this is remains to be seen. Even if we accept that the closure 
of the Shildon Works was a much smaller affair and therefore, perhaps, 
untypical, it is difficult to see much evidence of a raised political 
consciousness resulting from the campaign against closure. On the 
contrary the campaign and closure is now seen, by most of those 
interviewed, as something that was, although traumatic, simply part of some 
inexorable process which is unalterable and even, for many, mysterious. 
They know that somehow they've been had, yet still seem prepared to pay for 
a guess about which cup has the pea. It would be satisfying to think 
otherwise, to believe that the experience of fighting together had, 
somehow, created bonds that would endure, but evidence for such hopes has 
yet to emerge. 
This prompts the question of just how typical was the closure at Shildon. 
In many ways,, as we have seen, it followed a familiar pattern. The 
"announcement" of closure was followed by a "postponement" which in turn 
immediately preceded the actual closure. This almost exactly followed the 
developments surrounding the closure of the Consett steel works four years 
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before. In many ways it resembles most closures. Sometimes the closure 
is part of a take-over strategy- where the seller "trims surplus" labour or 
the buyer "rationalises" the assets- or sometimes simply the result of a 
"market forces" type d.ecision. Whenever and however, it almost always 
happens much as it did in Shildon. 
Was there anything about Shildon, however, that was different from other 
closures? In one sense the relatively unusual nature of what was made 
there, as opposed to other industries in the area, did make it slightly 
untypical, but this is stretching an already fine point- the closure of a 
factory is much the same whether it is in Durham or Dunkirk. The response 
to the closure was, in one sense, typical, but the size of the community 
involved did make it somehow a more personal affair- everyone seemed to 
know everyone else. 
It is difficult to compare one closure with another. Certain similarities 
will obviously occur, but each will also have its own special 
circumstances. Perhaps the closure at Consett offers the nearest parallel 
to Shildon. Both happened within the 1980's, both happened in the same 
County, both affected relatively small towns. 
Kathleen Price, in "An Alternative 'Consett Story"' describes some 
further similarities. There was the threat <and eventual stoppage> of a 
steel strike during the campaign. In Consett the feeling was that "if 
Consett came out they'd never get back in." and in Shildon "a strike is all 
they need to close us". Price describes <pp 205) how the other 
threatened steel town, Corby, "gave up the fight" in much the same way as 
Horwich "left us to fight on our own" in Shildon. 
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Inter-union 
differences were also common to both campaigns; many in Shildon will see an 
ironic echo in the comment <pp 210) that "the National Union of 
Blastfurnacemen admits that the local union leaders have 'rarely seen eye 
to eye', but nonetheless planned a "Save Consett Campaign". 
Price makes an interesting comment on the peculiar difficulties for unions 
faced with a closure: 
"If closure situations are compared with other sources of conflict 
between capital and labour it would appear that, whereas forms of 
collective bargaining and withdrawal of labour are well developed 
strategies, which have clear procedures and a strong basis of 
collective identity among the membership, a closure evokes more 
individualist and fragmentated actions and arguments about strategies, 
affecting the extent of inter-union cooperation". 
"An Alternative 'Consett Story'" pp 191. Kathleen Price 1986 
And later: 
"Union procedures are very precise <and that) the committee structure 
for the campaign ... were inappropriate if a united campaign was to be 
conducted ... One advisor <union> noted that the workforce were angry 
and wanted to do something about the situation, but they couldn't 
'discover how to protest' and that union leadership did not try to 
gauge their reactions" 
Ibid pp 226-227 
Price, when discussing mass demonstrations, also makes an interesting 
comparison with Shildon which is both complimentary to Shildon and yet 
reflects similar attitudes in both towns. A planned "mass demo" in 
Consett <25th July 1980) expected an attendance of 10,000, but in the event 
only around "1500-2000" turned up which seems to indicate that Consett was 
less interested in their campaign than Shildon where attendance was always 
good. Consett did, however, see the same fairly rapid dwindling as the 
speeches wended their rhetorical way through the day- "by the end of the 
speeches most people had left" <Price. pp 223>; this does mirror the slow 
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departure of crowds at Shildon as they grew irritated by the "political 
cliches". There is also a sense, in the Consett description, that the 
march there attracted more "onlookers" than participants, and that there 
was a feeling of "community detachment" <Price. pp 223>. These are, of 
course, subjective impressions, but are nonetheless worth recording- what 
people who were there believe happened will always be important to any 
study of the kind Dr Price made and is being presented here. 
So, as we have seen, closures do provoke similar responses and yet, 
naturally remain unique to their time and place. We will all experience 
the same rhetoric whenever a new closure is announced, the same pledRing of 
support from politicians, the same sense of raised expectations, all 
leading to the same end- a closure. Rarely does a campaign seem to do 
more than simply delay matters. This, of course, can be useful- if only 
to give the workforce time to organise itself around other jobs, other 
possiblities- but in the end the jobs usually go. 
If this is true what then is the point of campaigns against closure? 
Would it be more sensible perhaps to simply accept the fact and quietly do 
the job until it is taken away? The only people likely to advocate such 
a policy would be those who, like Lord Young, yearn for the days when any 
combination of workers brought out the troops. 
It is obvious that any threat of closure must be resisted because to do 
otherwise means giving away too much too soon. The very act of resistance 
will create SOME raised consciousness- whether political or simply the 
first glimmerings of altruism <perhaps the same thing?>- and this in turn 
will help form a united response. It is obviously necessary for people to 
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combine against threats to their livelihood, but it also necessary that 
they fully understood what is happening during the campaign. 
Closure campaigns, like wars, use rhetoric and bluff to conceal true 
positions- it is crucial, however, that the leadership knows which is 
which. It does no one any good to promise what is not possible. This 
simply raises expectations and encourages the notion that victory is only 
about defeating the opponent. To persuade people of the need to 
compromise DURING a campaign is a tricky process, but one that constantly 
needs attention. 
The main difficulty of any anti-closure campaign is that it usually 
involves a process of PUBLIC negotiation. The workforce, perhaps 
? formerly acquiescent, is suddenly watching their "leaders" every move- this 
can be a disconcerting process for those used to operating in "cabinet". 
Because the stakes usually evolve around some sort of salvaging process it 
is often necessary to convince the opposing negotiator that what is on 
offer will not only be an acceptable solution but one that can be clearly 
explained to the workforce. 
Such negotiating skills are not as common as is popularly thought. The 
trade union movement is becoming aware of the need for training in these 
skills- the Trade Union Research Unit <1984) noted that better 
communication with the workforce was an essential part of the 
'politicisation' process- but it would be a mistake to simply see the 
process as a simple extension of the old political practices somehow writ 
large. 
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As industries are forced to change so dealing with the management of those 
industries will have to change. In the past once an industry felt that it 
would make economic sense to move it moved. What happened to its former 
workforce was someone else's problem. As we face industrial change this 
process will have to change. Some degree of responsibility for a former 
workforce will have to be statutorily devised. 
In discussing the Shildon closure Alan Roberts, Chief Executive of SDC, 
made some interesting comments on the implications surrounding BREL's 
involvment with SASDA. 
"I reckon the cash value that BREL put into SASDA was eventually 
around £2m. They got some of that back from Europe via grants, but 
it would still be around £1.5m plus. This is important because one 
of the problems in terms of closures in this country, and from what 
I know of other countries, is that we do let the major companies, 
whether public or private, off very lightly. Whether it is the kind 
of German moratorium, or how the French and Italians operate-they 
make it difficult in the short term for companies to close down. 
Either by extending the period of notice or whatever. Whereas in 
this country we let multinationals off too easy. Both <political) 
parties do this. We should tell them that they must make, in 
addition to statutory redundancy payments, a grant of a £1000 per 
lost job. Redundancy payments are alright for the 50 year old, but 
no good to the younger person or, more importantly, the person who 
would've worked at that plant. These are the sort of people who 
leave once the jobs are gone and the community dies. The government 
should look at what BREL did in Shildon. They lost 2500 jobs and 
put in around £1000 per job back into the community. We should make 
all these cash-rich companies do the same. If they want to leave 
they must put that money into the community, not through local 
authorities because they might use it to cut back on the charge to 
the ratepayers, but directly into the community. It should be done 
via an agency, if one doesn't exist create one. And that cash will 
be used, through this agency, to help the economic regeneration 
of that community." <From the transcript of an interview at SDC 
offices- 3rd July 1990) 
How much the campaign was responsible for BREL's making such sums 
available is difficult to evaluate, but it seems fairly certain that 
without such action BREL would have had a much easier time avoiding that 
kind of commitment. 
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How does Shildon seem now, six years after closure? In some ways little 
has changed and yet there does seem to be a slightly different "feel" to 
the place. During the months following the closure there was a sense 
that the town had lost, not only the Works, but also any sense of purpose. 
The "mini-boom" which often follows lump-sum redundancy payments did not, 
with a few exceptions, make much impact and the people, as if attending a 
dying relative, seemed prepared for the worst. That sense of quiet 
despair does appear now to have eased. It was almost inevitable that 
once the closure had become fact the town would, after a short period of 
"mourning", get on with things. 
Any town is more than a mere collection of individuals, but how it gets its 
particular sense of place is very hard to determine. If, when people 
meet, they are mostly friendly this becomes normal practice; if they ignore 
each other, or are positively aggressive, this, in its turn, affects how 
people treat their neighbours. The rumours <and suspicions) that were 
part of the closure campaign were bound to condition attitudes. Whether 
people worked in the Works or not, they could not help but be affected by 
the tensions that accompany any threat to jobs. Now the closure is 
becoming history those tensions are slowly disappearing. 
Perhaps one small part of this process is, perhaps ironically, the low cost 
of housing in Shildon. The town's problems affected house prices which 
made them attractive to first-time buyers from outside the town. These 
"newcomers" brought new attitudes and, more importantly, were not affected 
by the past in quite the same way as older residents. They also 
represented a different kind of person; more mobile, less nervous of 
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change, and possibly less obsessed with the minutiae of gossip and myth 
that pervades any community which has "turned in" on itself. 
Whether this gradual arrival of new people is something to be welcomed or 
not, is, in a sense; irrelevant. It might, after all, mean that some in 
Shildon could be deprived of something that might eventually have become 
theirs, but it has happened and the process will not now be reversed. It 
is, of course, possible for the local authority to provide cheap housing, 
but recent moves towards home ownership has changed many people's attitude 
towards council housing. Owning your home was always felt somehow to be 
the prerogative of the middle classes, but, following recent Government 
policy, that option has moved down a social peg or two. The motives behind 
this policy may be suspect, but it would be difficult to deny that for many 
who were dependent on the council for their homes, the change has not been 
wholly unwelcome. 
Work has also returned to the town, but it is difficult to accurately 
assess how much of this is due to SASDA and how much to the normal, if 
slow, process of regeneration. In July 1990 the SDC Development Committee 
conducted a "1990 Employment Survey of the Manufacturing Sector in the 
District". It noted that the: 
"manufacturing sector is the major component of the district's 
employment structure, representing 58% of all employment. This is in 
contrast to the position in the Northern Region and Great Britain, 
where manufacturing employment accounts for 29% and 25% of the total 
employment respectively." 
Many of the new industrial estates on the outskirts of Shildon are 
manufacturing industries. It is normal to expect such industries to 
employ more women than men, but the Survey seems to contradict this. 
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"During the last year the total number of jobs has increased by 420 
resulting from an increase in male employment of 1,110 and a decrease 
in female employment of 690. This level of job growth, 2% over the 
last year, is below the average increase over the last three years of 
6%: being suppressed by the decrease in female employment." 
In a later paragraph it explains where the losses occurred: 
"areas experiencing job loses include Spennymoor <100 male and 240 
female jobs>, Shildon <140 female jobs) and Fishburn (320 female 
jobs>." 
It states that a large percentage of the losses have "been concentrated 
among a few large employers" which might explain the loss in female jobs, 
but this is a suprising reversal of recent trends where it has been the 
women who got jobs rather than men. 
The Survey does express some optimism about the "trend" of job creation. 
"Comparison of the 1990 Survey with that for 1989 also indicates that 
the trend evident in the last year's survey of new jobs created moving 
ahead of jobs losses has been maintained; a reverse of the situation 
that had existed for much of the 1980's. This success is in part due 
to the efforts of all concerned with industrial promotion, including 
the Council and SASDA. The latest survey showed that during the year-
a> 72 new companies established in the District providing 660 new 
jobs. 
b) 46 companies ceased trading with the loss of 330 jobs; and 
c) In other established business there has been a new increase of 
90 jobs." 
When the Survey comes to detailing the size of the companies it becomes 
clear that the above jobs depend on very small size "firms". 
that 65% employed fewer 
In comparison, last 
people and 95% less than 
sector firms in the 
"Analysis of the size of the 'new firms' shows 
than six people and 86% few than 21 people. 
year 75% of new firms employed less than six 
21 people ... Overall 91% of the manufacturing 
District employ fewer than 100 people." 
These figures certainly suggest that many people in the District now work 
far quite small companies although the Survey does point out that "50 
firms employing more than 100 people make up 70% of total employment". 
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This type of job pattern suggests that people are working in very different 
jobs than was normal in the past. The older, and much larger industries, 
mining, and railway engineering, have been replaced by small <sometimes 
very small) companies which appear, if we note the comment in the Survey 
about keeping "ahead" of job losses, to come and go. The workforce in 
such companies will have to be very adaptable, readily prepared to change 
to whatever is demanded. Job security, as was understood in the older 
industries, will have virtually vanished. 
Whether such changes are welcome depends on a number of rather complicated 
considerations. This kind of mobility can lead to low wages- lacking 
security it become more difficult to argue from strength. The jobs are 
rarely skill-based and labour can, therefore, be changed very quickly- the 
"troublemaker" is more easily got rid of. Union recruiting becomes 
difficult, if not at times, impossible- and in some cases firms, 
unsurprisingly, actively discourage union membership. Constant changes of 
employment encourage a very individualistic attitude which makes joint 
action to remedy unfair working conditions difficult. 
On the positive side such a working pattern does mean people are less 
dependent on one employer. They become skilled at learning where 
conditions have become unacceptable. They will have to learn to rely more 
on themselves for work. They will learn that their job simply depends on 
a demand for their labour and not as if according to some strange law of 
nature. They will, in fact, learn the realities of a market economy and 
having absorbed this lesson might, perhaps, start to use that market to 
their benefit? 
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It might, for instance, occur to some that perhaps they could work for 
themselves? That small companies often need only small amounts of capital 
and are, therefore, not that difficult to develop as co-operatives. Such 
activity will hardly solve the unemployment problems of the District, let 
alone the region, country, etc, but if working people begin to really 
understand how their labour is used they may begin to make other 
connections- perhaps even political ones? 
It was certainly true that in many interviews conducted for this study 
there was a recurring sense of bewilderment about the Works closure. Many 
seemed almost to see it as some kind of punishment; as if someone somewhere 
had plotted the town's downfall as part of a deliberate policy of 
attrition. Can a town become collectively paranoic? There were times, 
during the interviewing, when this did seem possible. Even if it were 
only a few <and there is much to suggest there were many) who thought in 
this simplistic way then a better understanding of what promotes <and 
removes) work cannot be but a good thing. Many in Shildon put all their 
trust in the railways and believed their jobs were safe. They were to 
learn, perhaps rather brutally, that if you work for someone else your job 
is never "safe" and that it is best to make plans for when it is taken 
away. 
It seems appropiate to end with the Survey's summary of the current job 
position in Shildon-
•The overall decrease in employment of 160 jobs is as a result of 
the closures of 29 companies and the loss of jobs occurring with 17 
companies, which has not been matched by the establishment of 14 new 
firms. The majority of this decline bas occurred among female 
employees <nearly 90%) and has been concentrated at Dale Road and 
Furnace Industrial Estate." 
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The people of Shildon, like many elsewhere, have "seen the future" and it 
doesn't seem to "work." They will, however, have to carry on paying 
their rents, their mortgages, and feed their families. They will survive 
because however indifferent successive governments might be they always 
have to be re-elected and so cannot let matters deteriorate too far. 
Too many in the town trusted people elsewhere to look after their 
interests. They are perhaps beginning to learn that this was unwise. 
Throughout the 1980's many of those suffering closures in the rep;ion asked 
"'When are they going to do something about it?" At first this seems a 
reasonable question, but it does, perhaps, betray a fatal misunderstanding. 
For centuries "they" have come to the region to use its labour then, when 
"they" had not need of it anymore, "they" went. This seems to suggest that 
"they" are not very reliable and that it is, perhaps, better not to trust 
them over much 
However we define "de-industrialisation" one thing seems certain- there 
will be an increasing number of people without a job. How they, and us, 
deal with this is difficult to understand. The people described in this 
study are trying to understand these changes and by listening to them- and 
many like them- it might be possible to, if not provide the answers, at 
least begin asking some of the right questions? 
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APPENDIX: SHILDON SURVEY. 
In the summer of 1988 a survey, via questionnaire, was conducted in 
Shildon. The questionnaire (a copy of which is at the end of the 
Appendix) arose from a study by the Work and Employment Research Unit 
<University of Durham) into the possible effects of a proposed British Coal 
opencast mine to the north of the town. The application by British Coal 
was eventually refused by the Department of Environment, but the Inquiry-
conducted by the local authority in conjunction with British Coal- was a 
public one and local opinion about the scheme was sought. It seemed, 
therefore, that some kind of examination of how the town felt about itself 
was an appropriate corollary to work on the Inquiry. The STC agreed to 
finance the printing and distribution of the questionaires. 
It was decided that the questionnaire would remain anonymous with no 
accompanying interviews. This was done for two reasons; one, because the 
cost of mounting an interviewing team could not be realistically arranged 
given the budget; and two, it was felt by STC <Tom Toward, Town Clerk> that 
unless some degree of anonymity was offered co-operation might be difficult 
to obtain. 
Of the 500 delivered 102 were completed with 22 adding comments. 86 were 
returned unanswered. The survey was delivered to the home and then 
left to the goodwill of the respondent to return. This helped anonymity, 
but had obvious weaknesses; it might, for example, have been responded to 
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by those who were more civic minded than others? The relatively small 
return- one in five- also meant that any findings needed cautious 
qualification. 
It should be said that such a survey, whilst useful, is dependent on a 
number of imponderables. This survey, for instance, collected an older 
range than would be normal in a community like Shildon. This can be 
explained in a number of ways; the old might be less inhibited by the whole 
process; might be socially programmed to "do as they're told"; be simply 
more accommodating; see perhaps that such an exercise might help the 
town, etc. The young, however, may be tired of surveys and the 
paraphernalia of the state via Job Centre, MSC schemes, and consequently 
less inclined to participate. It might also be true that the young are 
more fatalistic about the future and therefore cynical of attempts to 
change things? It is true that 66% of the respondents were over 45 years 
of age, with only 8% being under 30 years. 
Much of the response contained inherent contradictions. People would 
declare no interest in politics,environment, or membership of group or 
party (33% did not feel this question <Q6> relevant to them) and yet most 
would want to share decision making with councillors and officials <78% 
Ql6). Similarily 30% were "satisfied" with their social and financial 
position <Q7) and yet 89% felt a "sense of powerlessness" and had"little 
hope for the future" <Q13). These contradictory answers would suggest 
that most respondents answered honestly- the dishonest would perhaps have 
taken care to be logical- but that there was also a need for caution when 
dealing with the "results". 
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Below is the list of questions together with results and, where 
appropriate, a brief comment. 
Question 1. YOUR OCCUPATION WAS/IS? 
There was a wide range of occupations from professional and managerial <in 
education after 21 years- see Q5) to labouring. It was no suprise that 
railway employment predominated (44% of total returned). The next largest 
"group" was related building trades <15) with mining following up (5) and 
then textiles (5). Within both the larger groups there was a range from 
managerial/foreman/supervisory grades to general labouring. 
The rest was a scattering which included civil servants, policeman, 
fireman, nurses, motor mechanics, bank employees, an oap from out of the 
area, teachers, domestics/cleaners, postman, porters, a dental surgeon, a 
management accountant, shop workers<4>, health visitors, etc. 
unable to spell their occupation of many years. 
Question 2. THE LENGTH OF TIME YOU HAVE LIVED IN THE AREA? 
Up to 5 years 
Up to 10 years 
Up to 20 years 
Up to 30 years 
Up to 40 years 
Up to 50 years 
Two were 
2% 
3% 
12% 
14% 
22% 
45% 
This question, with Q3, indicated how the age range of the survey was 
tilted towards the older members of the community. 81% of the respondents 
had lived in the area for over 20 years, with 67% aver 30 years. 
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Question 3. THE NUMBER OF CLOSE RELATIVES YOU HAVE LIVING IN THE AREA? 
None 11% 
Up to three 
Up to six 
18% 
69% 
The figure of 69% for having six "close relatives"in the area might suggest 
that the community which is predominantly unchanging, even static. This 
is, in itself, not unusual. Many communities, larger than Shildon, will 
have the same type of close family structure, but this can sometimes become 
a trap: having close relatives nearby is a very good reason for not wanting 
to move. Some may, of course, move BECAUSE of their close relatives. 
Queston 4. THE AGE BRACKET THAT APPLIES TO YOU 
18 to 30 
31 to 45 
46 to 65 
65 to 100 
8% 
23% 
47% 
19% 
It is sufficient to note that the preponderance of answers fall in the 
category "46 to 65 years" <47%). 
Question 5. WHEN DID YOU FINISH YOUR EDUCATION? 
<Please include any education courses over 9 months) Before 15 46% 
Before 16 29% 
Before 19 15% 
After 21 7% 
The answers here could suggest that the survey should be read with care. 
The 1944 Education Act provided statutory education up the age of 15 years 
which means that anyone over 55 would have been in education up to the age 
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of 15. Yet 46% of our respondents claim to have left school "before 15" 
against 73% being under 65 years of age. Now this either means most, if 
not all, of the 46% in age bracket "46 to 65" are in fact over 55 or, what 
is more likely, that when some people ticked ''before 15" they should have 
ticked the next box. 
Question 6 DO YOU TAKE AN INTEREST IN THE FOLLOWING? 
Politics 20% 
The Environment 34% 
Being member of 
political party or 
group 12% 
Left blank 32% 
The biggest reaction to this question was either to ignore it or strike it 
out of concern by drawing a line through the question. 32% of respondents 
had no interest in "politics", "the environment", nor were "a member of a 
group or party". 
Question 7. IN WHAT WAY WOULD YOU ATTEMPT TO REALISE YOUR POTENTIAL 
SO AS TO IMPPROVE YOUR SOCIAL AND FINACIAL POSITION? 
Further Education 15% 
Retrain and learn new 
skills 16% 
liait and see what 
develops 5% 
Satisfied 27% 
Seek better careers 
guidance 2% 
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Seek better in-bouse 
training 1% 
Work for yourself 15% 
Work for yourself with 
support from the 
community 3% 
Left blank 12% 
That only 1% saw any point to "in-house training" suggests either an 
extraordinary level of suspicion about such activity or that experience had 
shown it to have been of little use. 
Question 8. WHICH INDUSTRIES HAVE YOU/YOUR PARTNER WORKED IN? 
Mining 9% 
Chemicals 6% 
Textiles 11% 
Railways 38% 
Agriculture 4% 
Public services 14% 
Shops/Food industry 17% 
As one would expect the majority (38%> worked in the railways. The nearest 
other occupation <17%> is "shops/food industry" and it should be noted that 
this latter category included a range of different occupations. The other 
spread of occupations in the town are fairly evenly distributed. The low 
figure for mining (9%)is not suprising and most miners who responded were 
obviously long retired. 
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Question 9. IN WHICH INDUSTRIES HAVE YOU/YOUR PARTNER BEEN MADE REDUNDANT? 
Mining 8% 
Chemicals 1% 
Textiles 8% 
Railways 49% 
Agriculture 0% 
Public services 2% 
Shops/food industry 5% 
As expecten the redundancy figure for railways predominate <49%). It is 
interesting that when redundancy is compared to work <Q8), we get a far 
higher figure for railways employment, <38% against 49%) . This could 
suggest that some who had worked for the railway now have other employment. 
Question 10. HAVE YOU/YOUR PARTNER EVER HELD A POSITION ~ITHIN A 
TRADE UNION IN THE FOLLOWING INDUSTRIES? 
Mining 6% 
Chemicals 3% 
Textiles 3% 
Railways 22% 
Agriculture 0% 
Public services 3% 
Shops/food industry 4% 
Left blank 61% 
That 61% had had no positon in their trade union is perfectly normal for 
any industry or community. That 22% of those responding had held a 
position in the railway union(s) is suprising. Either this indicates a 
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higher level of union involvement in industry than is normal or, perhaps, 
that those responding are from a group who take an interest such matters. 
By responding to our survey our respondents, in a sense, became a self-
selected group who, by implication might contain people who would involve 
themselves in trade union affairs. 
Question 11 HAVE YOU/YOUR PARTNER EVER HELD A POSITION ON THE 
FOLLOWING COUNCILS? 
Parish <NUMBERS) 3 
District 1 
County 1 
It is no surprise to find so few respondents involved in council affairs. 
The question had to be asked if only to formally ascertain the general 
level of local involvement in town affairs. The averages presented are 
perfectly normal, but do confirm that the survey located 5 people who are, 
or were, representatives of the town at local and county level. Without 
knowing this there was no way of telling whether such representatives had 
been part of the survey. 
Question 12. HOW WELL ORGANISED WAS THE OPPOSITION TO THE 
REDUNDANCY/CLOSURE PROGRAMME BY THE TRADE UNION 
MOVEMENT? 
Strong 35% 
Moderate 18% 
Weak 17% 
Left blank 30% 
This question, perhaps more than any other, posed probl~ms for the 
respondent in that what it asked for was a very subjective response. How 
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strong" is strong? How "weak" is weak? Perhaps the fact that 30% failed 
to answer the question is an indication that many felt unable to judge and 
so ducked the issue. 
Question 13. IN WHAT MANNER DID YOU ACCEPT THE REDUNDANCY/CLOSURE 
PROGRAMME AT THAT TIME? 
With understanding of 
the firms reasons and 
need to do so 8% 
With deep reluctance 
but feeling of 
powerlessness 42% 
With fatalism and not 
much hope for the future 26% 
Left blank 23% 
It seems sensible to combine the figures of answer 2 with those of 3. The 
line between "reluctance" and "fatalism" is a very fine one. The 
distinction was offered in an attempt to separate out those who felt some 
resentment from those who simply accepted their fate, but the combined 
figure of 68% seems a reasonably accurate, if disturbing, picture of how 
the community saw the closure. 
Question 14 WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION DID YOU FIRST RECEIVE REGARDING 
REDUNDANCY/CLOSURE? 
Personal letter 14% 
TV news 13% 
Newspaper 4% 
Trade union meeting 23% 
Verbally from 
management 15% 
Left blank 32% 
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The question does not specify whether the employer was BR, but that 17% of 
respondents first heard of their redundancy- whatever the job- from the 
media is something that should be regretted. To be told one is now 
without a job is bad enough, but to be told this via television, or through 
the local newspaper is, by any criteria, unacceptable. Any redundancy 
brings with it an unavoidable sense of rejection, but to compound that with 
a kind of casual rudeness seems almost cruel. 
Question 15 DO YOU BELIEVE YOU HAVE ENOUGH SAY IN THE DECISIONS 
MADE BY THE FOLLOWING BODIES? Please tick YES or NO 
Numbers, NOT percentages British Rail 4 Yes 65 No 
British Coal 4 Yes 61 No 
Shildon Town 
Council 14 Yes 63 No 
Durham County 
Council 3 Yes 65 No 
S.A.S.D.A. 4 Yes 54 No 
Sedgefield District 
Council. 7 Yes 72 No 
This was a complicated question. That the majority of townspeople felt 
that they had little say in their affairs is evident. This is confirmed by 
the overwhelming response to all six questions about whether one has any 
"say" in decisions. As can be seen in almost all cases the answer was 
"no". As mentioned before there is a degree of contradiction in this in 
that many express little interest in local affairs yet say here that they 
have too little say in those same affairs. Perhaps the former indifference 
springs from an earlier disillusionment at "getting involved"? 
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Question 16 DO YOU BELIEVE THAT PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY SHOULD 
Control decision 
making? 9% 
Share decision 
making with councillors 
and officials? 78% 
Leave decision making to 
councillors and officials? 13% 
Left blank 1% 
When asked if they would like a "share in decison making" it is not 
suprising that most people said, effectively, yes (78%). That 9% wanted 
unshared control over decision making is an interesting figure- it could 
indicate that there is a significant group of townspeople who have a very 
positive idea of who should run their community- themselves. 
Question 17 IN WHICH JOB AREA DO YOU BELIEVE YOUNG PEOPLE WILL 
FIND EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH DURHAM IN THE FUTURE? 
Community ventures 9% 
Government training 
schemes 15% 
Shops and foodstores 8% 
Public services 3% 
Civil service,DHSS,tax 3% 
Further education 8% 
Reliance on council 
to bring jobs to area 11% 
Manufacturing 9% 
Moving to another area 15% 
Chemicals 1% 
Electronics 4% 
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Working for themselves 6% 
Working for themselves 
with support from the 
community 6% 
Most people ticked one preference <49>, but a few ticked two <22) or more 
<16). The largest single response was the 19 <20% of the whole) who 
thought the ONLY alternative was to move to another area .. 
The questionnaires allowed a space for "any comments". Most did not 
bother, but a few did- 21 out of the 102 returned. In the main these 
were of a fairly general nature and in some cases seemed to have had little 
to do with the questions posed by the survey- statements like "too many 
dogs roaming free". 
One recurring notion was that Shildon was divided into "two towns" with New 
Shildon being the denied section of town. In a sense most, if not all, 
towns have an area which the locals will regard as being the "wrong side of 
the tracks". The accuracy of this description often depends, like many 
things, on the prejudices of the person making it. The desire to 
categorise the suitability of one's neighbours probably goes back to 
when Cromagnon man supplanted his Neanderthal predecessors, but its 
existence needs to be noted. 
One commentator said "there are no civic amenities" in New Shildon. 
Another asked why New Shildon had no ... 
"chemist,doctor,or shopping centre ... it makes it very difficult 
for old and disabled". 
Yet another asked for more shops "especially in New Shildon". One 
correspondent went into considerable detail about provision generally and 
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concluded with ... 
"another thing that bothers me is all the rest of the town and 
entrances to the town seem to get tubs of flowers or hanging 
baskets BUT NOT NEW SHILDON. Have we got a split in the 
town?" 
Another wrote at some length ... 
"· .. New Shildon was gutted of houses and sold to private 
developers who will take years to replace the housing that was 
lost. Amenitys <sic) in New Shildon are virtually nil and 
overall since Shildon lost its own council the town appears to 
have gone downhill and furthermore try counting the number of 
11 tter bins available for use." 
These complaints were often linked to the feeling that there was "not 
enough activities and entertainment for young people between 14 and 18 
years". 
There was also an undercurrent of feeling which suggested that the BREL 
workforce had somehow been an elite and that there had been a kind of 
family closed shop mentality operating there. 
"I could never get a job at the railway works because my father 
didn't work there. Unfair" ... 
was one such comment and another said ... 
"never having worked at 'British Rail Engineering' ... I have never 
felt the effects of the closure. However the experiences of my 
family, to try and get help in their working lives here in Shildon 
have been hampered by not having worked for B/Rail. It seems to 
one that having worked with B/Rail is a must if one needs help of 
any sort." 
These were echoed in the comment that 
"until what jobs there are in Shildon are shared out fairly, 
giving (sic) to the people most in need, we feel that Shildon 
youngsters, have a very hard task indeed for their social and 
economic lives". 
Some expressed anger that they had been made redundant in midde age and 
consequently were not being considered for any new jobs ... 
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"nothing was done by SASDA to find work for the over 50 years 
group of which quite a number were skilled tradesmen with up to 
15 years of working life left." 
A few people complained that there were no 
"gas, electric shops" and that "the shopping centre left a lot 
to be desired ... lots of people travel elsewhere to do their 
shopping- a modern trendy shopping centre is certainly required". 
Shops would 
"save people having to travel to Bishop Auckland to pay bills. 
Offices where people can go and report defects also rent and 
rates office." 
Some comments were more a general statement. 
"Disgusted that the town has again become a depressed area" 
"The closure of the Shildon British Rail Engineerinp; was a 
political decision and not an economical one. 'Something that 
will not be forgiven'." 
Of politicians 
"(!)bundle the lot as adventurers ... just as many adventurers in 
trade unions as there are in politics ... our biggest mistake 
was in not electing a Tory- if we had done so the railway works 
would still be working ... most people don't want any 
responsiblity in making decisions. " 
"The only way to help our town is by restoring people's faith in 
Sedgefield District Council as over the years it has badly 
deteriorated ... " 
About Shildon's future there was, perhaps predictably, mixed feelings. 
"I believe that Shildon is slowly recovering from the tragedy 
of the closure of the railway workshops. People are gradually 
finding other jobs, but in a lot of cases at much reduced wage 
packets." 
"Not enough public money being put into attract new industry" 
"I know if I'd been younger I'd have emigrated. This country 
is slowly beinp; sold off to other countries" 
Finally "Dear Sirs, In my op1n1on, instead of job creation scheme·s, 
and YTS, full time employment should be offered to people with a 
proper wage, and all these surveys people do are of no use to 
Shildon's future at all. Thank you." 
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These then represent the feelings of those who bothered to make a comment. 
The survey can only be seen as an IMPRESSION of the town. It indicates 
what those who bothered to answer think, fair or unfairly, about their 
community. Any conclusions need to be accompanied by much cautious 
qualification. Most surveys can be used to say many things; by the 
judicious juxtaposition of figures all manner of judgements can appear 
validated. We will never know what those who did not respond think about 
the points raised? Perhaps they would have responded to different 
questions? Perhaps not, but enough did respond to allow some tentative 
observations about how Shildon sees itself. 
It is clear, as mentioned above, that most of the respondents (66%) were 
above 45 years of age. This inevitably creates problems when trying to 
assess, for instance, the mobility of the labour force. If the 
preponderance of the respondents are old it is very likely that they will 
be disinclined to move to find work. This group would not, perhaps, view 
innovation or attempts to alter/modify their attitude in the same way as 
someone in a younger age range. They would also probably belong to an 
"extended" family and therefore would have to abandon two sets of relatives 
if they moved to find work. It is interesting, however, to note that 
despite the age bias of the respondents 15% of those answering Question 17 
believed that to find work people must "move to another area". This 
response went across all ages of respondents and could, perhaps, suggest a 
sense in the community that, for some, the town has served its purpose and 
that the future lies elsewhere? 
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The responses to educational standards <Question 6) is also interesting. 
Whilst allowing for the age range it is still worrying that 76% of 
respondents left school at 16. This figure in conjunction with that of 
only 15% staying until 19 might suggest that a significant proportion of 
the townpeople will not be prepared for what might well become a more 
demanding technological future. 
The sense of "powerlessness" noted in the response to Question 13 is 
perhaps not suprising, but that 26% had "no hope for the future" is, 
possibly, a little more alarming. Even allowing for the small response 
<20%) this still suggests that a significant minority of people might be 
suffering some psychological damage. Even if the figure were halved it 
would still record a worrying percentage who could be at risk. 
It is, of course, perfectly possible that the sense of "powerlessness" and 
sense of "no hope" is specifically linked to being made redundant and not 
necessarily an indication of a general emotional state. However, it 
should also be recognised that many people see their work as something 
which gives them their identity. Whether this is regrettable or not is 
not at issue, but that it happens- especially in a small communni ty like 
Shildon- will not make life any easier for the people affected. Remove 
work as part of a person's identity and it is possible to be left with 
someone who is unsure what he or she now is; other than a feeling that they 
are now useless. 
As mentioned above many of the respondents appeared to contradict 
themselves. The very nature of such a questionnaire will inevitably lead 
to over-simplification which, in turn, can create confusion. Most 
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surveys, even those involving interviews, operate around wide margins of 
error. When asked these sorts of questions do people always tell the 
truth? Do they sometimes tell the questioner <or compliler of the 
questionnaire) what they think he or she wants rather than what THEY think. 
Might they not think something different tomorrow? However, allowing for 
the shortcomings- whatever they might be- such surveys do give SOME 
indication of what people are thinking when they write. The very fact 
that four fifths of the people surveyed in Shildon did not bother to 
respond tells us something if only that they are like most people- too 
busy, or preoccupied, to be bothered with abstractions like whether they're 
feeling "powerlessness" or "satisfied". 
Such exercises are necessary, however limited, because they at least begin 
to illuminate whether assumptions about a place, and the people in it, 
might be reasonable or not. Asking questions- and understandinR the 
answers- is always a subtle process, but how else can things be learnt? 
Whether the questionee is a person, a community, or country, does not 
matter, providing the conclusions are placed in an appropriate context and 
their limitations properly understood. The Shildon survey was no more 
than a quick "taking of the temperature". It indicated some things, said 
little about others, but did go some way towards helping understand how the 
town saw itself in the summer of 1988. 
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UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 
SURVEY OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONDIT ION OF SH ILDON UPON THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ECONOMIC BASE 
INSTRUCT IONS 1 
SURVEY ONE 
WOULD YOU BE KIND ENOUGH TO DO THE FOLLOWING 
WHEN ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS 
(1) PLEASE WRITE IN QUESTION ONE WHAT YOUR MAIN 
OCCUPATION WAS OR IS AND THE NUMBER OF YEARS 
IN THAT OCCUPATION 
( 2) PLEASE ''TICK" THE APfROPRIATE BOXES OF YOUR 
CHOICE INrEACH QUESTION 
(3) YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE COMMENTS OF A SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC NATURE ON THE MALAISE AND FtrrURE 
REGENERATION OF SH ILOON TOWN BRIEFLY IN THE 
SPACE BELOWa 
-276-
PLEASE PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION OF YOURSELF: 
PLEASE TICK THE APPROPRIATE BOXa 
1. YOUR OCCUPATION WAS/IS? 
2. THE LENGTH OF TIME YOU HAVE LIVED IN THE AREA? 
3 • THE NUMBER OF CLOSE RELATIVES YOU HAVE LIVING IN THE 
AREA? 
4 • THE AGE BRACKET THAT APPLIES TO YOU 
5. WHEN DID YOU FINISH YOUR EDUCATION ? 
Please include any education courses over 9 month 
duration in your assessment. 
6.,; • DO YOU TAKE AN INTEREST IN THE FOLLOWING ? 
IN WHAT WAY WOULD YOU ATI'EMPT TO REALISE YOUR POTENTIAL 
SO AS TO IMPROVE YOUR SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL POSITION ? 
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UP TO 5 YEARS 
UP TO 1 0 YEARS 
UP TO 20 YEARS 
UP TO 3 0 YEARS 
UP TO 40 YEARS 
UP TO 50 YEARS 
NONE 
UP TO THREE 
UP TO SIX 
18 to 30 
31 to 45 
46 to 65 
65 to 100 
BEFORE 15 
BEFORE 16 
BEFORE 19 
AFTER 21 
POLITICS 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
BEING A MEMBER OF 
GROUP OR PARTY 
A 
FURTHER EDUCATION 
RETRAIN AND 'LEARN 
NEW SKILLS 
WAIT TO SEE WHAT 
DEVELOPS 
SATISFIED 
SEEK BE'rtER CARE 
GUIDANCE 
SEEK BETI'ER IN 
HOUSE TRAINING 
WORK FOR YOURSELF 
WORK FOR YOURSELF 
WITH SUPPORT FROM 
THE COMMUNITY 8 
f 
I 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
2 
3 
4 
2 
3 
8. WHICH rnDUSTRIES HAVE YOU/YOUR PARTNER WORKED nr ~ 
9. IN WHICH lliDUSTIES HAVE YOU/YOUR BARTNER BEEN MADE 
REDUNDANT? 
10,.; HAVE YOU/YOUR PARTNER EVER HELD A POSITION 
TRADE UNION IN THE FOLLOWrnG INDUSTIES? 
WITHrn A 
11 • IIAVE YOU/YOUR PARTNER EVER HELD A POSITION ON THE 
FOLLOWING COUNCILS? 
12. HOW WELL ORGANISED WAS THE OPPOSITION TO THE 
REDUNDANCY/CLOSURE PROGAMME BY THE TRADE UNION 
MOVEMENT? 
13 • . IN WHAT MANNER DID YOU ACCEPT THE REDUNDANCY/ 
CLOSURE PROGRAMME AT THAT TIME? 
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MrnrnG 
CHEMICALS 
TEXTILES 
RAILWAYS 
AGRICULTURE 
PUBLIC SERVICES 
SHOPS/FOOD INDUSTRY 
M~NrnG 
CHEMICALS 
TEXTILES 
RAILWAYS 
AGRICULTURE 
PUBLIC SERVICES 
SHOPS/FOOD INDUSTRY 
MINlliG 
CHEMICALS 
TEXTILES 
RAILWAYS 
AGRICULTURE 
PUBLIC SERVICES 
SHOPS/FOOD INDUSTRY 
PARISH 
DISTRICT 
COUNTY 
STRONG 
MODERATE 
WEAK 
WITH UNDERSTANDlliG 
OF THE FIRMS 
REASONS AND NEED TO 
DO SO 
WITH DEEP RELUCTANCE 
BUT FEELINGS OF 
POWERLESSNESS 
WITH FATALISM AND 
Nar MUCH HOPE FOR 
THE FUTURE 
' 2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
3 
2 
P:T:O: 
14 : WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION DID YOU FIRST RECEIVE 
REDUNDANCY/CLOSURE ? 
15 • DO YOU BELIEVE YOU HAVE ENOUGH SAY m THE DECISIONS 
MADE BY THE FOLWWING BODIES: 
y!-yes N-no Please tick your choice 
:..16 • DO YOU BELIEVE THAT PEOPLE m THE COMMUNITY SHODLD 
17: IN WHICH JOB AREA DO YOU BELIEVE YOUNG PEOPLE WILL 
FIND EMPLOYMENT m SOUTH DURHAM IN THE FtJrURE ? 
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• 
PERSONAL LETI'ER 
T .V: NEWS 
NEWSPAPER 
TRADE UNION MEETING 
VERBALLY FROM 
MANAGEMENT 
BRITISH RAIL 
BRITISH COAL 
SHILDON TOWN COUNCIL 
DURHAM COUNTY COUNCIL 
SEDGEFIELD DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 
CONTROL DECISION-
MAKING 
SHARE DECISION- MAKING 
WITH COUNCILLORS AND 
OFFICIALS 
LEAVE DECISION- MAKING 
TO COUNCILLORS AND 
OFFICIALS 
COMMUNITY VENI'URES 
GOVERNMENT TRAmrnG 
SCHEMES 
SHOPS AND FOODSTORES 
PUBLIC SERVICES 
CIVIL SERVICE I 
DHSS:TAX 
RELIANCE ON COUNCIL TO 
BRING JOBS INTO THE 
MOVING TO ANOTHER AREA 
CHEMICALS 
ELECTRONICS 
WORKING FOR THEMSELVES 
WORKING FOR THEMSELVES 
WITH SUPPORT FROM THE 
COMMUNITY 
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